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This thesis compares the impact of two modes of state-led urbanisation on the livelihoods of 
resettled rural villagers with case studies from Tianjin and Zhejiang. In the ongoing debate 
over the path for rural development and human welfare in China, it is unclear whether to 
integrate the rural area into the urban area or whether to develop the rural economy 
independently. Based on eleven months of fieldwork with resettled villagers in Huaming 
Town (Tianjin), and Dongheng Village, Wusi Village and Qingyanliu Village (Zhejiang), this 
research analyses the two different livelihood patterns generated by the two antithetical 
approaches to rural development, the urban-integration approach and rural indigenous 
development approach. Focusing on villagers’ capabilities, possession of assets and 
activities, this research examines the imbalances in rural resource redistribution at three 
levels, among social groups, between villages and across the rural-urban divide. This 
research shows that the urban-integration approach leads to a livelihood pattern which 
relies on rental income from ownership of properties, leaving unskilled farmers with very 
limited livelihood strategies; in contrast, the rural indigenous development approach creates 
a livelihood pattern with a balanced dependence on labour and ownership income, 
generating a diversified livelihood pattern for resettled farmers. Furthermore, this thesis 
raises deeper structural questions about the driving forces behind the land rights reforms, 
which release the liquidity from the rural farming land. It argues that the structure of 
incentives in the governance system, particularly at the village committee level, plays a key 
role in reorganising and redistributing rural resources; at the same time, having the space 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research background  
During the last 30 years, China has experienced massive urbanisation. The urbanisation rate 
jumped from only 20% in 1990 to over 56% in 2015 and China now has over 100 cities of 
more than one million people (World Bank, 2016). Despite of the rapid urbanisation 
progress, China has no intention of slowing down the pace. 
On 16 March 2014, China’s State Council, the country's cabinet, released the National New 
Type Urbanisation Plan (2014-20). According to the plan, by 2020, 60 percent of the Chinese 
population will be urban residents, while 45 percent of the total population will be residents 
with urban hukou (户口 household registration). The extraordinary urbanisation rate can be 
attributed in part to the existing household registration system in China, which separates the 
entitlement of urban and rural residents such that rural migrants are not entitled to urban 
social welfare even if they work and live in cities. Currently, China's permanent urban 
residents account for 53.6 percent of the total population, while residents with city 
household registration make up only 36 percent of the total population (NDRC, 2016). To 
achieve the goal set in the National New Type Urbanisation Plan, China needs to raise its 
urbanisation rate in terms of permanent urban residents by 1 percentage point each year 
until 2020, and increase the urbanisation rate in terms of residents with city household 
registration by 1.5 percentage points. Therefore, during this period, about 100 million more 
rural people must move to cities. According to figures from the National Bureau of Statistics, 
at present, 260 million migrants are living and working in cities (Xinhua, 2014). 
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China’s new urbanisation plan has five major targets: first, level and quality of urbanisation 
will be improved steadily; second, the layout of urbanization will be optimised; third, the 
pattern of urban development will become more scientific; fourth, living conditions in cities 
will be made harmonious and pleasant; fifth, systems and institutions of urbanisation will be 
continuously improved (National New-Type Urbanisation Plan 2014-20, 2014). With the key 
aspects of the new plan, including people, land and funds, as well as the long terms goal of 
changing the urban-rural dual structure, it is clear that the focus of the new urbanisation 
plan is on urban development, including its layout, systems, and mechanisms. The approach 
to development chosen by the central state is to integrate less developed areas into more 
developed areas, as part of the existing programme of of “Building a New Socialist 
Countryside” (NSC) (jianshe shehuizhuyi xin nongcun, 建设社会主义新农村), a state 
priority since 2006. This strategy has raised intensive debate in which an opposing “New 
Rural Reconstruction” (NRR) (xin xiangcun jianshe, 新乡村建设) school of scholars, headed 
by Wen Tiejun, the dean of Renmin University, argues that integrating rural areas into urban 
areas puts the economically weaker rural area into a vulnerable position. Instead, according 
to Wen, the right path for rural development is limiting integration between rural and urban 
areas (Bloomberg, 2014). 
Aside from the debate over these two approaches to state-led urbanisation, there seems to 
be a missing group in the policy. One specific point addressed by China’s Vice Minister of 
Human Resources and Social Security, Yang Zhiming, is the rural-urban migrants: "We must 
make sure they are employed when they move into the cities, have training before they are 
employed and get paid for their jobs" (Bloomberg, 2014). The quotation from Zhang’s 
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speech highlights that the Chinese central state’s intentions with the new plan including 
migrants’ access to employment, labour rights and interests, the development of their 
technical abilities, as well as their integration into enterprises, their children’s integration 
into schools, their families into communities and the integration of their group as a whole 
into urban society.  
However, given the large scale of the new urbanisation plan, many of those who move into 
cities will not be voluntary rural migrants but resettled farmers, the majority of whom did 
not choose to settle down in the city but moved by the state during the urbanisation of rural 
areas and the expansion of cities. Based on statistics from Chinese Academy of Social 
Science, there are 40 to 50 million landless farmers, making an important and sizeable group 
(Diplomat, 2013). Neglected by both state development pronouncements and by the 
existing academic literature, which focuses overwhelmingly on those who choose to migrate 
to the cities for work, these farmers often have neither urban skill-sets nor urban-related 
work experience. Given the considerable differences between urban and rural life in China, 
it remains unclear whether this population group is able to adapt to the urban lifestyle and 
makes a sustainable living in the city. Also, according to the state’s plan, those moved to the 
city are supposed to benefit from the improved urban living conditions, but two related 
questions remain unanswered: first, whether the resettled farmers is able to obtain 
sufficient, sustainable incomes to support themselves; second, how they perceive 
themselves after resettlement and what are the implications for social stratification of the 
new urban communities.  
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1.2 Research question  
Therefore, the main question this thesis seeks to answer is: What are the impacts of two 
different approaches to state-led urbanisation on the livelihoods of resettled rural farmers? 
The two approaches are, first, the NSC approach of developing the rural area by integrating 
it into the urban area, of which one example is the large-scale resettlement in Tianjin; and, 
second, the NRR approach of developing the countryside by investing in rural industries and 
rural areas, one example of which is the eco-economy in Zhejiang. This research conducts a 
comparative study of two Chinese provinces, Tianjin and Zhejiang, to examine the impact of 
rural development and urban expansion on the most vulnerable groups, rural farmers and 
their livelihoods. This also implies answering a range of secondary empirical and theoretical 
questions raised by the literature, which can help with formulating an answer. Specifically: 
first, who are the winners and losers in terms of post-resettlement livelihoods in each case 
study village? Second, what are the factors that affect and shape the post-resettlement 
outcomes in each village? Third, what are the drivers that formulate the factors and 
mechanisms affecting resettled villagers’ livelihoods? Fourth, what is the impact of the 
changing pattern of means of living on resettled rural farmers’ perception of their social 
status and the social stratification of their communities? The answers to these questions 
about the results of state-led urbanisation in the Chinese context relate to much broader 
questions about the nature of development in general, in terms of the intended targets of 
state development projects, and whether they should aim to benefit specifically the weakest 
social groups, for example poor farmers with no other skills, or if they should aim more 
generally at enhancing the economic development of the target area. 
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The focus of this research is Chinese farmers who were located in villages that underwent 
state-led urbanisation, under NSC and NRR modes to state-led urbanisation, based on 11 
months of qualitative fieldwork conducted in four former and current villages in Tianjin and 
Zhejiang, . The majority of farmers interviewed were relocated from rural housing to a 
resettlement community, in either the rural or urban area. Depending on the sites, other 
interviewees also included villagers who were located in the fieldwork villages but not 
involved in the resettlement process. The thesis explicitly compares the NSC and NRR 
approaches throughout. The NSC approach was promulgated in the 11th Five-Year Plan 
(2016-2020) by the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao administration, aiming to modernise the 
countryside through marketisation, and is the official approach to state-led urbanisation 
established by the central state. In contrast, the NRR approach is embodied in the social 
movement “New Rural Reconstruction”, arguing that rural development should be based on 
limiting marketisation. The division is complicated by the fact that, without a formal policy 
guideline, some local states practice the NRR approach under the cover of the NSC 
approach.  
The purpose of comparing the two modes of state intervention is to understand the 
relationship between the mode of state intervention and the implications on the livelihoods 
of different social groups. Given my interest in questions of livelihoods and development, I 
approach this topic through two bodies of literature that speak to these issues. The first is 
the sustainable rural livelihoods framework, much used in studies of agricultural 
development, which analyses farmers’ livelihoods from the perspective of capabilities, 
possession of assets and activities in obtaining income. The advantage of using this 
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sustainable rural livelihood framework in this research is that it embodies no prior 
requirement for the poor rural individual or family to be a ‘small farmer’, but takes an open-
ended view of the combination of assets and activities that turn out to constitute a viable 
livelihood. The second area, development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) 
and in particular Michael Cernea’s Impoverishment, Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model, is 
less a body of literature than a set of frameworks for empirical research, which addresses 
risks, stresses and shocks that emerge in the rural development process, focusing 
particularly on the role of state intervention in causing and tackling the risks, stresses and 
shocks.  
As I will argue in the literature review that follows, the sustainable rural livelihood 
framework proves to be insufficient to capture all the complexities of the state-led 
urbanisation cases in China. Notwithstanding its useful insights about the livelihoods 
composition in rural area, the framework gives little weight to the formation process of 
livelihood components. In this regard, the development-induced displacement and 
resettlement (DIDR) approach and Michael Cernea’s Impoverishment, Risks and 
Reconstruction (IRR) model offer the missing perspective of state intervention. However, 
these suffer their own problems. For example, the frameworks are not designed for 
urbanisation-induced development and resettlement per se and therefore require 
significant adaptation. 
Both approaches encounter difficulties when applied to the context of the transitioning 
villages in China, particularly when it comes to study the implications of different state 
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approaches in the transitioning villages. During state-led urbanisation, some villages are 
resettled to the urban area while others remain in the countryside. For either of the 
scenarios, the context of livelihoods, and the key institutional mechanism, like labour 
market, land policies and village layout, are conditioned to change. It is the villagers’ losses 
and gains of livelihood resources during the transition period, along with the further state-
intervention after transition, that shape the livelihoods of resettled villagers in state-led 
urbanisation. Therefore, it is imperative to address how farmers’ livelihoods are shaped the 
transforming institutional mechanisms, and how the latter is shaped by different approaches 
of state intervention. The complicated, multi-faceted and subtle differences between 
different state intervention approaches, which often happen during different stages of 
development, cannot be fully captured by frameworks generated to analyse the 
consequences of a single development event at a particular time point. 
The insufficiency of usingthe sustainable rural livelihood framework or development 
frameworks alone in addressing the implications of state intervention on farmers’ 
livelihoods in China, then, suggests that a combined approach might be needed to answer 
my research question. In light of these considerations, this research uses both the 
sustainable livelihoods framework and theoretical work on development-induced 
displacement and resettlement (DIDR), including Michael Cernea’s Impoverishment, Risks 
and Reconstruction (IRR) model, in analysing the implementation of state intervention on 
livelihoods. By connecting the livelihood components to the specific mechanisms that 
accommodate them, for example the labour market, land-related policies and individual 
identity, this research identifies how livelihoods are shaped by institutional mechanisms that 
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are in transition; by connecting state interventions to those critical institutional mechanisms, 
this research further explains why the key institutional mechanisms transform in their 
peculiar ways, and thus explores the role of the state intervention in shaping the livelihoods 
of resettled farmers.  
My reflection on the literature, analysed in Chapters 2 and 3, guided my choice of methods 
and the general direction of interviews. During my fieldwork it became clear that some 
questions were more important to my respondents than others, and that a comparison 
between villages in Zhejiang would illustrate the NRR model in a more thorough manner 
than a simple assessment of one village. Acknowledging suggestions from the interviewees, I 
therefore explored two additional villages in Zhejiang. Additionally, in both the interviews 
themselves and in the way I have analysed and presented my findings, I have focused on 
reflecting the similarities and differences between development models within the NRR 
approach as well as between NRR and NSC approaches. Particularly, I compare different 
social groups within one village, and compare the same social groups across villages in the 
same mode of state intervention, then between the different modes of state intervention in 
Tianjin and Zhejiang.  
As indicated above, the analysis is at various levels including individual, household and 
village, thus the effects on social stratification are given prominence in Chapter 2, Chapter 6 
and Chapter 8. Similarly, In Chapters 6 and 8 the effects of the transformation of the labour 
market and land-related policies on the livelihoods of resettled farmers in my case studies is 
discussed at length. 
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To explore further the driving forces behind the changing labour market, land related 
policies, Chapters 5 and 7 focus on the roles of local states, particularly the village 
committees, in shaping these mechanisms. The decision to explore the role of village 
committees through these specific lenses was based on their evident salience for residents. 
As the village committee itself is also a mechanism shaping redevelopment outcomes, 
Chapters 5 and 7 also discuss the cadre incentive system and its effects on the local state 
organisation structure. 
In speaking to resettled farmers about their personal experiences of the urbanisation 
process, it became clear that questions of their changed perception of their own identity 
could not be left out of the analysis. Pursuing these lines of enquiry opened up fascinating 
new terrains of discussion, including questions of how the village layout, boundaries and 
redistribution of assets shape resettled people’s self-perception. This helps us understand 
the changing class structure in China, and why rural social groups behave the way they do. 
To further this discussion, the empirical Chapters 6 and 8 also focus on how the 
resettlement process affect group behaviours and the social class structure in China.  
A final concern relates to my position within the research process. As a native Mandarin 
speaker, I could understand the language spoken by interviewees. Nevertheless, as an 
outsider of the rural communities where I carried out the research, and the relatively short 
period of time spent in the supplementary Zhejiang villages of Wusi and Qingyanliu, my 
observations and interpretations of the conversations are unavoidably lacking in the 
nuanced cultural expertise that a person with rural origins would have understood. As for 
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my urban background and educational position, initially it was a challenge for me to identify 
the topics and use the language familiar to local villagers in their daily conversation. I tackled 
that challenge by initiating small talks with villagers and outside research interaction. I can 
only hope that any deficiencies are compensated for by one advantage an outsider of a 
community has; that is, a certain distance which allows me to make observations from a 
comparative perspective. Beyond this all I can offer are my fascination with the topic of rural 
development, a determination to understand the dynamics that drive it and the lives of the 
resettled farmers, and a desire to represent the words of my respondents as I believe they 
were intended.  
 
1.3 Contribution to knowledge 
The thesis’s original contribution to scholarship is considerable, which lies in fourfold: 
empirical literature, conceptual understanding, methodology the theoretical framework. 
First, this thesis augments empirical literature on China’s urbanisation process by 
investigating an important but systematically understudied aspect of China’s rapid 
urbanisation, the implications for livelihoods of displaced farmers and the livelihood in 
transition. This under-researched area is also policy relevance at local, national and global 
scales.   
Second, at conceptual level, this thesis innovatively combines the theoretical insights of the 
sustainable livelihoods framework with the development-induced displacement and 
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resettlement, as well as impoverishment, risks and reconstruction models. Furthermore, this 
study represents the first attempt to apply this mutually complementary and sophisticated 
framework to analysing the specificities and complexities of China’s rural and urban 
development contexts, as well as the interplay of multiple social dynamics related to 
livelihood sustainability and security of the resettled villagers. This not only expands the 
scope for discussion on urbanisation in China, but also the global development process.  
Third, methodologically, this thesis is the first attempt to formulate a comparative case 
study method comparing and contrasting, as well as identifying commonalities and 
differences, strengths and weaknesses of two major urbanisation-driven development 
paradigms, i.e. the “Building the New Socialist Countryside” programme (termed as the 
“urban-integration approach”), and the “New Rural Reconstruction” initiative (termed as the 
“rural indigenous development approach”) through protracted in-depth ethnographic field 
studies conducted in North and Southeast China (Tianjin and Zhejiang). The comparison 
between two development modes unveils the linkage between governance and individuals’ 
livelihoods.  
Fourth, this research broadens the theoretical framework by incorporating an overlooked 
dimension of governance through investigating the role of local states, in particular the 
village committee, in policy implementation, adaptation to local conditions and its dealings 
with other actors below (e.g. villagers) and above (e.g. upper-level authorities) in the 
process of displacement, resettlement, negotiations, rural/urban change and 
transformations. The thesis argues that on the one hand, the incentive structure of the 
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governance system has played a central role in reorganising and reallocating rural resources 
(the NSC model), while on the other, allowing space and capacity for village initiatives is 
crucial for the success of the rural development programme (the NRR model). 
 
1.4 Thesis structure  
Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical literature on the livelihoods framework and on social class 
for use in the empirical chapters which follow. It begins with a brief overview of the 
livelihoods framework and assessment of its strengths and weaknesses, situating my 
research with this theoretical framework. Then it moves to discuss the elements in the 
livelihood framework – capabilities, possession of assets and activities – as well as their 
characteristics and relations to each other, while highlighting livelihood stresses and shocks, 
as well as livelihood risks from the IRR approach. To understand what the impacts on 
individual and household livelihoods means for social groups and communities, particularly 
in the Chinese context, the second part of the chapter examines the development of social 
class in China with supplementary class theories based on western countries. The chapter 
ends by introducing the existing class structure in China, and the new social relations shaped 
by the state-led urbanisation, before the next chapter discusses the institutional 
mechanisms that shape livelihood components. This chapter provides an overarching 
theoretical foundation for empirical chapters 6 (on Tianjin) and 8 (on Zhejiang), which focus 
on how the resettlement process affect group behaviours and the social class structure in 
China. 
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Chapter 3 critically reviews the empirical literature on state-led urbanisation, including the 
generation of stress and shock under different modes of state interventions, as well as how 
they affect displaced people’s strategies of coping with risks and restoring their livelihoods. 
It provides essential theoretical and empirical backgrounds for Chapter 5 (on Tianjin) and 
Chapter 7 (on Zhejiang), which compare the formulation of stress and shock with different 
styles of state intervention. In response, Chapter 6 (Tianjin) and Chapter 8 (Zhejiang) 
examine the reaction and coping strategies of resettled farmers. This chapter starts with the 
existing literature on state-led urbanisation, comparing different approaches to it and how 
the state in each approach engages with the rural development process. The second part of 
the chapter discusses the generation of stress and shock in the livelihood components – 
capabilities, assets and activities, focusing on how these are generated during the transition 
of the labour market, land ownership rights and the residential built environment. The last 
part of the chapter examines the motivation behind state interventions, particularly at 
village level, including the cadre promotion system at local state level.  
Chapter 4 outlines the methodological approach I adopt to address the research questions, 
providing a detailed account of the research design and processes of data collection and 
analysis. This includes backgrounds of case study villages, justifications for the choice of 
fieldwork sites, access and engagement to interviewees, and data interpretation of the 
integrated used of qualitative and quantitative data. It is followed by a discussion on the 
subjectivity of the interviewer in the researcher-respondent relationship and other practical 
challenges faced during the fieldwork. The final section presents a critical analysis of case-
based research and outlines my strategy for comparative analysis.  
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Chapter 5 focuses on the role of the state in the NSC approach to state urbanisation in 
Huaming town, Tianjin, paying special attention to the actions of local states at various 
levels. It analyses the existence, motivation, behaviour and implications of state intervention 
during state-led urbanisation. This chapter applies the development-induced displacement 
and resettlement (DIDR) framework to analyse shock; in terms of risks, this chapter utilises 
Cernea’s impoverishment, risks and reconstruction (IRR) framework to the case of state-led 
urbanisation in Tianjin municipality. It examines the general risks mentioned in the 
framework in the context of urban resettlement communities; at the same time, it 
summarises the new risks, livelihood disruptions, stresses and shocks that are specific to the 
Chinese rural context as well as the ones that are unique to the NSC approach, followed by 
the description of the transition of the market mechanisms and analysis of how they affect 
the livelihoods of individual farmers and households.  
Chapter 6 examines implications for the livelihoods of individuals and households with the 
NSC approach to state-led urbanisation process in Huaming town, Tianjin. It considers three 
inter-related questions: first, how individuals and households are affected by state-led 
urbanisation; second, the responses and strategies of individuals and households in 
overcoming the livelihoods threats; third, the effects of resettlement on the perception of 
resettled villagers, in terms of their self-perception, identity and fairness. To understand the 
livelihoods of resettled farmers under the NSC model fully, this chapter discusses how 
different social groups are affected by the transformation of each of their livelihood 
components. The first part of the chapter identifies the gains and losses of livelihood 
resources, followed by a discussion on the existing and new ways in which resettled 
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villagers’ possess or lack capabilities to act on the new dynamics of the allocation and 
redistribution of assets. Along with the new redistribution of resources and the response 
from villagers, it also examines whether new types of social stratification are an implication 
of the post-resettlement livelihoods under the NSC approach to state-led urbanisation in 
Huaming town in Tianjin.  
Parallel to Chapter 5 on Tianjin, Chapter 7 discusses the role of the state in the NRR 
approach to state urbanisation in Dongheng, Wusi and Qingyanliu villages in Zhejiang 
Province, paying special attention to the actions of local states at various levels, and 
analysing the existence, motivation, behaviour and implications of state intervention. Both 
this chapter and the next focus on Zhejiang and the NRR approach to state-led urbanisation, 
in comparison to the study of Tianjin and the NSC approach in Chapters 5 and 6. This chapter 
argues that state intervention during the process has considerable impact on the livelihoods 
of villagers, especially interventions from different levels of the local states. Compared to 
the livelihood risks, shocks and stresses of the NSC model, where state intervention and the 
activities of resettled villagers did not effectively eliminate the threats, this chapter 
discusses whether there is a similar set of livelihood risks, shocks and stresses in the NRR 
approach, and whether the state intervention and villager activities serves to mitigate or 
increase the risks and threats to livelihoods.  
Parallel to Chapter 6 on Tianjin, Chapter 8 explores implications on for the livelihoods of 
individuals and households under the NRR approach in Zhejiang. It considers three inter-
related questions: first, how the individuals and households are affected by the state-led 
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urbanisation process; second, the responses and strategies of individuals and households in 
overcoming the livelihoods threats; third, the effects of resettlement on the perception of 
resettled villagers, in terms of their self-perception, identity and fairness. To understand the 
livelihoods of resettled farmers under the NRR model fully, this chapter discusses how 
different social groups are affected by the transformation of each of their livelihood 
components. The first part of the chapter identifies the gains and losses of livelihood 
resources. Then the chapter moves on to examine the existing and new ways in which 
resettled villagers’ possess or lack capabilities to act on the new dynamics of the allocation 
and redistribution of assets, along with the various patterns of activities and strategies that 
resettled villagers used in response to different livelihoods implications. It also examines 
whether new types of social stratification are an implication of the post-resettlement 
livelihoods under the NRR approach to state-led urbanisation, and compares the Zhejiang 
cases to Huaming town in Tianjin. 
Chapter 9 draws together the key findings from the four previous chapters, to highlight 
similarities and differences between and within the NSC and NRR approaches in Tianjin and 
Zhejiang, as well as to suggest the broader implications of my research for Chinese 
urbanisation and for global issues in development. This final chapter reviews the livelihoods 
of different social groups with the NSC and NRR approaches, analysing who is better or 
worse off and connects this to the behaviours of different levels of local states. The first part 
of the chapter summarises the key findings on livelihoods of social groups in Tianjin and 
Zhejiang respectively; the second part compares the same social groups across Tianjin and 
Zhejiang to reveal the role of the village committee and the organisation of the local states 
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in eliminating livelihood risks and creating sustainable livelihoods; the last part focuses on 
the limitation of this research, as well as broader implications of this research in 
development studies, rural-urban studies and for future research. It concludes with a 














Chapter 2 Livelihoods and Social Class in China: a critical review of the literature  
2.1 Introduction 
In order to understand the implications of different styles of state intervention on 
livelihoods, this research combines the rural sustainable livelihoods framework and two 
related development frameworks, development-induced displacement and resettlement 
(DIDR) and the risks and reconstruction model (IRR). This chapter reviews the first part of 
the theoretical literature, that of livelihood framework and social class where the 
displacement frameworks will be examined in the next chapter. The discussion on 
sustainable rural livelihood framework offers important insights into understanding the 
composition of individuals’ and households’ livelihoods. Concerning the implications for 
livelihoods, this chapter considers three inter-related questions: first, how individuals and 
households are affected by the state-led urbanisation process; second, the responses and 
strategies of individuals and households in overcoming livelihoods threats; third, the effects 
of resettlement on the perception of villagers, in terms of their self-perception, identity and 
fairness of resources redistribution.  
The first part of this chapter examines the benefits and critiques of using the livelihood 
framework in analysing the development related issues. It assesses the strength and 
weakness of the framework, as well as its connection to the specific topic of my research. 
While acknowledging this important contribution, this chapter argues that in the 
contemporary Chinese rural development various other contextual factors must also be 
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taken into account, including how the livelihood risks, stresses and shocks are created in a 
context of transition, for example in a rural development and state-led urbanisation process.  
The second part of the chapter turns to components in the livelihood framework, including 
capabilities, possession of assets and activities, in particular their characteristics and relation 
to each other, which highlights the dimensions and unique features of the components. 
Although the sustainable rural livelihood framework provides an open-ended framework for 
this research to understand a group of resettled farmers with various backgrounds, the 
framework does not deepen the discussion on the formation of the livelihood components 
particularly in a transitional context with risks, stresses and shocks and the implications of 
state intervention. To further this discussion, the next chapter will discuss how the livelihood 
components are shaped based on the new layout of the residential community, labour 
market, land rights, governance system and the resources redistribution mechanisms.  
Before moving on to the implications for social groups and communities, this chapter 
discusses livelihood sustainability, which looks at individuals’ ability to cope with the stress 
and shock generated in the transition of the livelihood setting, subjected to the set of 
opportunities and constraints. The last part of the chapter attempts to understand what the 
impacts on individual and household livelihood means to the establishment of social groups 
and communities, particularly in the Chinese context, examining social class in China as well 
as supplementary class theories derived from western countries.  
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2.2 Livelihood framework and rural development   
The sustainable rural livelihoods approach is rooted in rural development thinking. The 
starting point for this discussion is small-farm focus, which became the focal point of rural 
development in the early to mid-1960s, and asserted the central role of agricultural 
productivity in economic growth where small farmers are rational economic agents (Schultz, 
1964; Mellor, 1966). The small-farm approach placed agricultural growth in a central place 
as the condition for non-farm economy growth and poverty alleviation (Singh, 1990). This is 
the so called “rural growth linkages” (Delgado et al., 1998). After the continuing 
development of the small-farm approach in the 1970s, evolution of market liberalisation in 
the 1980s and development of process, participation, empowerment and actor approaches 
in the 1980s and 1990s, the sustainable rural livelihoods approach became a mainstream 
framework in rural development thinking (Ellis & Biggs, 2001). The sustainable livelihoods 
framework is a bottom-up framework, in line with the paradigm shift in rural development 
theories during the 1980s and 1990s from the market liberalisation to participation and 
actor approaches.  
The major scholars who developed the livelihood framework include Chambers & Conway, 
1992; Ellis, 1998; Carney, 1998, Scoones, 1998 and De Haan, 2000. The definition and a 
diagram (See Diagram 2.1 below) of a sustainable livelihood is given by Chambers & Conway 
(1992: 6):   
 “A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and 
activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and 
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recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not 
undermining the natural resource base.” 
Diagram 2.1: Components and flows in a livelihood  
 
(Source: Chambers & Conway, 1992) 
One key strength of the livelihoods approach for my project is its inclusiveness of villagers 
who work in the non-farm sectors or who are unemployed. Focusing on how capabilities, 
assets and activities constitute sustaining livelihoods, the sustainable rural livelihoods 
approach does not require the rural individuals to participate in small-scale farming 
activities. Based on empirical research conducted in South Asia and Africa, it is suggested 
that only around 50% of rural livelihood income comes from farming-related activities, while 
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the income rural individuals obtain from urban areas plays an important role in their 
household income, including remittances and transfers (Reardon, 1997). 
In state-led urbanisation, villagers involved in the process are not necessarily small farmers. 
For villages located adjacent to the urban area, there might be a large portion participating 
in the urban labour market even before resettlement. In state-led urbanisation projects 
where rural villagers are resettled to the urban area, they would have no more farm income; 
even if still located in the rural area, the income sources of rural villagers might change 
according to the new rural economy and the methods of resource redistribution. As a result, 
compared to the small farm approach in rural development, the sustainable rural livelihood 
approach provides a valuable analytical tool for understanding the livelihoods of resettled 
farmers during rural development and transformation process in this research. 
However, to be of use the sustainable rural livelihood approach must be placed firmly in 
context. A livelihoods framework is an approach to analysing rural development that 
concentrates on the relationship between livelihood resources “input”, “output” and 
livelihood “outcome”. Input includes the livelihood resource and context. The input goes 
through the institutional process and comes out in individuals’ livelihood strategies as 
outputs, which create sustainable livelihood outcomes. While the three steps in the 
framework are usually used by economists as a checklist to address implications from the 
economic perspective, the social and broader implications are often neglected; furthermore, 
a nuanced analysis of the livelihood components is often unaddressed, for example the 
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formation of assets and the social-political processes in linking inputs and outputs, as well as 
outcomes (Scoones, 1998). 
A diagram from Scoones clearly shows the factors that affect individual and household’s 
livelihoods, as well as the relationship between them: 
Diagram 2.2: Sustainable rural livelihoods: a framework for analysis  
 
(Source: Scoones, 1998) 
This research attempts to address the issues highlighted above. Rather than using the 
framework as a checklist, this research focuses on the social and political context as often 
neglected in the framework, and understands the role of governance in shaping the 
livelihood components, like assets, as well as the role of governance in formatting the 
linkages between livelihood inputs, outputs and outcomes.  
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When it comes to the hierarchical levels of livelihood, the livelihood is based at the 
household level in Chambers & Conway’s (1992) work. Nevertheless, it is important to shed 
light on the other levels, including individual, intra-household, social group and community. 
For example, within a household, livelihood may be conditioned by gender and generation 
of individual household members, as well as their strategies (Beall, 2002). Particularly at the 
individual level, livelihoods of women and children might be inferior to that of male 
members because women are more likely to work in the less regulated and lower paid 
sectors than men (Chambers & Conway, 1992; De Haan, 2000). Resettlement and 
development might create the opportunity to change the functionality of members in a 
household, where there is a possibility of the empowerment of women and the raising 
livelihood for women; conversely, the process could also go to the other direction where 
women or other members of the family suffer. This research examines these issues in detail 
in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.  
Other strengths of the livelihood framework include: first, its inter-disciplinary nature, which 
provides multiple perspectives for development challenges (Scoones, 1998). Second, an 
advantage of the livelihood perspective is its diversity (Scoones, 1998). As rural development 
is a socio-economic project, it is highly contingent on the local context, the specific set of 
policies at the place, as well as the relation of the place to its neighbours. Third, the 
livelihood framework provides a bottom-up perspective, which allows researchers to 
understand individuals’ own livelihood strategies as an active actor rather than a passive 
receiver of policies (Bebbington, 1999). In addition, by depicting the living experience of 
rural individuals, the livelihood framework also reflects an account of subjective experience, 
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in terms of their self-perception of identity and satisfactions of the experience, along with 
their material livelihood struggles (Chambers, 1989; Ellis & Biggs, 2001).  
When it comes to the drawbacks of the livelihoods framework, an important aspect is the 
absence of the role of governance in shaping livelihoods. Governance could be reflected in 
the change of context, livelihood resources and institutions, and the lack of emphasis of 
governance in the framework compromises its effectiveness for interpreting the implications 
of rural developments on livelihoods. As Scoones (2009) suggests, central concerns about 
the efficiency of the framework include “power, politics and social difference – and the 
governance implications of these” (Scoones and Wolmer 2003, 180). Specifically, in the 
livelihoods framework, the discussion on livelihood is disconnected from that of governance, 
resulting in omitting attention to issues of power and politics. One consequence of 
neglecting the role of governance is a possible shifting of responsibilities and blame to 
individuals. Impoverished rural individuals, at times the victims of rural development 
programmes, may be blamed for their incapability to gain a sustainable livelihood. The lack 
of accuracy in identifying the source of development failures and poverty often results in a 
poverty reduction agenda which is entirely focused on economics, ignoring social impacts 
(Scoones, 2009). 
With this limitation of the livelihoods framework in mind, my research mitigates the 
problem by drawing attention to governance, power and political issues. In particular, this 
research compares the implications of different mode of governance on individuals’ 
livelihoods to gain a better understanding of the role of governance. This research is tailored 
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to the Chinese context and compares the subtle difference between the impacts on farmers’ 
livelihoods under the different styles of state intervention. Furthermore, this research fills an 
important gap in the livelihoods literature by addressing one of the key critiques of the 
livelihoods framework and rebuilding the connection between livelihoods and governance.  
A further deficiency of the sustainable rural livelihoods framework is that it is unable to 
capture future livelihoods, particularly shifts in the rural economies and agricultural sector 
(Scoones, 2009). Moreover, Satterthwaite & Tacoli (2002) argue that because the livelihoods 
framework has been developed based on a rural context, considering different vulnerability 
contexts and the kind of shock and stress generated in different backgrounds, the usefulness 
of the livelihood framework in the urban context remains ambiguous. This is particularly 
acute when the new urban context and new rural context suggest new livelihood 
components that were non-existent in the previous rural context. By using a livelihood 
framework only where the context is regarded as consistent and stable, the dynamics and 
changes of livelihood context alongside transition is often neglected, which causes failure in 
capturing the pragmatic composition of rural individuals’ livelihood income.  
To address the lack of attention to future livelihoods, this research assesses the possible 
future sustainability of resettled villagers’ livelihoods when comparing the transitions in 
Tianjin and Zhejiang. In addition, by studying the state planning and intervention in the post-
resettlement period in each case study village, my research aims to find out the impacts of 
the resettlement processes on the immediate and medium-term livelihoods of (former) 
farmers.  
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2.3 Livelihood component 1 - Capabilities 
In the three components of livelihoods as stated above, the capabilities factor can be 
understood in both material and non-material ways (Chambers 1989). Capability is the 
ability of a person to pursue or be certain things that are valuable to them, given their 
personal background, socio-economic status etc (Sen, 1997). It is important to note the 
condition of capability where the ability of a person to pursue things of value is based on 
their existing socio-economic circumstances. Based on this concept, we might assume that, 
given an equal amount of new resources and placed in the same context, individuals from 
different social and economic backgrounds with different personal experiences would have 
different capabilities of making a living, or of obtaining income in the rural development 
context.  
Capabilities have three dimensions: the well-being and freedom of people; their economic 
production capacity; and the ability of individuals to bring social change (Sen, 1987). In the 
context of rural development, on one hand, capabilities measure people’s ability to gain 
employment and income, from the economic perspective; on the other hand, capabilities 
concern the wellbeing of people and their state of living, for example their self-perception, 
identity, satisfaction and exclusion. 
The economic perspective of human capability is related to the concept of human capital, 
where human beings function as labour in the productive process, with little difference from 
other physical productive forces like capital or land. However, the concept of human 
capability is broader than the concept of human capital. In addition to depicting the role of 
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human in productive activities as creating value through their skills, knowledge and effort, 
equivalent to physical capital in production, the concept of human capability also addresses 
whether the individual has a choice to value things that have meaning to them (Sen, 1997). 
With this distinction in mind, we might assume that under equal circumstances, individuals 
from different social and economic background with different personal experiences would 
also have different capacities to make choices to lead a live they value.  
The difference between human capability and the economically-focused human capital also 
suggests the broader instrumental role of capability in bringing social change, which makes 
up the third dimension of the concept of capability. From the social perspective, capabilities 
are individuals’ ability to question, voice, challenge policies in development and be the 
agents of change (Sen, 1997).  
Chambers & Conway (1992) expand Sen’s account of “capability” further to include the 
ability of coping with stress and shock, and the ability of seizing and using livelihood 
opportunities. This is not restricted to reacting to adverse changes of livelihood conditions, 
but concerns gaining “access” and making “claims” over tangible and intangible resources. 
Individuals’ strategies in dealing with shock and stress will be discussed in the sustainability 
section in this chapter. This part of “capability” is tightly related to the concept of “assets”, 
explained in detail in the following section.  
In a resettlement and transition process, such as that in my case studies of rural 
redevelopment in Tianjin and Zhejiang, we might expect changes in the livelihood setting in 
the resettlement community. As the rural residents’ existing capabilities have been 
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developed to make a living in the previous rural community and working environment, the 
changing environment poses challenges to the balance between individuals’ sets of 
capabilities and the new living environment.  
During the resettlement in Tianjin and Zhejiang, we might expect to see different groups of 
resettled farmers face different challenges, with various degrees of abilities to cope with 
shock and disruption of livelihoods. Policy measures which aim to tackle a certain type of 
shock in one social group may not benefit other social groups. Particularly in the case of 
rural-urban transition, the transformation of the labour market and the shift of dominant 
industries are likely to create significant change regarding the requirement of labours’ skill 
sets. We might expect to find resettled farmers, on the one hand, facing shock and 
disruption of livelihoods; and, on the other hand, creating new access and making new 
claims over previous or re-organised resources. However, what is less clear is whether 
resettled people use the same strategies in the two sites, despite the very different models 
of redevelopment, or whether their strategies are different contingent on the livelihood 
conditions as a result of various resettlement procedures. 
 
2.4 Livelihood component 2 - Assets  
As one of the three livelihood components, the concept of “assets” is closely related to the 
other two components. It is also the most complicated dimension, and it is also where 
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different scholars developed various categories for it. The major two approaches to 
livelihood assets are from the work of Chambers & Conway (1992) and Scoones (1998). 
In Chambers & Conway’s (1992) sustainable livelihoods framework, they expand Swift’s 
(1989) classes of asset from “investments”, “stores” and “claims” to “tangible” and 
“intangible”, where tangible assets include resources and stores, and intangible assets are 
composed of claims and access. Stores include food, manufactured goods and financial 
materials, while resources consist of natural resources, farming tools and domestic facilities 
(Chambers & Conway, 1992). On the intangible side, the aim of claims is to obtain additional 
material or moral support during times of stress or shock (Chambers & Conway, 1992). The 
activists who make claims vary across individuals, agencies, social groups and communities 
(Chambers & Conway, 1992). Lastly, the concept of “access” covers two aspects. First, it 
assesses whether individuals have the opportunity of using resources and stores in real life; 
second, it is about individuals’ chances of gaining information, techniques, income-
generating activities, and rights to common property resources, food or income (Chambers 
& Conway, 1992). 
As Chambers & Conway (1992) point out, displacees are more likely to make claims under 
circumstances of shock and stress than when they are not under these circumstances. We 
might expect shock and stress to be created at different stages of the resettlement process. 
If we consider the process of resource reallocation during resettlement, there are three 
stages: first, assessing the original rural resources at individual level and village level; 
second, reorganising resources at village level and re-collecting resources from the 
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individual level; third, redistributing resources to the individual level. Using stage three as an 
example, there are two possibilities for unequal distribution of resource via “claims” and 
“access”. First, the recollected and reorganised resources at village level may be divided into 
unequal shares for different households. Second, the reorganised resources may be divided 
into equal shares; however, different households have different access to these resources 
and the chances for individuals and households to make claims might vary. It is also possible 
that both of the above two scenarios exist at the same time. In Chapters 6 and 8, I carefully 
examine the above scenarios in the context of my two case study sites, and compare and 
contrast the circumstances in Tianjin and Zhejiang.  
However, in Chambers & Conway’s (1992) work, access to the intangible is not clearly 
pointed out. The access to intangible assets is particularly important in a transitional context 
because this is when hidden intangible assets may fail to be exchanged for new forms of 
resources in the new context. For the purposes of this thesis, the key question is how 
“access” to resources and chances changes in different livelihood contexts, for example from 
the rural context to the urban context.  
One example is land. In the extensive literature on spontaneous urbanisation in China, 
where rural migrants move to urban areas to work, land serves as a form of unemployment 
insurance, where migrants can return when laid off from the urban labour sector, or on 
becoming ill, retired, or deciding to start their own business at home. On the other hand, for 
the “left-behind” (typically the young, elderly and female farmers), it is a space for them to 
provide food for the household in a self-sufficient manner (Biao, 2007). Therefore, apart 
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from the tangible productivity function of farm land, it also embodies unemployment 
insurance, health insurance, pension and domestic production functions – all of which are 
less likely to be measured and compensated for in the transition process. However, the 
realisation of these intangible functions relies on material access to the land. Also, because 
of the seasonal and informal nature of these less-visible functions, they are difficult to 
measure and are easily lost when farmers’ relation to the land is changed. As shown in the 
migration literature, these issues are also part of the reason why many rural migrants are 
reluctant to give up their land in exchange for a fully urban life (Zhao, 1999). Migrants are 
aware that when they lose land, they lose more than just the productivity of the land. As a 
result, migrants usually prefer to maintain their relation to their land, in the forms of rural 
hukou and farmland, because they can enjoy the intangible functions as long as they 
continue to have access to land.  
In the case of resettlement and relocation, if individuals’ land is re-collected and 
redistributed, this inevitably changes individuals’ relationship to their land, and must be 
considered in any assessment of the impacts of resettlement and redevelopment on rural 
people. As discussed above, where the intangible asset is often associated with individuals’ 
and households’ livelihood security, the easily neglected access to intangible is a threat to 
resettled villagers’ livelihoods. While the ownership rights of land may be redistributed and 
farmers may be financially compensated based on land productivity, the loss of material 
access to land itself endangers the intangible functions of land to which farmers were 
formerly entitled. One question to examine in this research on the resettlement and 
redevelopment process in the two provinces in China, is therefore whether the less visible 
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intangible value of land is neglected in the compensation package when farmers lose 
material access to land. This may increase the chance of shock and disruption of livelihoods, 
which on one hand, increases the chances that resettled rural residents make claims on 
stocks and resources for alternative income sources to compensate for the loss of insurance; 
on the other hand, it may enhance the possibility for resettled people to encounter feelings 
of insecurity, loss of choice, disempowerment and loss of identity.  
When it comes to claim-making, one way of claiming resources is collectively at the 
community level and then redistributing resources to community members, rather than 
claiming at the individual level (Bebbington, 1999). One example from Guatemala shows 
that claiming resources collectively is an effective way of protecting private and collective 
property rights against other users (Katz, 2000). The term “communities” is not limited in 
the geographical sense of a group with shared residential space, rather the term represents 
any groups with shared cultural identity, experience of discrimination or with strong intra-
communication bonds (Woolcock, 1998; Leach et al., 1999).  
For the purpose of this thesis, where the livelihood context changes with the rural 
development process, so does the forms of assets, and it is therefore important to study a 
more nuanced account of “assets”, which is not constrained by either rural or urban context, 
and which decomposes assets into elements. Scoones’s (1998) work on assets describes the 
asset component as being what people possess and control in order for them to employ 
livelihood strategies (Scoones, 1998). The major difference from Chambers & Conway’s 
(1992) account is the categories of assets. According to Scoones (1998), assets concern 
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economic capital, human capital, social capital and natural capital, which is viable in either 
rural or urban context rather than addressing the majorly rural-based natural resource. 
Economic capital includes cash and means of production; human capital includes skill, 
knowledge and physical condition of the labourer, as discussed in the capabilities section; 
social capital describes the social networks of the labourer; natural capital describes natural 
resources and the related services (Johnson 1997; Scoones, 1998).  
While Scoones (1998) also addresses the importance of access in the discussion of assets, he 
applies a more structuralist view by summarising access through the barriers and 
opportunities posed by institutions. Also, compared to Chambers & Conway’s (1992) 
account, apart from the material benefits obtained through “access”, Scoones (1998) pays 
more attention to the variety of subjects who initiate “access”, including individuals, 
households, social groups and communities. Furthermore, the interaction of different actors 
generates power relations and the interaction is often distinctive in each context, according 
to the rules and norms in that context (Giddens 1979; Scoones, 1998). To analyse the access 
to livelihood assets and resources, Scoones (1998) argues that not only are the forms of the 
institution important (i.e. formal/informal), but interaction between different actors in the 
institution and the interaction between the actor and institution also deserves more 
attention, for example, “contestations, negotiations and trade-offs” are some forms of these 
interaction (Scoones, 1998, p12). This leads to the following sections on the balance 
between the livelihood components.  
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The discussions on assets from Chambers & Conway (1992) and Scoones (1998) are not 
exclusive, but are complementary to each other, showing augmenting aspects of the asset 
component. Therefore, in my discussions of livelihood assets, I include the resources, stocks, 
claims, and access to assets, as well as the various subjects who initiate the behaviour of 
access, and the interaction between assets and other livelihood components. This literature 
is useful for my research because it enables me to examine the livelihood components in a 
transitional livelihoods context.  
2.4.1 Transition of livelihoods contexts 
The socio-economic and political context has influences on people’s livelihoods because it 
shapes people’s access to assets and their consequent livelihood strategies (Meikle, 2002). 
The livelihoods concept in the urban context also consists of capabilities, livelihood 
resources and strategies. The key differences from the rural livelihoods are the components 
of the livelihood assets and the consequent livelihood strategies (De Haan, 2000).  
Where rural livelihoods rely more on the use of natural resources, for example land, and 
sustainable livelihoods concerns using these natural resources sustainably (Johnson 1997; 
Scoones, 1998), urban livelihoods typically rely more on income in the forms of cash and 
assets (Satterthwaite & Tacoli, 2002). There is also a possibility that rural people often 
receive income in a different way from urban people – eg in kind (assets) rather than as a 
wage (money). Furthermore, De Haan (2000) argues that the urban poor rely more on their 
labour, related to their human capital or capabilities; therefore, livelihoods of the urban 
poor are more associated to labour-related conditions, for example wages, working time 
 44 
and working conditions. With increased capabilities through education and skills training, 
people should have better access to wage employment, while with a reduction in 
institutional restrictions, people should have better access to assets (Rutherford, 2002; 
Harper, 2002). 
As for differences in livelihood strategies, rural labourers diversify their household 
livelihoods from farm income to off-farm income by having some family members migrate to 
the urban area, while urban labourers diversify their livelihoods by working in different 
sectors in the urban labour market (De Haan, 2000). However, not all scholars agree with 
this analysis. Breman (1996) argues that it is unlikely in reality that labourers move between 
the formal sector and informal sector, and sometimes take up jobs in both sectors. Also, if 
livelihood and livelihood strategies are contingent on policies and the structure of 
organisations, rural livelihoods are concerned more with local levels, while urban livelihoods 
are also influenced by national and international level factors (Satterthwaite & Tacoli, 2002). 
As a result, while applying the rural livelihoods framework to urban livelihoods, it is 
important to notice the above differences. As for my research, the sustainable rural 
livelihoods framework is most helpful when the context of livelihoods is constant, which in 
this case it is not. To reflect on the transitional context from rural to urban areas, in 
particular the role of state intervention, my research will therefore also use important 
displacement frameworks, discussed in the next chapter, to deepen the analysis.  
 
2.5 Livelihood component 3 – Income-generating activities  
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One important reason for analysing the access to livelihood assets is that different access to 
resources shapes people’s strategies for gaining a sustainable livelihood (Scoones, 1998). 
This strategy is formulated at various levels, including individual, household and village. 
Income-generating activities are the third component of the livelihood concept. In the rural 
context, one livelihood strategy is “agricultural intensification/extensification”, in which 
better livelihoods would be gained if more capital and labour is invested in farming 
(Scoones, 1998). Another livelihood strategy is “livelihood diversification”, in which 
livelihoods are secured by diversifying income sources (Scoones, 1998). For example, rural-
urban migration can be a livelihood diversification strategy; migration of family members 
expands the household income sources from farm income to off-farm income, reducing risk 
of livelihood failure (Chambers &Conway, 1992; Carney, 1999; Scoones, 2009; De Haas, 
2010). “Livelihood portfolio” describes the various activities the actor chooses for the means 
of living, while the scale of actors can vary from individual level to households to villages to 
countries (Scoones, 1998). 
This is especially interesting in the context of this research, since in spontaneous migration, 
migrating to the city is a way of diversifying, but in my case studies being “urbanised” does 
not actually mean diversification, as the original livelihood (if farming) may be lost. 
Therefore, it implies another difference between state-led urbanisation and the much more-
researched voluntary migration. In my research, we might expect fewer possibilities for 
diversification for those who are resettled to the urban area. To seek alternative income and 
diversification of household income, this group would have to look for other opportunities. 
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2.6 Sustainable livelihood  
The sustainability of livelihoods consists of both environmental sustainability and social 
sustainability. As elaborated in Chambers & Conway’s (1992) livelihoods framework, the 
former concerns the impact of a livelihood on existing resources and assets, while the latter 
focuses on whether the subjects of livelihood are able to cope with stress and shocks and 
sustain an improving livelihood. Both aspects concern both tangible and intangible assets, 
where the amount of tangible assets received by the affected population is largely 
contingent on the intangible assets they possess.   
At the local scale, the environmental aspect concerns the impact of livelihood activities on 
local natural resources, including water, soil, soil fertility and forest. On the other hand, the 
global scale concerns how local livelihoods are affected by global trade, and reduced access 
to the global markets and global common properties. In this thesis, the focus of 
sustainability, as well as shock and stress, remains at the local level to address the different 
approaches of state intervention through comparison of two different resettlement 
approaches in two different locales. The social aspect of sustainable livelihood concerns the 
ability of individuals and households to maintain a sustainable livelihood.  
There are two types of threats to sustainable livelihoods. Chronic and continuous threat is 
termed “stress”, while sudden and unpredictable threat is called “shock”. Both types of 
threats concern the tension between supply and demand of resources as well as access and 
claim to resources. Rakodi (2002) suggests distinguishing sustainability and security, where 
the former refers to the impact of human behaviours on the environment, and the latter 
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concerns the vulnerability of people, which is about the ability of the actor to recover from 
stresses and shocks. Stresses and shocks both describe disturbance for production and 
livelihoods, but they differ in scale and effects, where stresses are small and predictable, and 
shocks are large and irregular; as for effects, stresses cause chronic effects and shocks cause 
immediate effects (Scoones, 1998).  
Because of the difference of livelihood resources in rural and urban contexts, we might 
expect the substance of “stress” and “shock” to vary according to the context. Moreover, 
when the condition of the context changes, it is likely that “stress” and “shock” would 
change as well. This suggests that to cope successfully with stress and shock, the affected 
population will need to adapt their strategies to the changing challenges. For example, in the 
rural setting, stress and shock might largely come from challenges of natural resources, 
including declining soil fertility, farm size and rainfall. On the other hand, in the urban 
setting, stress and shock may happen in the form of declining employment opportunities, or 
reductions in real wages. In this research, the change of livelihood context might suggest the 
change of the types of stress and shock as well. For rural villagers, the stress and shock that 
they used to face in the rural context might therefore change into urban stress and shock. 
For those who successfully dealt with stress and shock in the rural context, whether they 
would be able to cope with urban stress and shock is uncertain, which poses a potential 
threat for them to achieve sustainable livelihoods. For villagers who struggled with 
livelihoods in the rural context, whether the new livelihood context would generate 
opportunities or more stress and shock is unknown. 
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Unaddressed stress and shock cause vulnerability. Two approaches to eliminate 
vulnerability, as noted by Chambers & Conway (1992), are public and private actions. In 
terms of public action, this is contingent on the formulation of the livelihood setting, where 
prevention and protection from natural disasters are provided and more employment 
opportunities are generated (Chambers & Conway, 1992). This is largely the responsibility of 
the authorities who have the resources and are often the driver of development. As for 
private action, this is where the households themselves attempt to expand their portfolio of 
assets in order to compensate for the loss during livelihood disruption.  
In state-led urbanisation cases in Tianjin and Zhejiang, we might expect to see the co-
existence of both public and private actions. For example, for public actions, the authorities 
could provide employment opportunities for resettled villagers, provide employment 
training, and compensate villagers; as for private actions, villagers might take collective 
actions, petition, use legal measures, or keep their discontent and dissatisfactions quiet. The 
difference between the sites, with their very different approaches to rural redevelopment, 
may be in the forms of the public action and what specific measures individuals take for 
private action. There are also likely to be different types of shocks and stresses in the two 
sites (as well as different responses). Is one kind of resettlement pattern more likely to 
create shocks than the other? The empirical chapters 6 and 8 will elaborate this in detail 
based on the livelihoods implications for different social groups in Tianjin and Zhejiang.  
 
2.7 Reaction to stress, shock and disruption  
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Reaction to stress has two dimensions, positive and negative, where positive is when 
individuals/household take a proactive approach in adapting to the changed livelihood 
setting, exploiting existing opportunities and creating new possibilities. On the other hand, 
negative is when individuals/households take a reactive approach to livelihoods, passively 
responding to stress and shock (Chambers & Conway, 1992).  
When it comes to private action, it is useful to examine the existing reactions of the socially 
and economically vulnerable groups, including rural migrants and urban laid-off workers 
because these measures could also be the way for resettled villagers in this research to 
express their discontent. In China, individuals take different measures to express their 
discontent; while some may choose collective action or even violent action to show their 
dissatisfaction and to press for more resources, others choose to keep silent. Collective 
action is a common strategy for rural migrants to take. The forms of collective action include 
petition, appeals, demonstrations, protests, and legal measures (Lee, 2007). Most of these 
collective actions are interest-based, and arise as the consequence of conflict between rural 
migrants and their management regarding work and salary related issues (Chan et al., 2009). 
The organisation of collective action usually takes place in a shared living space, like factory 
dormitories and the migrant communities (Chan et al., 2009). The shared space cultivates 
shared identity, shared interest and a sense of belonging that go beyond any specific 
narrower networks, based on hometown, ethnicity, gender (Lee, 2007). Based on this 
literature, it is rational to assume that given the shared space, interest and identity, 
collective action would also be one strategy for resettled villagers use in order to express 
their dissatisfaction and claim more resources.   
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Another useful account to the study of the expression of dissatisfaction by resettled farmers 
in the state-led urbanisation cases is the existing research on collective actions of laid-off 
workers in urban China. Similar to rural migrants, urban laid-off workers also make collective 
resistance spurred by the massive scale of retrenchment as a result of privatisation reforms 
after 1997 when the lifetime employment ended and the social contract between workers 
and the state was broken (Gu, 1999; Hurst, 2004; Lee, 2007). Different from rural migrants, 
the cause of collective resistance was due to the lack of financial resources of the state 
firms, which led to retrenched workers’ deteriorating economic situation and frustration. 
Compared to rural migrants, the target of laid-off workers’ collective actions was either firm 
management or local governments, depending on the measures taken by each of them. The 
management can easily be the target when it takes strong measures, because the workers 
believe that the management can solve the problems; when workers believe that the 
management is weak and unlikely to solve their problems, they shift their attention to local 
governments. When they become the target of collective action, local governments take 
measures to weaken workers’ motivation for taking collective actions by increasing the costs 
of action (Cai, 2006). 
Also useful to the context of understanding resettled farmers reactions to redevelopment is 
the inaction of some urban laid-off workers in China. One major piece of work studying this 
process is Cai’s (2006) account of workers laid off from state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Cai’s 
work shows that, despite some retrenched workers taking measures for protection and 
collective action, the majority of workers actually chose to remain silent. One explanation of 
this is workers’ cost-benefit analysis, in which they calculate whether it is possible to obtain 
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more benefits from participation in action; if not, they prefer to use their time and energy to 
find other income sources rather than voicing their discontent (Cai, 2006). Another 
explanation is the absence of solidarity, caused by the fragmented identity of the laid-off in 
China (Cai, 2006). Although they share the common experience of being laid-off and some 
degree of shared identity, these do not indicate that workers share similar interests 
regarding collective action. The attitudes of the laid-off workers were rather decided by their 
access to alternative income sources, social networks, level of education and former 
employment (Cai, 2006).  
Applying the above discussion of literature to my research, it is worth noting several points. 
First, when dissatisfied by the resettlement process or the compensation, resettled villagers 
might take collective action in either violent or peaceful ways, or remain silent. Their 
decision depends on two factors: first, whether there is shared identity and interest 
between the resettled farmers; second, whether resettled farmers make a cost-benefit 
analysis before making decisions as to whether to take collective action. On the other hand, 
resettled villagers’ decision also largely depends on the reaction of the local states. There 
might be distinction between lower level states and the central state, where for resettled 
people local states are the equivalent of SOE management in the case of rural migrant 
collective activities, since they directly manage the resettlement and rural development, and 
the central state is more distant to the operation of rural development. Second, the shared 
identity and interest is an important factor in motivating discontented farmers to take 
violent collective actions. Third, the decision of resettled villagers might be partly affected 
by the local states’ strategies in calming their actions. 
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In the Tianjin and Zhejiang cases, we might expect to find that some resettled farmers do 
not see violent action or peaceful collective action as a useful approach of private action, in 
which case this rational behaviour theory would be a plausible explanation. We might also 
expect to observe a contrast between identity and interests in the Tianjin and Zhejiang cases 
as well, which suggests the emergence of new social groups that are not adequately defined 
by their rural origin or by the resettlement experience.  
For those who take action to voice their grievances, they may assess the strength of the 
entity which directly handles the resettlement process, which is the village committee. If 
resettled people reckon the village committee is capable of reflecting their demand to the 
upper level governments, or would bend to collective pressure, villagers may target their 
complaints to the village committee. However, in cases where the village committee is 
perceived as weak, or where the village committee no longer exists after resettlement, we 
might expect farmers to address their dissatisfaction to the upper level states directly. This 
could also happen when the villagers make their first attempt to the village committees - if 
this fails, they would either stop there or keep forwarding the grievance to the upper level 
government, and expect that the hierarchy of authority would help them address the issue. 
However, in this case, farmers may still fail if there is a close relationship between the village 
committee and township governments, or between the town-level and county-level states, 
since the connected interests between cadres might motivate them to protect each other. I 
will analyse these questions in detail in the case studies in Chapters 5 and 8. 
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2.8 Dimensions of livelihood transition 
2.8.1 Livelihoods in the transitional context 
In state-led urbanisation, the aim in Tianjin appears to be to transform rural livelihoods into 
urban livelihoods, while in Zhejiang the goal is to enhance rural livelihoods. In both cases, 
the key is the transition of livelihoods. The transition is multi-dimensional, which covers the 
transition from rural to urban and from short-term to long-term livelihoods. This section 
examines these dimensions and anticipates the potential shocks, stresses and disruptions of 
livelihoods that are likely to be generated during the transition process by drawing on 
relevant literature in order to understand how livelihood risks, shocks and stresses are 
generated in the context of state-led urbanisation in my research. Living in an urban context 
is different from living in a rural context. With the occupational transition from farming to 
non-agricultural work, peasants’ farming-related lifestyle and traditions are gradually 
replaced with non-agricultural-related lifestyles. With a change of basic administrative unit 
from village committees to urban neighbourhoods, previous village and farm work unit 
divided groups are transformed to occupation-based or individual interests-based groups 
(Xu et al., 2011). However, no current literature has examined the livelihoods of this group, 
and this research aims to fill this gap. 
2.8.2 Comparing resettlement livelihoods to the livelihoods of migrants 
Much scholarly work has focused on rural-urban migrants in the process of spontaneous 
urbanisation in China, and on migrant livelihood strategies. Migrants typically move to the 
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urban area voluntarily, and are thus often more ready to develop the skills required in the 
urban labour market, as well as being self-selected in terms of their age, health, family 
support and physical condition. When it comes to households, migration of members in the 
household is often a diversification strategy of rural households. Migrants in the urban area 
send home remittances, which expand their farm income to off-farm income and they 
provide support for new migrants; at the same time, they and their rural relatives invest in 
properties in rural and urban locations, which also diversifies the income source of the rural 
household (Ellis, 1998; Satterthwaite, & Tacoli, 2002).  
Migration is maintained by migrants’ access to urban off-farm income opportunities and 
their rural relatives’ access to rural assets, like land and rural housing, and in many cases 
migrants need to go home often to assist the rural household or when their urban job is not 
working out (De Haan, 2000). The motivation for migration tends to reduce when migrants 
cannot find satisfactory employment in the urban area, or they do not possess rural assets 
any more (Satterthwaite, & Tacoli, 2002). 
Unlike migrants, resettled farmers are forced to adapt to new labour market conditions, 
whether urban or rural. As a result, they are not only less ready to take up the new urban 
work, but also often less capable in developing new skills. In the discussion of livelihoods, 
most of the literature refers to migration as a diversification strategy of rural livelihoods, 
while other research examines urban livelihoods, but almost no literature examines the 
urban livelihoods of resettled rural labourers. Nonetheless, we might expect that the 
resettled rural labourers would be even more vulnerable to the changing context of 
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livelihoods than migrants and more likely to participate in the urban informal sector, self-
employment or household workshops. The transition of household livelihoods from the rural 
context to the urban context could threaten the living standard of resettled rural farmers if 
it is not managed well. On one hand, this concerns the establishment of the new livelihood 
in the urban area, in terms of strategies of individuals and households in response to the 
“shock” of resettlement by enhancing their human capital/capabilities or seeking other ways 
of means of living; on the other hand, it concerns the impact of reduced access to diversified 
assets in rural and urban areas on the stability of the household livelihoods. 
For those former farmers who are resettled to urban areas, the whole household moves to 
the urban areas permanently, which is different from temporary migration, typically with 
the retention of rural land. After the movement, the resettled rural labourers tend to have 
no more access to farmland and rural housing, although in some cases they may have 
regular income generated by land use right transference programmes. At the same time, 
their costs of living may increase because they have to pay for resources that they did not 
need to pay for in the rural areas, for example water, farm food, transportation and other 
urban facilities (Satterthwaite, & Tacoli, 2002). The vulnerability and the consequent 
livelihood strategies therefore make resettled rural labourers a very interesting group to 
study, and it should not be assumed that findings derived from studies of voluntary migrants 
can necessarily be applied to their case.  
In summary, the livelihoods framework tends to miss the transition process of the context 
from rural to urban, as well as the role of state intervention in shaping the contexts where 
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productive and non-productive activities take place. This thesis argues that livelihoods are 
constructed and maintained in particular spatial and political contexts, and these conditions, 
and transformation of them, can serve to alter the livelihood structures and dynamics. 
Livelihoods and social stratification are also highly sensitive to economic context, because 
this determines the resources that are made available for maintaining patterns of activities. 
These insights bring together the bottom-up livelihoods framework and the top-down 
displacement frameworks, to show how these interact in sometimes unpredictable ways. 
Urban livelihoods mostly rely on off-farm income, which comes from one’s ownership of 
assets and participation in the urban labour market through wage labour, self-employment 
or household workshop (Hart, 1973; Moser, 1998; Beall, 2002; Rutherford, 2002). These 
income-generating activities exist in both the formal and informal economies (Rutherford, 
2002). The co-existence of the formal and informal economy provides possibility for 
diversification of urban livelihoods. 
These issues will be addressed in the next chapter, which discusses in depth how the role of 
the states, and the relationship between local states, shape the labour market, land related 
policies and community culture in a transitional context. The rest of this chapter focuses on 
the relationship between livelihoods and the class structure in China. Although the 
sustainable rural livelihoods framework helps to understand the livelihoods of individuals 
and families, it is unable to provide a full picture of the further implications for the 
community and, in particular, for the reformation of social groups. It seems that other 
interpretive lenses are needed to understand how changes happen in the social 
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stratification, as a result of changing composition of the each social group and relationship 
between social groups.  
 
2.9 Group effects - Livelihoods and the changing class structure in China   
2.9.1 Livelihoods and class formation theories 
The previous section discussed the sustainable livelihood approach. In most cases, it is not 
that people choose to work in the informal sector, but that it is their only choice in gaining 
livelihoods due to their lower skill level and structural barriers like, in China, the hukou 
system (Rakodi, 2002). In some cases, labourers look for work in the informal sector to get 
supplementary income for their wage-earning job in the formal sector; in other cases, 
labourers who do not secure a job in the formal sector or rural migrants aiming for income 
opportunities, tend to work in the informal sector (Hart, 1973; Breman, 1996). With the 
increasing participation of rural labourers in China’s urban labour market, in particular that 
of resettled rural labourers, are the former “rural” and “urban” class labels being mitigated? 
What is the perception of resettled rural labourers on the changes in their social status after 
rural redevelopment? 
Following from the above discussion, this section first provides a brief overview of classical 
class formation theories based on one’s relation to means of production and prestige. It 
then moves on to an examination of class theories of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
and their implications before and after market reform. In the discussion of the class 
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structure after the market reform, this section argues that the boundary of the former rural-
urban dual class structure is becoming blurred. On one hand, the traditional unified rural 
class is segmented into a stratified structure based on the material gains of some rural 
labourers; for example, some rural migrants are gradually financially better off than certain 
poor urban groups due to a combination of reasons, including the development of the 
market economy and rural migrants’ ability to accumulate wealth with increasing rural 
labourers working and living in urban areas. On the other hand, the failure of rural labourers 
to participate in the urban formal sector and the diversified livelihoods in the urban informal 
sector prevents them from becoming a unified new urban working class. The blurring of the 
rural-urban class structure as a result of these two processes raises the question of whether 
state-led urbanisation is generating new Chinese class identities and perceptions. 
2.9.2 Class formation theories 
In class formation theories, Marxists typically argue that formation of class relations and 
awareness are based on the common relationship to the means of production, while non-
Marxists argue that the relationship to the means of production is not the cause but the 
result of class struggles, based on class relation and awareness (Marx, 1963 [1846-1847]; 
Wright, 1978; Roy, 1984). Marxists have tended to study the relationship between classes, 
while non-Marxists studied the formation of classes.  
To understand the construction of social reality, Bourdieu (1987) recognised both the 
objective and subjective perspectives. From the objective perspective/structuralism, social 
reality is a set of invisible relationships, which define positions and distance in a social space. 
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The difference in distances is constituted by the different levels of possession of economic, 
cultural, and social capitals and the change of the volume and composition of capital over 
time in a social space. Nevertheless, from the subjective perspective/constructivist, class is a 
“symbolic construction of the pursuit of individual and collective interests” (Bourdieu, 1987, 
pp.9), which factors in individual’s values in the formation of social class.  
2.9.3 Proletarianisation and the impact of informal economies 
In order to understand what happens to farmers when they are resettled to urban areas, it is 
necessary to consider the literature on proletarianisation, which is a process which 
happened typically in western countries where farmers shifted from alternative income 
sources to wage labour, as we might expect resettled Chinese farmers to do. When it comes 
to class formation based on one’s relation to the means of production, in Marxist 
terminology proletarianisation describes the historical process in which labourers lose 
alternative means of living and their only income source becomes selling their labour in the 
market (Tilly, 1978). Tilly (1979) also pointed out that solely relying on wage labour rather 
than diversified income sources makes people more vulnerable to capitalist exploitation. In 
this paper, the term proletarianisation is used as a simple description of the process by 
which farmers become urban wage labourers, but does not necessarily involve exploitation 
in the Marxist sense. 
The historical process of proletarianisation is less likely to happen in an economic context 
where the informal economy plays an important role. Hart (1973) distinguished the formal 
and informal sectors by the type of recruitment and rewards. The characteristics of 
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employment in the formal sector are regular recruitment and wage-earning employment 
and the opposite in the informal sector (Hart, 1973). Castells & Portes (1989) disagree with 
putting the informal economy in the opposite position to the formal economy, or as a sector 
providing employment for marginal social groups. Rather, they suggest that the informal 
economy is a production and exchange relationship, in which informality lies not in the 
nature of the economic activities, but in the extent of regulation imposed by the state, or 
the extent of institutionalisation of the economic structures. Therefore, Castells & Portes 
(1989) argue that the boundary of the informal economy is contingent on the extent of the 
state intervention and that productivity in the informal sector is not necessarily lower than 
that in the formal sector.  
By identifying the informal economy as a specific production relationship, Castells & Portes 
(1989) further argue that growth of the informal economy is closely related to the formal 
economy in a way that might redefine the production relationship between them, as well as 
within the formal economy, which is called “informalisation”. Especially in economies with a 
highly institutionalised structure, such as China, more activities are often generated in the 
informal economy where individuals are able to escape from the formal institutionalised 
structure (Castells & Portes, 1989). 
According to this view, one of the impacts of informalisation is in hindering the 
proletarianisation process because alternative income sources remain available for urban 
labourers in their wage employment and non-wage employment in the urban informal 
sector (Portes, et al., 1989). The productivity of capital in the informal sector is relatively 
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high because of the reduced bureaucratic structure and reduced costs of labour (e.g. 
through subcontracting). At the same time, activities like subcontracting introduce flexibility 
into the institutionalised economic structure, which tend to weaken the vertical class 
structure through the growth of the informal sector (Castells & Portes, 1989; Portes, et al., 
1989). The informalisation process affects some groups more than others, especially groups 
with fewer employable skills required by the urban labour market, for example rural 
migrants, women and ethnic minorities (Portes, et al., 1989). We might equally expect that 
this group would include resettled rural labourers in the cases of Tianjin and Zhejiang. 
In his migration study, Todaro (1969) used a probabilistic migration model to describe the 
process of rural labourers entering the urban labour market. He suggested that rural 
labourers would arrive in the less-regulated urban informal sector briefly and then move to 
the urban formal sector. Nevertheless, this two-stage theoretical model is not borne out by 
the empirical literature (Hart, 1973; Banerjee, 1983; Breman, 1996). Rather than seeing the 
urban informal sector as a temporary stop for rural migrants, Hart (1973) addressed the 
function of the urban informal sector in lifting urban unemployment and providing 
supplementary income for rural migrants and the urban poor, and identified that informal 
income-generation activities exist across the primary, secondary and tertiary industries, as 
well as in self-employment and person-to-person transactions. Banerjee (1983) and Breman 
(1996) also found very low mobility of rural migrants from informal to formal sector from 
empirical studies in India.  
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To conclude from the above debates in migration studies, there are several reasons rural-
urban migrants are less likely to become involved in the proletarianisation process in China, 
i.e. solely relying on selling their labour as a commodity and becoming a part of the urban 
working class. First, rural migrants generally have less chance of finding wage employment in 
the urban formal sector; if they do find wage employment in the urban formal sector, it is 
frequently low-paid, and they may need to seek another wage or non-wage job in the 
informal sector as complementary income. More importantly, no matter what types of 
employment rural migrants have, they often retain the connection with farming land and 
their rural households, especially in the Chinese context where the hukou system reinforces 
agricultural hukou-holders’ ties to their land. On one hand, these ties keep migration as a 
part of the household strategies in diversifying livelihoods from farm income to non-farm 
income (De Haan, 2002); on the other hand, they act as a buffer for migrants’ full 
commitment into the urban labour market and urban life, for example land may call 
migrants back when farm business is busy, and allow migrants to return to the countryside if 
they fail to find satisfactory employment in the urban labour market. 
When it comes to resettled rural labourers, the different drivers of moving and different 
means of living between them and rural migrants might lead to more differences concerning 
class formation. As the above livelihoods section suggests, resettled rural labourers may be 
more likely to work in the urban informal sector, self-employment or household workshops, 
and this diversifies their income sources. Xu (2011) studied newly built towns in suburban 
areas in Shanghai and found that the low rental prices of apartments in these areas 
attracted many rural migrants who work in the adjacent urban areas, such that former rural 
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farmers who were resettled to these areas could live on rent collecting, which was at a 
similar level to farming income. This again suggests that resettled people may be unlikely to 
take part in the process of proletarianisation and more likely to participate in the informal 
economy. However, unlike rural migrants, the movement for resettled rural labourers is 
permanent, and the whole rural household is resettled in the new area such that they have 
no more access to farmland and rural housing, reducing the diversity of their income 
sources. A key part of proletarianisation, according to Tilly (1979), is the accompanying 
process of wage labourers losing their other income sources, like land and capital, to 
capitalists. Without their ties with the rural area and farm-income, the resettled rural labour 
group may in fact be more likely to lose alternative income sources and live by selling their 
labour in the market. The question thus remains of whether this process would generate 
new class identities and perceptions in the Chinese context. 
One condition of the generation of new class identities through proletarianisation is that 
class formation mainly relies on one’s relation to the means of production. However, this 
has not often been the case in the history of class in China. The following sections will first 
review non-Marxist class formation theories and the official CCP theories; then summarise 
the evolution of the class structure in China, before finally coming back to the question of 
whether state-led urbanisation, i.e. the resettlement process, is creating new classes with 
new class identities and perceptions. 
2.9.4 Non-production-related class formation theories 
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Relation to means of production is not necessarily the only foundation that a social class 
could be based on. Shared prestige or culture also shape classes. Krieger, et al. (1997) 
related social class to socioeconomic position and regarded socioeconomic position as the 
combination of prestige-based and resource-based positions:  
“Prestige-based measures refer to individual’s rank or status in a social hierarchy, typically 
evaluated with reference to people’s access to and consumption of goods, services, and 
knowledge, as linked to their occupational prestige, income, and education level. Resource-
based measures refer to material and social resources and assets, including income, wealth, 
educational credentials; terms used to describe inadequate resources include ‘poverty’ and 
‘deprivation’.” (Krieger, et al., 1997, 140) 
According to Krieger et al. (1997), social class is a social relationship rather than a property 
of individuals; it is a combination of the prestige-based and resource-based positions. Apart 
from social class, other aspects of socioeconomic status include racial/ethnic group, and 
gender relations. Weber (1946) regarded social relationships as cyclical and suggested the 
possibility of the stratification of status emerging when the pattern of distribution and 
consumption of commodities are stable.  
Based on Bourdieu (1987)’s capital-possession-related objective social class model, the 
newest report of the UK class survey experiment provides an example of this type of 
understanding of class. It grouped the population in the UK into seven classes by measuring 
their possession of economic, social and cultural capital rather than solely measuring the 
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possession of economic capital. The producers of the report, Savage et al. (2013), described 
the new model as an evolution of the previous class classification models.  
The first class classification model was based on Marxism, which focused solely on the 
economic state of the individual and mainly addressed the value of labour. Under Marxism, 
society is divided into lower-middle-upper classes. The end of this era is attributed to the 
end of mass production, accompanied by the decline of the working class (Savage et al., 
2004). Also, the polarisation in the working class also accelerated the pace of its decline as 
the upper part of the working class pursued the life of the middle class and the rest were 
more likely to become the underclass. The second class classification was based on 
occupation, which emphasised production and economy. Savage et al. (2013) point out the 
limitations in Goldthorpe’s occupational class model by highlighting that the new model 
includes the effects of cultural and social impacts on class ranking, with a larger sample size, 
and uses income rather than occupation in evaluating social mobility. Skeggs (2004, pp 47) 
attributed the favouring of cultural capital to the “de-materialization of commercial 
production” and “the shift from manufacturing to services in post-industrialization” in 
developed countries.  
In the transition of occupation-based class structures to cultural-factors-based class 
structures, the function of class labels has been transformed from redistribution to the 
politics of recognition/identity (Taylor, 1994). In a class structure based on cultural factors, 
social positioning concerns the moral value of individuals, in which culture is used as a form 
of economic resource in the consumer context (Skeggs, 2004). Skeggs (2004) also showed 
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concern about the potential conflicts between the possession of cultural capital and a sense 
of belonging, arguing that culture is a source of exclusion because identities and a sense of 
belonging are composed of the shared “values, aspirations and ways of living”, which can 
only be attained by a selective group of people while others are excluded.  
When it comes to exclusion, membership of a social class plays a role in constituting self-
esteem and self-image of individuals (Argyle, 1994). When individuals join a higher level of 
class from a lower position, acceptance from the members in the higher-level class plays an 
important role (Argyle, 1994). The newcomers are more easily accepted and the sense of 
belonging is more likely to be formed if they share dominant values with the higher-level 
class; otherwise, they would tend to be excluded by the class in the higher position (Savage 
et al., 2004). The literature suggests that while observing the social class transition in Tianjin 
and Zhejiang, it is important to consider cultural factors and individual farmers’ self-
perception. 
2.9.5 The Chinese Communist Party’s theories on class formation and implementations 
The previous sections discussed the fundamental role of the relation to means of production 
in class formation and the impact on the informal economy on it, and introduced other 
possible factors that often generate new class identities and relations, for example 
occupation, income, education and culture. In the history of class in China, the image and 
perceptions shaped by the CCP and other cultural factors were often the basis for the 
emergence of new class structure and identities. This section explains how the images of 
certain classes, shaped by the theory of the Party, influenced the perception of the Chinese 
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population of their own class identities, in order to show how these historical class identities 
may be shaping the new identity of resettled farmers in the case of state-led urbanisation in 
China. This is especially relevant when comparing those who are resettled to an urban area 
and those who are resettled to a rural area.  
One of the functions of political campaigns and movements in the Mao era is that they 
shaped people’s perception of rural and urban areas and the social position of the group 
they belonged to. These perceptions continue to influence Chinese understandings of class 
today. The following section will use the class history in China to give two examples 
demonstrating how the process worked. The first example describes the class labels 
assigned by the Party which shaped people’s perception that the revolutionary “red” class 
was the superior class. The second example from Brown (2012) describes how the sent-
down movements shaped the perception of urban people that rural areas were a place of 
starvation and much inferior to urban areas. This is relevant to the question of state-led 
urbanisation and the resettlement of rural people because we might expect different 
implications for social stratification formation with different approaches to the state-led 
urbanisation process in Tianjin and Zhejiang.  
Kelliher (1994) argues that CCP theory embedded two essential characteristics of Chinese 
peasants into a two-sided theory, such that the state perceived peasants’ farming activities 
as revolutionary but their agrarian production activities as “petty bourgeois aspirations” 
(Kelliher, 1994, p391). Before the 1949 revolution, the CCP gained support from peasants by 
promoting their revolutionary image and by establishing the “worker-peasant alliance”; after 
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success in 1949, the CCP legitimated the subordinate position of peasants in urban 
industrialisation by promoting the “petty bourgeois” peasant image (Kelliher, 1994). 
Although the formation of class identities and perceptions was not based on the relation to 
the means of production in the Marxist sense, the theory of the CCP fitted Marxist theory in 
terms of the Party claiming the role of leading the working class in the “worker-peasant 
alliance” (Kelliher, 1994).  
The implementation of the theory and its influences on Chinese people’s perceptions were 
achieved through political campaigns and the mobilisation of the population. The following 
section examines how people’s perception of rural areas as an inferior place was shaped 
before market reform began in 1978. It illustrates, first, how the CCP changed the basis of 
rural class structure from land ownership to moral value; second how the CCP assigned 
household and individual class labels to the urban population; third, how the CCP mobilised 
people from urban to rural by using previously assigned class labels, solidifying the 
formation of a perception-based class structure. 
Before 1950, the social structure in rural China was based on land ownership, in which rural 
population groups included landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants and poor peasants 
(Unger, 1984). In this social class gradient, landlords and rich peasants were the minority at 
the top of the rural class structure; following them were middle peasants, self-sufficient 
based on the land they owned and with a larger population; the majority of the rural 
population were poor peasants who owned little or no land and were located at the bottom 
of the rural class structure (Yang, 1959; Hinton, 1966; Unger, 1984).  
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In the 1950 land reform, land ownership of rural households was surveyed by CCP work 
teams and a class label was assigned to each rural household according to their land 
ownership before 1949 (Unger, 1984). The assigned class labels were not only for 
households, but also defined the social status of individuals in rural society; moreover, the 
system placed the previous bottom class at the top and top class at the bottom in the new 
rural class structure (Unger, 1984; Whyte, 2010). Previous classes of poor and lower-middle 
peasants were given a top class label of “good-origin” by the Party, while landlords and rich 
peasants were given a bottom class label of “four bad categories element” (Unger, 1984). To 
reinforce this new class structure, properties owned by former landlords and rich peasants 
were confiscated by the Party-State and redistributed to the establishment of collectives by 
the mid-1950s (Unger, 1984). During land reform, the CCP created a perception that private 
ownership, in the form of dividing farmland to individuals, was “backward”, which related to 
the “petty bourgeois aspirations” side of the peasant characteristics (Kelliher, 1994, p391; 
Yang, 1956). Thus, collective ownership was justified and a part of the property previously 
owned by the rural landlords became state owned and a part of it became collectively 
owned. This becomes important to my case studies, in particular to the changed land rights 
and resettled farmers’ possession of land rights in the new resettlement context examined 
in Chapters 5-8. 
The class struggle in rural China continued in the 1960s and 1970s, still motivated by the 
Party, but with different aims after 1958. The objectives of class struggle changed from 
gaining support from the majority of the population to transforming attention of the 
peasants away from the economic difficulties caused by the Great Leap Forward (Unger, 
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1984). Thus the Party put forward the slogan “Never forget class struggle” and used 
peasants’ economic standing and property ownership before land reform as the base of the 
class structure in those two decades (Unger, 1984). The targets of class struggle included not 
only landlords and rich peasants, but also now involved people who did not follow the Party, 
who had contacts with people in the “bad class” or those who did not treat “bad class” 
people harshly enough (Unger, 1984). 
To support “good class” poor and middle lower peasants in the class struggle, the Party 
justified their superior moral value from their suffering before land reform and entitled 
them to claim superiority in scarce resources, job opportunities, partners and life chances 
during 1960s and 1970s (Unger, 1984). Shirk (1984) refers to the emotional justification for 
the “good class” peasants as a “virtuocracy”, meaning distributing resources and life chances 
based on a person’s moral value, which is in contrast with “meritocracy”, i.e. distributing 
resources and life chances based on a person’s intellectual ability, technical skills and merits. 
Shirk (1984) argues that virtuocracy is often employed in the aim of political control, but that 
the virtuocratic distribution system itself is not stable.  
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), people who showed moral values and 
commitment to revolution in their behaviour were placed in high-class positions, while 
people who showed opposition to the revolution were placed in low-class positions (Shirk, 
1984). In rural China, revolutionary behaviours were voluntarily selling more “Loyal to Mao” 
grain to the state regardless of the economic situation of farmers (Oi, 1991). 
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After the Cultural Revolution and on the eve of market reforms, the class boundary between 
the “good class” and “bad class” began to blur and the faith in the class system began to 
dissolve. On one hand, the drive for improving economic performance required more 
intellectual abilities and technical skills rather than moral value; thus, meritocracy began to 
replace virtuocracy (Shirk, 1984). On the other hand, the material superiority and 
advantages which could be claimed by the “good class” label declined (Unger, 1984). This 
suggests that the principles of classes, particularly rural classes, are subjected to change 
based on the development goals of the state. This is another reason that we might expect 
different implications for livelihoods and class segmentation from different state approaches 
to the state-led urbanisation process.  
In China’s urban areas, in the early 1950s, each household was assigned a class label by the 
Party based on the source of household income in the three years before 1949 (White, 
1984). The “Five-Anti “Movement targeted the urban capitalist class, including “capitalist 
bourgeoisie - merchants, industrialists and business people” (Chen & Chen, 1953, pp10). This 
followed the “Three-Anti” Movement, which aimed to mitigate corruption, waste and 
bureaucratism in the Party and targeted Party cadres and bureaucrats (Chen & Chen, 1953).  
The class structure in urban China in 1950s to 1970s was different from that in rural areas, in 
that the urban population enjoyed more social mobility and the chance to change their class 
label. In urban areas, apart from “family origin”, which was the property ownership of the 
household before 1949, urban people were also defined by individual class labels, describing 
their occupation status, which could be different from their household class label (White, 
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1984). If individuals changed their occupation or means of living, they could change their 
individual class labels; at the same time, in some cases a “good” individual class label was 
able to offset some of the disadvantages a “bad family origin” brought for an individual. As 
White (1984) noted, individual class labels were similar to job titles and included “worker”, 
“teacher”, “intellectual” or “national capitalist”. An example for the social mobility in urban 
China was the formation of the urban management class, which consisted people from the 
“bourgeois management class” before land reform who had management skills but with 
“bad family origins”; the urban management class also included people from rural 
background but who had attended Party school (White, 1984). Therefore, in twentieth-
century history, urban class was often superior to rural class, and being a member of the 
urban class was usually a dream and desire for rural youth.  
Between the mid-1960s and 1970s, various groups of the urban population were sent down 
to the countryside by the state. They were deported from urban areas with different claims 
by the state, but one major shared reason was to relieve the pressure on urban areas of 
food shortage and unemployment (Brown, 2012). Sending down was also used as an 
opportunity to promote rural revolutionary spirit (Kelliher, 1994). One group sent-down was 
rural workers who had joined the urban labour market after 1958, who were asked to go 
back to rural areas in the mid-1960s. The other groups were sent-down youth and staff of 
the “Clean-ups” movement, aimed at purging so-called “class enemies” in rural land reform 
(Brown, 2012). The strategy for these two groups to go to the countryside was virtuocracy - 
that it was revolutionary to go to rural areas (Brown, 2012). However, transferring people 
from urban to rural was also a method of punishment. Brown (2012) noted the punishment 
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for “bourgeois behaviour” was sending down to rural areas, for misbehaviours including 
food crime and trade in the black market. 
The above historical records shows how the class structure was changed in the rural area, 
how new class labels were assigned in the urban area, and how both the rural and urban 
class systems were used by the Party in persuading and forcing urban people to move to 
rural areas in order to secure the food and job supply in urban areas. As Brown (2012) points 
out, the result of the state-led population movement between urban and rural areas was a 
widespread perception of urban areas as superior to rural.  
2.9.6 Occupation, culture and perception in shaping the class system since mid-1970s 
From the mid-1970s, the old class system based on family origin and revolutionary fervour, 
that had no connection with people’s socio-economic position in their lifetime, was 
gradually abandoned by the Party state. The modern Chinese class system since the 1980s 
has instead been based on a combination of occupation and perception. This section 
explains the transition of the old class system to the new one in order to understand the 
class transition in Tianjin and Zhejiang. It first describes the decline of the former class 
system in 1970s; second, it outlines how the occupation factor played an increasingly 
important role in the class structure formation; third, it describes the persistence of the 
perception factor in class formation; and fourth it analyses the formation of the new 
stratification system in Chinese society, asking whether state-led urbanisation is creating 
new classes and new class identities. 
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Disbelief in the class system in the 1970s was first found in the younger generation, 
especially the sent down youth during the Great Leap Forward who supported Mao Thought 
but still had to give priority in employment to the equally educated rural youth because of 
the class line (Unger, 1984). While the class system failed to reward the “good class” with 
“marginal advantages”, some peasants placed material interests prior to moral interest 
when they had to sacrifice one for another; at the same time, the disillusioned farmers were 
no longer willing to claim loyalty by supplying extra grains (Unger, 1984). Other examples 
include young people’s concerns about their present economic standing rather than their 
past, and their questioning the logic of the system whether moral status and privilege is 
inherited; the youth in the “good class” categories also started to ignore the class line, cross 
it and mix with people in the “bad class” (Unger, 1984). In addition, the material benefits the 
“good class” people could claim were also reduced compared to the past (Unger, 1984). 
In response, the CCP concluded this loss of faith in the class system was another sign of the 
“backward petty bourgeois behaviour” of the traditional peasant image, rather than any 
kind of development; at this stage, according to Kelliher (1994), even the Party’s own 
perception about peasants was influenced by the widespread perception shaped by the 
CCP’s previous policies. 
The hukou system played an important role in this. Its two key functions were resource 
allocation and identity building. This section focuses on the latter and shows how the 
identity building function of the hukou is based on the foundation laid out by its resource 
allocation function. Relatedly, the gradual destruction of its resource allocation function 
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reduces the role of hukou in identity building, which leaves space for other institutions, as 
well as opportunities for individuals to identify with alternative identities, and the 
emergence of new group identities. The dual structure of the income-based social class and 
individuals’ self-perception of their identities reconstruct the boundary of social classes. This 
is closely connected to my research where the shift away from the rural/urban hukou 
system and the resettlement process implies the rebuilding of identities for the resettled 
farmers.  
In the era of market economy, the previous institutional barrier of the hukou, which played a 
role of restricting rural-urban migration, began to be commoditised. This meant that many 
of its functions could now be purchased in the market economy. In general, rural migrants 
can be roughly divided into three groups according to their hukou status and wealth: those 
who have gained wealth and urban hukou; those who have gained wealth but have no urban 
hukou, and those who have no wealth and no urban hukou. Here, “wealthy migrants” refers 
to migrants who have enough economic capital to afford a lifestyle that is roughly equivalent 
to the average of urban residents.   
For the few rural migrants who have gained wealth and urban hukou in the city, 
theoretically, they are the same as urban residents because they can access what can be 
accessed by urban hukou status and they can buy what can be bought in the market. For 
rural migrants who have gained wealth but no urban hukou, although they can buy services 
such as healthcare directly from hospitals by paying at the point of use, there are still 
aspects of social services that cannot be bought. One example is education. As concluded by 
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Goodburn (2009), apart from the higher schooling fees, which could probably be afforded by 
this category of migrants, there are still many other problems in migrant children’s 
education. If migrant children apply for state-run schools, lack of urban hukou status means 
that migrants are required to present a range of documents, including working and 
residence permit, health certificate, social insurance certificate etc., which many are not 
able to provide. If migrants enrol in private migrant-run schools to avoid providing 
documents, their children face poor facilities, poor education quality, not to mention the risk 
of forced closure of these schools by the state. 
For the majority of rural migrants who have no wealth and no urban hukou, they have highly 
restricted access to healthcare and education in the city. Unlike the first category of 
migrants, they cannot access healthcare through the urban hukou package; unlike the 
second category, they cannot afford healthcare by themselves. As a result, they have to 
return to their hometown if they fall ill. When it comes to education, they have no access to 
free state education in the city due to the lack of urban hukou; most of them cannot afford 
to provide the documents needed for rural hukou holders. As a result, their only options are 
to send their children to migrant-run schools, to leave their children in the village or to 
withdraw them from school (Zhang, 2002: 318). 
The commodification of the hukou system not only gave a chance for rural migrants to work 
and live in the urban area, but also affected other urban groups. The most affected group 
was the urban working class that heavily relied on state subsidies in the planned economy 
period (So, 2003; Bian, 2002). Before market reform, cadres in state-owned work units were 
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already in a higher position than ordinary workers; apart from the status differentiation, 
cadres also received more state subsidies than workers (Bian, 2002). In the reform era, state 
subsidies reduced for workers who worked in the previous work units, but 
managers/professionals benefited from the capitalisation of the state-owned sector (So, 
2003). This process not only redistributed resources and capital between the public and 
private sector; more importantly, the material-based differentiation among workers, 
managers/professionals and entrepreneurs gradually shifted the class line from rural-urban 
groups to more occupational-based categories.  
In order to understand the transitional process of social stratification in the state-led 
urbanisation, we need first to grasp the history of class transition in China since 1978. This 
section briefly outlines the changes of principles in class transition in this period. The 
transformation of the class system to a more occupation-based structure is, on one hand, 
pushed by the market reform; on the other hand, carefully designed and developed by the 
Party (Goodman, 2014). The CCP expanded the definition of socialism from state and 
collective ownership to include private ownership; also, the Party detached the link between 
an individual’s socio-economic position and political consciousness and encouraged business 
people to join the Party (Goodman, 2014). These efforts made it possible for the class 
boundaries to be based on individual’s socio-economic position, which constitutes of one’s 
income, ownership, occupation etc. (Goodman, 2014; Bian, 2002). To reinforce the socio-
economic class line, the CCP promoted the discourse of “middle class”, characterised by a 
population which has economic power and willingness to consume (Goodman, 2014). This 
promotion forged a perception in Chinese society that “middle class” status is what one 
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should aim to achieve, and the discourse of “middle class” considerablely mitigated the 
attention to other dimensions of the society, for example the rural-urban class, state-private 
sector workers, managers/professionals-workers and so on. Lu (2002), from the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science, developed a social stratification structure mostly based on 
occupation: 
Upper middle/wealthy 
1. State and social administrators 
2. Managers 
3. Private entrepreneurs 
Lower middle/middle classes 
4. Individual business owners 
5. Professional and technical personnel  
6. Office workers  
Workers/poorer classes 
7. Employees of commercial services 
8. Industrial working class 
9. Agricultural labourers 
10. Urban and rural jobless, unemployed and semi-employed 
 (Lu, 2002) 
However, despite the commodification process of the hukou system and the increasingly 
important role of occupation in class formation after market reform, the perception of the 
inferior position of the rural population and rural areas compared to the urban population 
and urban area were not as easy to be changed as statuses on paperwork. This perception 
was not only shaped through history; a political discourse put forward by the state as the 
logic of development in the reform era also reinforced these perceptions: suzhi (素质，
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loosely translated as quality). Suzhi is a discourse representing the social and cultural aspects 
of human capital that individuals possess, for example, the way people dress, behave and 
communicate; furthermore, it is also a way of social positioning in the political and social 
hierarchy, in which people with high suzhi are more likely to obtain more political and 
economic capital (Anagnost, 2004; Kipnis, 2006). However, this discourse is not based solely 
on the occupation or individual’s socio-economic standing in the society; rather it includes 
the cultural capital of individuals, and as a result, is more likely to be affected by people’s 
perceptions shaped over time. State education projects in urban and rural China that aim to 
improve the suzhi of rural populations lead to the assumption that it is primarily people who 
come from rural areas who need to improve their suzhi (Yan, 2008).  
The use of the discourse of suzhi compromises the role of occupation in class formation; 
more importantly, it also undermines the social position that some of the rural population 
could have gained through the occupation-based class system. This applies to people with 
rural origins in general, and especially strongly to the rural population who work and live in 
urban areas, like rural migrants and – in the context of this research – resettled rural 
labourers. This discourse is used by various urban groups in different ways.  
Rural migrants’ fashion, tastes, accents, behaviours, dress code, possessions are all linked to 
the discourse of “low suzhi”, which relates to their rural origin. For example, the fashion 
sandals worn by young female migrants as an attempt to catch up with urban Shanghainese 
women are perceived by urban people as another sign of rural origin, as well as of money-
orientation (Anagnost, 2004). By targeting such cultural differences, the urban poor and laid-
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off workers could preserve their superior privilege by regarding rural migrants’ newly gained 
wealth as dysfunctional, since their money cannot buy them culture (Guang, 2003). When it 
comes to housing selection in the urban area, the neighbourhood’s suzhi is the most 
important factor after environment and price (Anagnost, 2008). Urban buyers require a 
similar level of intellectual and economic capital of their future neighbourhoods compared 
to themselves. The consequent residential clustering effect is a result of this “new gated 
housing development” (Anagnost, 2008). 
The female migrant group in particular, suffers from overlapping discrimination stemming 
from their combination of rural group and female group. This puts them in the most 
disadvantaged position in the social stratification, even worse than rural male migrants, or 
urban male/female laid-off workers. Ngai (1999) highlights the specific forms of 
discrimination experienced by rural women from male supervisors – being blamed for being 
stupid, dirty and rural and being castigated for not being appropriately “womanly” and 
“submissive”. From another point of view, discrimination towards female migrants also 
comes from the collision of the values represented by rural migrants in the urban context. 
Values promoted in the urban area include leisure, material consumption, order, urban life 
and fashion-consciousness, but the typical values of rural migrants are working hard and 
earning more money (Guang, 2003). 
2.9.7 The new multi-dimensional stratification system 
As discussed above, the foundation for class formation in the Chinese society shifted from 
land ownership to individuals’ moral value and households’ former socio-economic standing 
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in the 1950s to 1970s, then shifted back to individual’s relation to means of production since 
the late 1970s with the commodification of the hukou system. Nevertheless, a new urban 
working class that consists of rural labourers who work in the urban area is unlikely to be 
formed. On one hand, the urban informal sector and farm-related employment provide 
alternative means of living for these groups; on the other hand, cultural factors like suzhi are 
still shaping the class structure based on people’s previous perceptions of rural area and 
rural populations. Therefore, the class structure in Chinese society has evolved into a rather 
complicated, multi-dimensional stratification system with more flexible and blurred 
boundaries, in which the basis for class is a combination of socio-economic and cultural 
factors.  
In the state-led urbanisation process, the whole household of surplus rural labourers is 
resettled to the urban or rural area. They are not tied to the rural area by farmland or rural 
housing anymore, but at the same time they may lose alternative means of living from farm-
related income. The increased expenses of living in the urban area may also push them to 
rely heavily on wage employment. In the multi-dimensional social stratification system, both 
the occupation of resettled rural labourers and other cultural factors that shape people’s 
perception of what it means to be rural and urban play a role in exploring whether state-led 




This chapter has critically reviewed the rural sustainable livelihood framework and social 
class theories, and their functionality for this research. Despite of the many advantages of 
the rural sustainable livelihood framework that make it suitable to be applied to this 
research, this chapter argues that by using rural sustainable livelihood framework alone is 
insufficient to achieve the aim of this research, which is to understand the implications of 
governance on resettled villagers’ livelihoods. 
In the first part, I introduced the sustainable livelihood framework, dimensions of livelihood, 
and discussed the relationship between the livelihood framework and rural development, 
including the critiques regarding the framework. Given the multi-disciplinary nature of this 
research, the rural sustainable livelihood framework provides multiple perspectives for 
development challenges. Then I discussed the livelihood components, as well as the 
relations between the components where the inclusiveness of the framework fits this 
research very wellWhen it comes to achieving a sustainable livelihood, it is important for the 
affected population to cope with the stress and shock that generated in the livelihood 
environment. Not only do specific stresses and shocks disrupt livelihoods in different ways, 
they also shape the coping strategies of affected people in terms of obtaining a sustainable 
livelihood, which has a profound impact on their long-term livelihoods. By depicting the 
living experience of rural individuals, the livelihood framework addresses the active reaction 
of the focus group and reflects an account of subjective experience, including self-
perception, identity and experience.  
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However, the sustainable livelihood framework does not explain factors that affect the 
formation of its components, for example the role of governance. Furthermore, the 
framework is unable to capture future livelihoods after the resettlement period, nor 
livelihoods in a transitional context, for instance, from rural context to urban context. 
Therefore, this research uses additional displacement frameworks to address the 
inefficiency of the sustainable livelihood framework, which will be introduced in the next 
chapter.  
In the second part of this chapter, I examined Western and mostly Chinese class theories to 
provide a theorecial and historical understanding for the discussion in the empirical chapters 
of how the rural communities are affected by the state-led urbanisation process, particularly 
how the new conditions in the resettlement community change the social fabric, shape new 
social groups and generate emerging social relations.  
The next chapter reviews theoretical and empirical literature on rural development and 
state-led urbanisation, where I will discuss how the two antithetic approaches to rural 
development formulate different types of stresses and shocks, and how they affect the 
livelihoods of the relocated rural farmers in the Chinese context. This provides the essential 





Chapter 3 State-led urbanisation, approaches and mechanisms in China 
3.1 Introduction  
Having examined the sustainable rural livelihood framework, livelihood components and 
strategies, this chapter will critically review the empirical literature on state-led 
urbanisation, the displacement frameworks, particularly the generation of livelihood risk, 
stress and shock and the implications of state intervention, in order to understand the 
connection between governance and livelihood implications. 
Specifically, this chapter focuses on how stress and shock are generated under different 
state interventions, how they threaten livelihoods, as well as how they affect displaced 
people’s strategies in coping with risks and restoring their livelihoods. .  
The starting point for this discussion is a review of the existing literature on state-led 
urbanisation. It compares different approaches to it and how the state in each approach 
engages with the rural development process. This section provides the theoretical 
background and the precedent cases of application in China and elsewhere, as well as issues 
with the displacement frameworks and solutions to them. The second part of the chapter 
moves to the discussion of the generation of stress and shock to the livelihood components 
– capabilities, assets and activities. This part focuses on how stress and shock are generated 
during the transition of the labour market, land ownership rights and the residential built 
environment, and asks how the different styles of state intervention affect the formation of 
stress and shock. Since the forms of economic development policies are inseparable from 
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the form of governments, the last part of the chapter examines the motivation behind state 
intervention, particularly at village level, exploring what drives a certain level of state to 
adjust the market mechanism in a specific way. It discusses the intrinsic structure within the 
governance system, particularly the cadre promotion system, to understand why different 
places adopt different styles of state intervention.  
This chapter provides essential theoretical and empirical background for Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 7, which compare the formulation of stress and shock with different styles of state 
intervention in Tianjin and Zhejiang. In response, Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 examine the 
reaction and coping strategies of resettled farmers. 
 
3.2 The debate on approaches to rural development in China 
China’s rural challenges are the product of historical evolution of institutions, mechanisms 
and policies that have favoured urban residents rather than rural populations in access to 
employment, assets, and social welfare benefits, since the first five year plan for 
industrialisation in the 1950s, followed with the open door policy since the 1980. The former 
Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji in 2000 described the stagnation of rural economic 
development from the mid-1980s as the “three rural issues” (sannong wenti 三农问题), 
which summarises the low productivity in agriculture, backward rural villages and the low 
income of rural population (nongmin zhen ku, nongcun zhen qiong, nongye zhen weixian 农
民真苦, 农村真穷, 农业真危险). Since then, there has been much debate on the root 
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cause of rural stagnation, as well as solutions. Before examining the debate, this section 
provides a brief historical background of rural stagnation and the hukou system in China, 
which is essential for understanding the arguments of the two sides of the debate.  
China has maintained a high rate of urbanisation in recent decades. Lin et al. (2014) 
summarised the official statistics: according to China State Statistical Bureau (2011), the 
urban population in 1978 was 172 million, which was 17.9 per cent of the total population in 
China. By 2011, the size of the urban population increased to 691 million, 51.3 per cent of 
the total population. Although the statistics may not be entirely accurate, considering the 
rural-urban migrants group and the boundary changes of the urban area, they present a 
general picture of the fast rate of urban growth in China (Lin, et al., 2014; Chan, 2007). This 
high rate of urbanisation is mainly driven by spontaneous, i.e. voluntary, urbanisation.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, spontaneous urbanisation includes rural-urban and urban-urban 
migration. Spontaneous urbanisation has attracted a great deal of attention from scholars. 
Kasarda & Crenshaw (1991) point out the relationship between spontaneous urbanisation 
and development theories globally, which is that the type and pace of migration is 
contingent on the development state of the region. Kasarda & Crenshaw (1991) also 
comment on the impact of the rural-urban migration process on both rural and urban areas. 
China’s urban labour market works as a pull factor, attracting rural surplus labourers to the 
urban opportunities in the process of spontaneous urbanisation, but the flow of population 
movement would not be possible without the relaxation of the implementation of the state 
hukou system regulations. It seems that the pace and scale of population flow from rural to 
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urban areas in the last three decades is inseparable from the policies shaped by the Chinese 
states at various levels.   
The factors attracting rural residents to urban areas include opportunities in terms of work, 
education for offspring, healthcare and many others, while push factors which encourage 
farmers to leave the countryside consist of financial pressure, poor living conditions, lack of 
non-agricultural work opportunities and education (Wang & Zuo, 1999). The movement of 
migrants has broad benefits and challenges for individuals, as well for the receiving and 
sending places (Taylor, 1999). For sending areas, while migrants are working elsewhere, the 
remittances they send back contribute to their rural household and the local economy 
(Stark, 1978; Stark & Yitzhaki, I982). When migrants go back to rural home, they bring new 
ideas and skills from urban areas, creating a form of “brain gain” for the sending areas 
(Stark, et al., 1997; Levitt, 1998). However, although rural economy benefits from the 
remittances sent back by migrants working in the cities most of time, remittances may also 
be spent in conspicuous consumption and not invested productively, and fail to contribute 
to the rural economy; moreover, in some areas, there may be brain drain rather than brain 
gain (Taylor, 1999:65; Lipton, 1977).  
Migration is usually a part of a household strategy. As it is often the young, the healthy, the 
motivated and the skilled who are chosen to migrate to cities as a rural household livelihood 
strategy (Ellis, 1998) or for self-realisation, it is usually the elderly, the unwell and the less 
skilled workers who stay in the countryside. From the rural household perspective, many 
rural migrants send remittances to the rural area to support their households, and the rural 
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households look after migrants’ children if the parents choose not to take the children with 
them to the cities. For the receiving areas, migration provides the desired labour resources; 
therefore it will improve urban productivity (Todaro, 1969:139). However, receiving areas 
typically also see migrants as a threat to the established order (Richmond, & Valtonen, 
1994). When it comes to integration into the urban area, while a few affluent migrants 
manage to join the urban middle or upper class in China, for example the successful 
entrepreneurs and the highly educated and skilled, most rural migrants join the urban 
lowere class (Lee, 2007).  
Despite the emergence of the new class, the residence of rural migrants in the city is usually 
temporary in China. On one hand, concerning the social capacity of the receiving place, 
certain urban areas may have limited social and financial resources to provide for this group 
of the population, for example education services, transportation facilities, housing supply 
and healthcare. When the number of new incomers outweighs the maximum capacity of the 
city, it causes overcrowding, poor quality of social service for the existing residents and 
social instability (Wang & Zuo, 1999). In China, settlement of rural migrants to Tier 1 
metropolises like Beijing and Shanghai is strictly controlled by the state through the hukou 
system, but they are encouraged to settle down in medium and small cities, which have 
expansion plans. China uses the tier system to rank its cities. With seven tiers in total, Tier 1 
cities are the largest by population and the wealthiest. Tier 1 includes the four centrally 
administered municipalities: Beijing (19.61 million), Shanghai (23.01 million), Tianjin (12.93 
million) and Chongqing (28.84 million), based on the 2010 Chinese Census. Tier 2 cities are 
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slightly smaller and less affluent compared to Tier 1, and Tier 3 and the rest are descending 
in population size and wealth.  
Discussion on the hukou system is inseparable from the development of spontaneous 
urbanisation where rural labourers migrate to work in the urban area. As outlined in the 
previous Chapter, the hukou system was initially a household registration system, but was 
later used to restrict labour movement from the countryside to urban areas, and residents 
continue to enjoy different levels of social welfare according to their hukou status. It is the 
source of the dual land system in the rural and urban areas; the separated built environment 
and the production activities lead to differentiated lifestyles of rural and urban residents. 
These divisions are also the foundation of the dual class structure in China (Chan & Zhang, 
1999). Rural underdevelopment is to a large extent a result of this rural-urban division. In 
the 1950s, with the implementation of the CCP’s First Five-Year Plan, major cities and coastal 
cities became the priority in industrial development and access to these places was limited 
to unproductive rural labourers. Rural labourers tended to float to where development was 
fast and the opportunities were more to gain supplemental non-agricultural income beside 
their agricultural production. Tension was thus generated between rural labourers’ pursuit 
of higher income and better welfare in the cities and the state’s avoidance of dispersion of 
capital and high costs of industrialisation caused by rural peasants.  
After the failure of persuasion measures in keeping the rural inflows outside the city, the 
state restricted channels for rural labour intake from spontaneous to an organised and 
demand-based approach. According to Cheng & Selden (1994), the regulations even limited 
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“intra-rural and intra-urban” movements. The hukou system was strengthened in the mid-
1950s to support grain rationing, and to make sure there was enough grain being produced 
in rural China to facilitate urban industrialisation. These measures intensively distinguished 
urban areas from rural areas and made urban livelihoods (employment, healthcare, 
education, housing and retirement) the responsibility of the state while rural areas were to 
survive by themselves. The increased gap between subsidies to urban and rural areas called 
for a strict classification and regulation to fix the pattern. In the late 1950s, the tension 
between the state’s pursuit of rapid industrialisation and the freedom of the mass 
population in the countryside was formed. In the 1960s, the famine caused by the Great 
Leap Forward intensified the state’s struggle in supplying grain for the urban population, 
which caused stricter implementation of the hukou system and more urban population were 
sent to the countryside. Through 1960s and until the late 1970s, migration remained limited 
due to the state’s strict control (Mallee, 2003). 
Chan (2010) shows that reform since the 1970s has not fundamentally changed the hukou 
system. Although urban hukou is now granted to rural residents in areas adjacent to urban 
areas due to the process of urbanisation, discrimination towards people from rural areas has 
not been eliminated. Furthermore, since the hukou system is the core of rural-urban 
division, the existence of the hukou means the unequal dualistic structure has barely been 
changed. As Chan & Buckingham (2008) suggest, the hukou system can only be abolished 
fully if the subordinate relationship of rural areas to urban areas is fundamentally changed. 
Although the Chinese State Council abolished the distinction between rural and urban 
Chinese citizens in the announcement of the “end of the hukou (household registration) 
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system” in July 2014, Goodburn (2014) argues that the 2014 reform does not bring many 
benefits to rural residents and migrants, since the distinction between insiders and outsiders 
has merely changed from agricultural/non-agricultural to a locality-based system. Goodburn 
(2014) agrees with Chan & Buckingham (2008) that real hukou reform would require 
additional funding for public service provision, as well as further reform of China’s land 
rights.   
 
3.3 The “left-behind” and spontaneous urbanisation 
While the spontaneous urbanisation process has enriched a portion of the rural population, 
many challenges remain unsolved and new problems are created in China. When it comes to 
those who joined the urban work force, as mentioned in the previous section, most of them 
are the motivated, the young, the skilled and the healthy, but there is also an even larger 
portion of the rural population who still stay in the rural area, some of whom are stuck in 
poverty. For those who work in the cities, they are called “migrant workers” or the “floating 
population”, which describes the dilemma that they move between the city where they 
work and their rural home. For rural residents, they are a part of the bigger picture of the so-
called “left-behind” population. There is some debate in the literature on use of the term 
“left behind”, regarding the relationship between the remaining rural population and 
migrants, and their relation to rural development and migration. I do not use the term “left-
behind” here to describe those who did not migrate to urban areas, as this term typically 
presents surplus rural labour as a problem, and inevitably compares them to those who 
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migrate. This is not the aim of this research, which focuses on resettled surplus rural 
labourers and their livelihoods under different styles of state intervention. Therefore, I call 
this group “resettled farmers”, “surplus rural labourers” and “rural residents”, but not “the 
left-behind”. It is worth noting that, nonetheless, the focus group of resettled famers in this 
research is coterminous with what many scholars would call the left behind, and thus shares 
important attributes with them. 
Another consequence of rural stagnation has been the household income gap between rural 
and urban areas (Wen, 2001). The underdevelopment of the rural area and income gap 
between rural and urban area push rural residents to migrate and work in urban areas. 
While extreme poverty in China is expected to be eliminated by 2022, according to the 
World Bank (Sicular, 2013), income inequality has increased rapidly from 1980s to 2012, 
with China’s Gini coefficient increasing from 0.30 to 0.55, and more than 10% of China’s 
total inequality is now attributed to the rural-urban gap (Xie & Zhou, 2014). In 2009, the 
income of urban residents was 2.33 times more than those in rural areas. When it comes to 
regional disparity, rural residents earned three times more in coastal provinces from 1989 to 
2004, according to data from National Bureau of Statistics (NBSC, 2015).  
Apart from the restrictions posed by the state, for most rural migrants, the challenges of 
permanent settlement in urban areas are twofold: the unliquidated rural assets and the cost 
of urban settlement and living. In terms of their rural hometown, farmers cannot sell their 
farmland, which is tied with their village membership on the grounds of their hukou type. As 
farmland is collectively owned, individual farmers and households are not allowed to trade 
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nor sell their portion of land. Usually they hire neighbours to farm for them or leave it 
abandoned, or take the loss by forfeiting village membership and losing their land without 
compensation (Zhao, 1999). When it comes to the cost of urban settlement and living, rural 
migrants can rarely afford skyrocketing housing prices, particularly in the big cities, by their 
labour income, not to mention that the costs of urban living go beyond house prices, for 
example education costs and transportation costs. Therefore, even given an urban hukou, it 
is still difficult for rural individuals to settle down in the urban area where one big hurdle is 
urban housing.  
The result of this dilemma is that rural migrants typically either keep working in the urban 
area while sending money back to the countryside, where the majority of the Chinese rural 
households use that money to refresh their rural housing or build new, or migrants decide to 
go back to their rural home and start their own business. Although the countryside and the 
rural population benefit from either of the choices, it does not improve the productivity of 
rural land, which remains small-scale farming, nor the infrastructure of the countryside, and 
the livelihoods of the rural households heavily rely on remittance brought back by the rural 
migrants.  
The above analysis seems to show that the key lies in how to manage the remaining rural 
households, and in particular whether it is better for them to resettle in urban areas or to 
reorganise their rural life in the countryside. For the former, it is typically an option only for 
households with rural migrants, but still they face tremendous financial challenge in 
affording urban housing and covering the living costs. As for the latter, it largely depends on 
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the behaviour at the village level government, which could well be incentivised or regulated 
by the upper-level states. These are the two fundamental approaches which have appeared 
in the phenomenon of state-led urbanisation in China.  
 
3.4 Debate on development strategies  
To address the challenges mentioned above, the Chinese government initiated a new set of 
urbanisation policies since 2006, called state-led urbanisation (Xinhua, 2014). State-led 
urbanisation introduces a more proactive role of the state while working with the market. 
Apart from policy intervention, in state-led urbanisation the state takes the initiative in 
reorganisation of the rural production system, spatial structure and resource allocation. The 
implications for villagers’ livelihoods depend on what are the changes to the market 
mechanisms which shape their livelihood components. However, different methods of state 
intervention formulate different layouts of the market mechanism landscape.  
My research compares the two main types of state-led urbanisation with empirical findings 
from four villages. The arguments of the two approaches are antithetical as to whether or 
not marketisation is the path for rural development. One is embodied in the social 
movement “New Rural Reconstruction” (NRR), proposed by a group of intellectuals at the 
beginning of the 2000s under the leadership of Wen Tiejun, the dean of rural development 
at Renmin University. Wen Tiejun published the essay “Deconstructing 
Modernization”, which argues that rural underdevelopment is caused by the integration of 
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the rural areas into the urban market economy and the land privatisation process (Wen, 
2007). The other approach is represented by the policy of “Constructing a New Socialist 
Countryside” (NSC), promulgated by the Chinese central government in 2006. The policy was 
promulgated in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) by the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao 
administration, aiming to modernise the countryside, which has fallen behind the urban 
areas. From this year until 2020, the government promises to improve farmers’ livelihoods, 
advance industrial support for agriculture, tidy villages and develop democratic 
administration. According to NSC policies, in general, rural underdevelopment is caused by 
the lack of integration of rural areas into the urban market system, thus the solution for 
rural underdevelopment is to improve the unity of the rural-urban system and restructure 
rural life in order to integrate it into urban development (Central People’s Government of 
China, 2006). The stated methods of NSC to achieve these goals are industrialised 
agriculture, with urban areas supporting rural areas (Central People’s Government of China, 
2006).  
The major work on NSC is from Anna Ahlers, Gunter Schubert and Lynette Ong. Ahlers & 
Schubert (2009) argue that NSC has been effective in achieving its main goal of improving 
rural incomes, reducing rural population and transforming the countryside. They attribute 
success to the high level of coordination between policy planning and implementation. 
However there is a debate over the role of the special NSC offices at municipal level (Ong, 
2014), county level (Ahlers & Schubert, 2009), and village level (Wang, 2009). According to 
Ahlers & Schubert (2009), there are four levels in the NSC framework. Apart from the 
national NSC framework, provincial and city governments specify a provincial level 
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framework; then, the county level government designs development plans for their county 
based on the provincial framework; finally, villages and township governments come up with 
specific development projects based on the circumstances of their villages and apply for 
funding from the county government.  
The NSC approach to state-led urbanisation strengthens the role of policy making at the 
county level. NSC funding is allocated in a top-down manner where the provincial/city 
government transfers funds to the county government, which further transfers funds to 
village and township governments as village and township governments apply for funding 
jointly (Ahlers & Schubert, 2009). Ahlers & Schubert (2009) argue that although it looks like a 
bottom-up process, where the villages and township governments design the specific 
projects and apply for funding, it is actually the county governments who approve projects, 
allocate funding and select county-level model villages. They are important decisions for the 
county governments as the promotion of the county level cadres is related to the success of 
the county level model villages. Model villages (shifan cun 示范村) are showcases of rural 
development strategies. For the county-level cadres, promoting model villages is one of the 
NSC tasks and is also the dominant strategy for leading development. According to Ahlers & 
Schubert’s (2009) findings, model villages receive a large part of the total NSC funding. For 
the purpose of this research, Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 analyse this in detail, focusing on the 
different processes of model village selection in Tianjin and Zhejiang in order to explore how 
the organisation of local states affect the livelihood implications.  
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The background which enables the implementation of NSC is China’s early 2000s fiscal 
reforms – in particular the rural Tax-for-Fee reform (TFR). Ahlers & Schubert (2009) point out 
that this reform not only reduced the burden of farmers by removing agricultural taxes and 
rural fees, but also subsidised local governments with funding from the central government. 
However, other scholars argue that the impacts of TFR vary geographically across the nation, 
in terms of implications for local governance and villagers’ welfare (Alm & Liu 2013). While 
in general local governments in rural China receive less revenues for providing public 
services, the rich/coastal provinces suffer less because their budget is compensated by the 
funding transferred from upper level states, as well as the revenue collected from rural 
industries; in contrast, the poor/inland villages’ budget is rarely compensated due to the 
lower fiscal capacity of their upper level states as well as the lower revenue to collect from 
rural industries (Fork & Wong, 2005; Kennedy, 2007). As a result, the effects of TFR in 
reducing intra-village inequality in rich and/or coastal villages are more significant than that 
in poor/inland villages (Alm & Liu, 2014). This was in sharp contrast to the 1994 fiscal 
reform. From the start of market reform until 1994, local tax revenue was shared between 
local and central governments by the “fiscal contract system”, in which the local government 
retained the rest of the revenue after transferring a fixed amount to the central state 
(Chung, 1994). After 1994, this system was replaced by a new “tax-sharing” system, in which 
the central state received a proportion of the local tax revenue (Lin, et al., 2014). At the 
same time, municipal governments took on increasing responsibilities in providing 
affordable housing and social welfare for the urban poor and the migrant groups (Wang et 
al., 2009). With the growth of the economy, the central state gained more and the local 
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government retained less compared to before 1994. Therefore, with increasing pressure to 
provide social welfare for migrants and urban laid-off workers combined with decreasing 
local fiscal capacity, local governments sought to gain more revenue by transferring rural 
land into urban land and benefitting from its commercial use (Lin, et al., 2014).  
From the perspective of the county level state, NSC might therefore reduce the fiscal burden 
of local governments in China, as Ahlers & Schubert show. However, research conducted by 
Lynette Ong in Hefei, the capital and largest city of Anhui Province in Eastern China, provides 
evidence of an increasing reliance by municipal and local governments on land revenues and 
the financing of urban infrastructure by the governments’ land-leasing income. Ong (2014) 
argues that when it comes to municipal governments, officials at that level are still 
evaluated by provincial GDP growth, of which real estate has been the major engine, 
contributing 20-25 percent of China’s GDP (Chovanec, 2012; Ong, 2014). One important way 
for provincial governments to profit from the process is transferring collectively-owned land 
into state-owned land, which could be rented out to private developers. This is because, 
according to the Land Management Law, private developers can only develop state-owned 
land, not that which is collectively-owned. Municipal governments therefore have a vested 
interest in the large-scale development and urbanisation of the villages adjacent to the 
urban area, as opposed to smaller scale rural reorganisation. Although the rural hukou status 
of inhabitants exempts municipal governments from taking the responsibility of providing 
village residents with urban levels of social welfare, it also restrains their ability to 
reorganise the land for development (Wang et al., 2009). The rural hukou and the separation 
from the municipal government administration leave space for the village committees to 
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manage their own rural land rights. As the village leaders and their relatives are often 
holding rural land and have an entrenched interest in the land, their interest is not always 
aligned with that of the municipal governments. The above conflict in power protects the 
existing collective rural land rights while the village leaders fight for their own rights, which 
also protects individual farmers’ land rights; on the other hand, this breeds village-level 
corruption and impedes the development of a fair and transparent account of village 
finance. As a result, municipal governments tend to initiate large-scale development to gain 
more control of adjacent rural land (Ong, 2014).  
As for the village level governments, Wang (2009) elaborates the importance of urban 
villages for the livelihoods of the urban poor and village residents, particularly in providing 
affordable housing, employment in the informal sector and space for residents’ 
entrepreneurial activities. However, what is the factor that decides which development path 
the village committee is going to take? How does the small scale approach differ from the 
large scale approach in re-delineating the boundaries and rights of the rural collective 
ownership rights? The answer to these questions appears to be closely associated with the 
absent of clearly defined rural collective land rights, as the sections below will make clear.  
The second Chinese approach to rural development is the NRR school. This school, and 
particularly its leading proponent Wen Tiejun, argues in contrast to NSC that rural areas will 
not benefit from integration with the urban market economy, because when it is integrated 
into the system, it is in a weaker position compared to urban areas; therefore, the rural area 
would be more easily expropriated by urban areas in terms of land, labour and capital (Wen, 
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2001). The contemporary NRR approach is based on a 1930s movement of the same name, 
under the leadership of Liang Shuming, Y.C. James Yen and others, who aimed to reenergise 
Chinese villages against Japanese invasion (Wen, 2001). The movement was allied with 
neither the Nationalist government nor the CCP. In contrast to the CCP’s radical land 
redistribution, NRR argued for strengthening the village economy and unity of groups and 
development of technology as a method for rural reconstruction. Today’s NRR attributes 
rural underdevelopment to the wholesale dissolution of rural communes and the failure of 
the government since 1978 to continue to invest in rural collective public service 
institutions, for example the “barefoot doctor” system for healthcare and the replacement 
of agricultural education by modernised education at local schools (Wen, 2005). NRR argues 
that most collective communes were effective in the rural context, and that once these 
institutions were abandoned, public services for farmers were withdrawn. One example is 
the household responsibility system, which decentralised production responsibility into 
household units in 1984. Although this system boosted agricultural production by 
introducing market incentives, it also separated land use rights from collective land 
ownership and distributed land use rights to household units. The problem of this is that 
only rural collective ownership is protected by law but not the distributed land use rights of 
individual farmers (Wen, 2001). Therefore, NRRs’ method for tackling rural 
underdevelopment is to limit rural-urban integration and reorganise rural life in rural areas, 
including the re-establishment of rural collective production and social institutions.  
After promulgation of the national NSC framework in 2006, some NRR activists switched 
quietly to the NSC framework, while others were influenced by each other and all now 
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operate under the cover of the national NSC framework. As a result, it is increasingly difficult 
to distinguish the NSC approach from the NRR approach (Hale, 2013). Given the confusion in 
distinguishing the nature of development practice under the NSC policy framework, in this 
research, I discard the rhetorical differences and focus on the fundamental differences 
between the two approaches, which I take to be that NSC promotes the integration of the 
countryside into urban areas, with increased marketisation and incorporation of the rural 
economy, while NRR limits urban integration and strengthens rural integrity and the distinct 
rural economy. This means that NRR cases are smaller in scale and do not always involve 
physical resettlement. The following sections will summarise the typical models, and the 
consequences of both of the large and small scale development for livelihoods in the 
existing cases, before examining in detail how the two approaches interact with the market 
mechanisms and the state for the purposes of comparison of the two state approaches to 
state-led urbanisation.  
As shown in the above discussion, there is some literature on the behaviours of the local and 
central states, the policy framework, and the funding mechanisms of rural redevelopment in 
China. However, from the existing literature, it is unclear how the livelihoods of rural 
farmers are affected under the two approaches. The next part of the thesis will therefore 
draw on the development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) framework and 
the impoverishment, risks and reconstruction model (IRR) to provide an account of global 
literature on rural development. 
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3.5 Development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) 
State-led urbanisation in China is in essence a practice of development-induced 
displacement and resettlement (DIDR). In the large body of global literature on DIDR, much 
focuses on development motivated by the extraction of natural resources, development of 
industrial part or urban expansion, which is always accompanied by displacement and 
resettlement of populations living in the affected areas. In his important work on the DIDR 
framework, Terminski (2013) describes DIDR as a socioeconomic issue associated with loss 
of resources and access to resources, in which there is often an absent of social support. He 
asks three fundamental questions to consider for DIDR-type projects: “what is the purpose 
of economic development, who benefits from it, and by what means should it be 
implemented?” (Terminksi, 2013: 26).  
The core focus of DIDR projects, Terminski suggests, is about human development, human 
security and human rights. However, the interest of human security is often in conflict with 
the goals of economic development. Where economic development as a priority surpasses 
the importance of human rights of the marginalised communities, there is further 
marginalisation and continuous violation of human rights (Terminski, 2013). Among many 
other causes and types of DIDR, Terminski (2013) focuses especially on development-
induced displacement and resettlement caused by non-natural factors, like the state-led 
urbanisation process. He lists factors that affect the implementation process of resettlement 
– “the form of government, dynamics and principles of economic development and 
environmental protection policies, property rights, the level of respect for human rights, the 
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level of development of institutions of civil society, activities of NGOs, the relation of 
government to social inequalities, the problem of poverty and of communities on the 
margins of society, and antagonisms of economic, social, ethnic or religious origin” 
(Terminski, 2013: 22).  
One major theoretical framework of DIDR is Michael Cernea’s “Impoverishment, Risks and 
Reconstruction” (IRR) model. The impact of DIDR on uprooted people’s livelihoods is 
threefold: economic, social and psychological. More specifically, according to the IRR model, 
there are eight risks that threaten the livelihoods of displaced people: 1. Landlessness. 2. 
Joblessness. 3. Homelessness. 4. Marginalization. 5. Increased morbidity and mortality. 6. 
Food insecurity. 7. Loss of access to common property. 8. Social (community) disarticulation 
(Cernea, 2007, p1572). 
Benefits of the IRR model include: first, that this framework can address the sustainability 
point in the livelihoods framework, because it can provide diagnosis of livelihood risks and 
warnings. Second, the IRR framework includes the response of the displaced population to 
livelihood risks, stresses and shocks. Third, this framework also records the response of 
individuals to the social processes, aside from tracking their response to the economic 
process (Cernea, 2007, p1571). 
Although Cernea’s framework has not yet been applied in the Chinese context, his identified 
risks are acute in China’s state-led urbanisation. The economic consequences particularly 
feature landlessness and loss of access to common property, which is about de-
capitalisation in the form of reduced access to common property resources, often 
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permanent. Furthermore, the deteriorating economic conditions also cause social 
disintegration, which I analyse in detail as part of the reformulation of social class in the new 
resettlement community in Chapters 6 and 8 of this thesis. In the livelihoods framework, this 
is related to the possession of assets. Because common resources are usually an economic 
feature of rural communities, the loss of this part of resources has a particularly devastating 
impact on the uprooted people’s livelihoods. As these resources in the agricultural economy 
also shape people’s daily activities, the loss of these resources also disturbs the daily life of 
resettled people, which might further create psychological impact and disarticulation and 
damage to social fabrics. As for joblessness, Cernea argues that the uprooted people 
experience difficulties in participating in the new labour market due to the lack of 
agricultural related employment opportunity; at the same time, creation of fit employment 
requires investment.  
The IRR framework shows that it is essential to examine how the labour market and land-
related policies are shaped, particularly by comparing the effects of the state intervention of 
two styles. When the new labour market or land market require different activities and daily 
routines from the labourers, the pattern of behaviour of individuals and as a group also 
changes, which requires social supports and services to adapt and evolve in a sustainable 
manner. Social disarticulation concerns the loss of social capital, which is often the result of 
changing community structures and institutions. Due to its qualitative and invisible nature, it 
is difficult to embed in the compensation scheme, despite the fact that it causes 
disempowerment of the displaced communities. Are the social impacts, marginalisation and 
social disarticulation similar in the case in the state-led urbanisation? I analyse this in detail 
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in Chapters 5-8, focusing on the state’s efforts in shaping the labour market, behaviours of 
resettled farmers and social capital in order to do compare the implications on livelihoods 
with different state approaches.  
When it comes to the question of who loses in DIDR, in a given society with deeply 
entrenched social divisions, the economically or socially weaker communities are often not 
entitled to the benefits of the society, and individuals in the communities are not classified 
with full citizenship compared to the dominant social groups. As a result, these communities 
and individuals usually bear more costs of development rather than benefits (Terminski, 
2013). This is the case not only in those negatively affected cases, but also in projects which 
generate positive results. The dysfunction of agricultural related skills, importance of service 
industry skills, the reorganisation and reallocation of the rural assets, as well as the newly 
shaped activities, all challenge the existing social fabrics and the community structure, which 
might breed new social relations and generate new stratification in the resettled 
community. This is particularly important in this research, because the better-connected 
resettled farmers are likely to benefit much more from resettlement and compensation than 
the marginalised and not well-connected. 
The experience from DIDR cases globally shows that governance plays a key role in 
minimising the risks that the displaced people are exposed to, as well as the restoration of 
their livelihoods afterward. In summary, good governance aims to avoid or minimise the 
amount of people affected by displacement, to address this from the earliest stage from the 
perspective of development rather than liability. The support for the displaced population’s 
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livelihood restoration is typically composed of three parts: compensation for the cost of 
resettlement and lost assets, assistance during the transition period to the resettlement site; 
third, shared benefits of the additional economy created by the more efficient use of rural 
resources (Cernea, 1993). Given the risks and consequences, Cernea (2007) argues that 
measures to fix the damage include the setting up of national safety nets, supported by 
substantial national financial investment, in the form of compensation from multiple 
channels apart from cash compensation. Also, project planning from the start of the project 
in the aim of mitigating adverse effect is key. The restoration of livelihoods concerns not 
only how access to common property resources is lost, but also how access to new 
resources is created. As shown in the existing literature, the risks and consequences of 
displacement in each case depend on the planning, negotiation and conduct of the 
developer – which is the state in the case of China’s state-led urbanisation. As for the levels 
of state, they are different in NSC and NRR approaches, which will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 7. 
3.5.1 Example of DIDR in the case of China’s Three Gorges Dam 
While no previous studies have applied the DIDR approach to China’s urbanisation 
strategies, the Three Gorges Dam case is somewhat similar to the case of the large-scale 
development in Tianjin and a review of the displacement literature on the Dam is therefore 
instructive. Of course, different from cases of displacement caused by dam building or 
mining projects, urbanisation features urban use of rural land, rural surplus labour and rural 
capital. Therefore while the other types of displacement focus on one-off compensation, 
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development-induced urbanisation must address the importance of setting up the new 
labour market, housing market and capital market that could benefit resettled people, 
particularly the most vulnerable groups. Nevertheless, similar to the Three Gorges Dam case, 
whether the most deprived groups can benefit from resettlement and redevelopment 
remains a question. The focal group in state-led urbanisation is the rural population who 
remained behind in rural areas during spontaneous urbanisation, those who held rural 
hukou and were not entitled to the benefits of economic reform at equivalent rates to the 
urban level. Although state-led urbanisation targets the most vulnerable social group from 
the previous reforms, the surplus rural labourers, this group of population is also stratified in 
itself.  
The similarity between the cases lies in the large amount of rural population for relocation 
and the reconstruction of the resettlement community. The existing literature has 
intensively recorded the displacement of the Three Gorges Dam project, including the 
planning, process, and impact on livelihoods. The Three-Gorges Dam is located in south-
central China, 2335 meters long and 185 meters high maximum (Huang, 2000). It was 
finished and started generating electric power in late 2003. The Three-Gorges Reservoir Area 
extends to 58,000 km2, which surpasses the size of Switzerland by 16,710 km2 (Huang, 
2000). The Dam was built to control major floods, improve river transport, and generate 
electricity to a quarter more reaching a capacity of 22,400 MW 9 (Jackson & Sleigh, 2000). 
Apart from the ecological and environmental impact, there was an even bigger socio-
economic impact on the 1.3 million people who were displaced for the project. The 
implications for livelihoods included the loss of farmland, inadequate compensation for 
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property rights, and the loss of employment for the resettled population. A total of 40 per 
cent of farmers without land had to migrate and join the urban labour market (Jackson & 
Sleigh, 2000).  
In a comparative study of post-Three Gorges Dam displacement livelihoods in two counties 
in Hubei province, Wilmsen (2011) shows that while it is important to promote benefit-
sharing investment in the resettlement area, the key for successful displacement is to ensure 
that the most deprived group has access to income-generating activities (Wilmsen, 2011). 
While the majority of the resettled farmers from both of the counties experienced a 
deterioration in livelihoods due to the lack of access to higher income-generating activities, 
those who were better-off were located in the county which attracted increased investment 
from private enterprises supported by favourable policies (Wilmsen, 2011; Zuo, 2010). The 
low education level was one hurdle for farmers to access high income generating 
employments. While those who previously relied on farming for livelihood could work in the 
construction sites, the payment was usually too low to cover the living expenses and the 
work was unstable which exposed farmers to long-term livelihood risks (Wilmsen, 2011). In 
cases where the employment opportunities did not match farmers’ skills, the research 
shows a simultaneous phenomenon of high unemployment yet a short supply of qualified 
labour (Wilmsen, 2011). In this comparative study at the county level, Wilmsen (2011) shows 
the important role of the Chinese state in channelling funding to the resettlement region; 
however, the implementation of the share benefit economy tended to benefit ordinary rural 
farmers less than those who are well connected (Wilmsen, 2011).  
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3.6 The labour market and rural development  
The Three Gorges Dam case study illustrates that the abrupt transition of the nature of work 
may cause economic and social risks in achieving sustainable livelihoods for those who are 
not used to the new daily routines and do not seek new work. For those who are successful 
in participating in the new urban labour market, the loss of autonomy, the highly specified 
and repetitive work, indoor work environment and the supervision system might all cause 
psychological shock. As mentioned above, one key factor that determines the success of the 
development programmes is whether the new labour market includes the local poor. The 
local government plays an important role in shaping the labour market. This section reviews 
the dimensions of the labour market and how they are shaped by the state intervention, and 
introduces the two solutions from the two styles of state-led urbanisation.  
In general, the state shapes the labour market in three ways. First, it shapes the scope and 
boundaries of the formal and informal sectors. Second, it channels the cluster of industries 
in the region with funding and regulating policies. Third, it provides training programmes for 
the unskilled or semi-skilled workers (Burawoy, 1983). In China’s planned economy before 
1978, during urban expansion, state-assigned employment assisted the rural population to 
adapt to urban livelihoods (Wang et al., 2009). However, this state employment allocation 
scheme is no longer available due to the transition to a market economy and the increasing 
size of the population. Scholars point out that the divisions between the rural and urban 
population as well as between the rural and urban land ownership rights are the 
fundamental factors which prohibit rural residents from effectively engaging in urban living 
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(Biao, 2007). The next section examines how the NSC and NRR approaches shape the labour 
market. 
3.6.1 Labour market and the two development approaches  
In large-scale development in China, such as that in Tianjin under the NSC approach, the 
planned urban labour sector is associated with the formal sector, which favours skilled and 
semi-skilled workers. The establishment of the formal sector is likely to be compensated by 
the diminishing informal sector as well as the flexible forms of employment offered in the 
sector. Based on a migration survey conducted in 119 villages from thirteen counties of nine 
provinces in China in 1997 by the Department of Rural Development of the Development 
Research Centre of the State Council (DRCSC), Ma (2011) studied return migrants and found 
that return migrants benefit more from skills and entrepreneurial ability than savings when 
it comes to their employment prospects after returning to the countryside. For the younger 
generation who are acquainted with computers and return migrants who understand the 
urban and international tourist demand, have knowledge in technology and management, 
they benefit not only from the development of the urban labour market, but also the rural-
based industries, like rural tourism (Su, 2013). This raises questions about the rest of the 
population who used to live by farming, and work in low paid positions because they are 
unlikely to acquire new technology and management skills. The generated prosperity for the 
former group, together with the loss of income sources for the latter group, may create new 
wealth gaps and intra-village social stratification. My research examines the impacts on 
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these different groups among the resettled population in detail in the case studies examined 
in Chapters 5-8.  
The other deficiency of the large-scale development is the neglected risk aspect for rural 
businesses, particularly when the scale of the business is small and there is a lack of cluster 
of industry. The poorly managed expectations of farmers for the success of their businesses 
is a risk factor for post-resettlement livelihood (Jim & Xu, 2002). Research on established 
rural tourism businesses show that support from the local state is desired, especially in 
financial funding support, the development of industrial cluster, marketing and tax cuts 
(Sharpley & Vass, 2006). The background of the operators of these businesses is unclear 
from the existing literature. Given the complexity of launching and running such businesses, 
I assume the owners of businesses in my case studies are typically those who have work 
experience in the urban labour market before, and possessed the know-how knowledge 
already. As for those farmers who would like to climb the ladder by launching rural tourism 
businesses, it is much more challenging, particularly if they have no related knowledge or 
skills in the sector. I examine this in the case of Wusi village where there is a cluster of rural 
tourism. Training programmes provided by the local governments for farmers, aiming to 
help them integrate to the new urban living environment, involve the basic literacy skills, 
financial skills and customer service skills, and may mitigate some of the difficulties (Yuan, 
2009). However, Ong (2014) also provides evidence of loss of work in this type of state-led 
urbanisation. Most of the villagers keep their prior employment after resettlement, but 
what is concerning is the situation for the young, the elderly and the female. The young 
people usually find work in the urban service sector, like in the restaurants, supermarkets, or 
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as sales people (Ong, 2014). This employment is labour intensive with no career 
perspectives, and with a salary that can only just meet their modest expenses. For the 
elderly and women, if they used to work on the farm rather than in the industrial or service 
sector, it is very likely that they are unemployed after resettlement and experience 
difficulties in finding new work because of lack of skill-set for the new labour market and age 
(Ong, 2014). The same considerations are likely to apply in the case of Tianjin, where the 
elderly and women are likely to be unemployed in the new labour market after 
resettlement.  
The existing research shows that local community participation is a solution to share the 
benefit of rural tourism to ethnic minorities and impoverished groups (Wang et al, 2010). If 
this does not create participation in the decision making process, at least there is 
participation in the benefit sharing process (Liu & Wall, 2005). More importantly, organising 
local participation and resources sharing requires the local states to have the capacity in 
terms of effective financial and policy support and intervention to set up resource 
redistribution mechanisms (Zheng, 2008). On example from the existing case studies is the 
local state identifying the cultural heritage and natural resources to support industrial 
clusters and providing small-scale funding (Toops, 1991). The role of community 
participation in the state-led urbanisation process in Tianjin and Zhejiang will be examined in 
Chapters 6 and 8 below. 
Compared to large scale development, one model of the smaller scale development method 
is rural tourism. Research by Zeng & Ryan (2012) shows that rural tourism is an efficient way 
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of boosting the rural economy in China. Rural tourism typically features the rural lifestyle 
with a variety of cultural, education and family activities (Bramwell and Lane, 1994). 
Furthermore, it extends to the rural customs, traditions, values and heritage (Pedford, 
1996). The benefits of rural tourism for the countryside include increasing farmers’ income, 
enhancing agricultural business, and escalation of access to employment for the returned 
rural-to-urban migrants (Sharpley & Vass, 2006). Given the fact that rural tourism provides 
an alternative income for farmers, which diversifies the risk from farming activities, it is an 
option in terms of reorganising rural life and developing the countryside without integration 
with the urban area.  
One important role of rural tourism is as an instrument for poverty alleviation programmes. 
In China, rural tourism has been used as a tool for poverty reduction for the last 20 years. 
Such programmes are called ‘Tourism-Assisting the Poor’, (fu pin lvyou, 扶贫旅游), 
abbreviated to TAP (Zeng & Ryan, 2012). They typically operate with market mechanisms 
but initiated by local governments (Guo, 2003). Compared to commercial tourism, TAP is 
more than a for-profit tourist product; rather it aims to channel revenues to the poor in the 
region. TAP tackles precisely the poverty of deprived groups who do not benefit from 
economic development. The additional benefits of pro-poor tourism include empowerment 
of women, promotion of skill training and reduction of illiteracy (Zeng & Ryan, 2012). 
In the Chinese context, one common form of existence of the rural tourism model is “Nong 
jia le” (农家乐) tourism (Happy Farmer Home) (Su, 2013). Despite the potential prosperity 
that could be gained by farmers, however, Nong jia le and similar businesses also present 
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challenges for the operation and benefit distribution. In terms of operation, the performing 
of the business requires a different set of knowledge and skills of the business operators, 
which include business management, marketing, operation and customer services (Sharpley 
& Vass, 2006). This differs considerably from the type and characteristics of the farming 
activates, which in the Chinese context is more labour intensive with requirements on 
specific and technical farming knowledge. Furthermore, the benefits of investment are 
sustainable only if the policy and regulation environment changes (Zhao, 2004). Scholars in 
China have identified four key aspects that contribute to successful TAP programmes, which 
include the target population, specific objectives, participation mechanism and financial 
management (Wu et al., 2004). Two issues emerging in the development of the rural tourism 
model are disparity of income among villagers and the barrier for the extremely poor to be 
involved in rural tourism development (Liu, 2006). The question of whether the poor can 
benefit from rural tourism development models thus remains unclear. 
Some scholars argue that rural tourism as a development method in China is inefficient in 
lifting the poor villagers out of poverty (Lei, 2008; Li, 2003). However, others argue that the 
poor benefit from rural tourism programmes, but the benefit is limited or less than average 
(Lei, 2008). Research shows that this is because fewer poor farmers participate in the rural 
tourism programmes (Zeng, 2008). One reason for the low participation rate is due to 
unequal access to tourist resources and businesses; another is the requirement for financial 
and human capital to start the rural tourism business (Zhang, 2007). By contrast, one 
contradicting analysis summarises the role of the government as the “operator, policymaker 
and coordinator” of the TAP programmes, but the extensive involvement poses the risk that 
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the government monopolises the tourism programmes and excludes the private sector and 
local poor from sharing the profits (Zhang et al., 1999).  
Despite the existing literature addressing the important role of state intervention for the 
success of TAP programmes and the benefit sharing result for the poor, the involvement of 
which specific level of the state makes a difference for the success of TAP programmes is 
unclear. Are the different findings related to the different levels of the state intervention? 
Or the different participation of the communities in the decision-making and benefit sharing 
process? Can intervention at the village level, particularly in collectively-managed 
enterprises, bring more benefits for the poor? It is important to ask this question when 
considering the impacts of NRR-based rural redevelopment policies, not only because TAP 
programmes are case based, which indicates varieties between the studied areas, but also 
because it enlarges intra-village social division if the benefits of TAP are reaped by the 
upper-end of the village strata and the local poor misses out.  
Having introduced the two approaches to rural development, analysed their advantages and 
challenges as well as the role of the state in the process, the next section examines how the 
market mechanisms operate in each of the approaches, and how it interacts with the 
livelihood components.  
 
3.7 Land rights and the two development approaches  
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Having examined the impact of the different approaches of state intervention on the labour 
market, this section introduces the organisation of land ownership rights in China, how the 
land rights are managed and how the two approaches to state-led urbanisation affect land 
rights. Furthermore, it explains the relation between land ownership rights and the 
livelihood components examined by the previous chapter. To address the rural common 
property problems, the empirical literature presents two solutions: one is to transfer to 
state land ownership rights; the other is to establish shareholding cooperatives, an 
innovative measure intended to solve the root problems. This section first outlines the 
problem and then introduces the two solutions. 
Apart from the hukou system, land ownership and property rights are also important factors 
in the process of urbanisation, especially in state-led urbanisation, which is largely driven by 
land acquisition. Land is mainly used in two ways in rural China: as farmland and housing 
land (zhai ji di 宅基地). Farmland is used for agricultural production, while zhai ji di is 
collectively-owned land with housing currently or formerly built on it, according to Ministry 
of Land and Resources (2010). Farmers in China had private ownership over their farmland 
and housing land before the formation of the People’s Commune, which was an 
administrative institution formed during the Great Leap Forward period (1958-60). After the 
transfer of farmland and housing land from privately-owned to collectively-owned, farmers 
lost the ownership of their land and could only rent or sell the buildings that are built upon 
the housing land. 
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Property rights in China are still separated into ownership rights (collectively or state owned) 
and usufructuary rights (right to possess, utilise and obtain profits from the land). The use 
right of construction land is associated only with state-owned land. Land use rights and land 
rental rights are both in the category of usufructuary rights. During the land use/rental right 
transference, land ownership rights still remain as collectively owned or state owned 
(Ministry of Land and Resources, 2004).  
The two key points around the collective ownership rights are, first, the boundary of the co-
operatives and, second, the rights among community members (Po, 2011). For the first 
aspect, it is unclear whether the decision-making body over the collective property is the 
township, village or the village group, since the ownership of the collective asset is not 
specified in the land law (Ho, 2001). This institutional ambiguity leaves the collective 
property rights as a whole at stake. On one hand, in the urban integration approach of 
resettlement when the land generates profits for non-agricultural use, the ambiguously 
defined collective rights are open for various interest groups to grab (Cai, 2003). In Ho’s 
study of the case of Changping, a rural district in the suburb of Beijing, conflict over the 
newly generated land profit led to the reform of collective property ownership, although 
some scholars argue that the institutional ambiguity has mitigated conflict among different 
interest groups in the reform process (Liu et al., 1998). On the other hand, apart from the 
tangible value which could be materialised, as the previous chapter has shown, collective 
property often carries invisible values which are more vulnerable to change, for example the 
insurance function of land, which may serve as unemployment insurance, pension and 
medical insurance for farmers.  
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As for the second aspect, the collective property rights are not identified with individual 
farmers. The lack of clarification of individual rights leaves individual farmers’ rights 
unprotected. As rural collective property rights are tied with the village membership (Zhou & 
Liu, 1988), this means that farmers lose their collective property rights when they lose 
village membership. In the resettlement process, particularly in the case where multiple 
villages are resettled to a concentrated community, individual village membership is lost 
during the process, and so are collective property rights. Where the individual villages are 
preserved, the village membership remains and so do the collective ownership rights for 
individual farmers. While Po (2011) argues that a new board of collective property 
management committee is essential in securing individual farmer’s rights, cases from this 
research show that it is not necessarily the case where the existing village committee could 
also take the responsibility. 
In state-led urbanisation, rural land expropriation in China consists of two parts. One part is 
the expropriation of the farming land and the other part is the expropriation of zhai ji di. 
Two national policies are involved in this process. One is “zheng zhuan fenli” (征转分离) 
(Tianjin government, 2009), which means that the ownership of the expropriated land is first 
transferred from collectively-owned to state-owned, then the local governments transfer 
certain construction land and unused land into agricultural land, and vice versa. By limiting 
the ownership of the construction land to state-owned, the agrarian land will be preserved 
and therefore food safety will be secured (Shen, 2007). When it comes to the transference 
of certain agricultural land and unused land into construction land, the central People’s 
Government of China established another land-use policy in 2004: “increasing versus 
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decreasing balance” (zeng jian gua gou, 增减挂钩). According to this policy, increase in the 
land used for urban construction will be balanced by decrease in the land used for rural 
construction.  
Most forms of land expropriation require the compensation of those who have lost land. In 
Lynette Ong’s research in Hefei, she found that although the forms of compensation should 
cover the loss of farmers during displacement from rural area to urban resettlement 
communities, farmers rarely received the full compensation package. In Hefei, there were 
three forms of compensation: land compensation fees (tudi buchangfei 土地补偿费) 
covered the loss of farming land; resettlement allowances (anzhi buzhufei 安置补助费) 
were for relocation; and crop compensation fees (qingmiao buzhufei 青苗补助费) covered 
lost farming income (Ong, 2014). Despite being entitled to all three compensations, Ong’s 
interviewees did not receive land compensation fees. As for resettlement allowances, some 
were compensated through self-employment allowance (zimou zhiye buzhufei 自谋职业补
助费), but not the 18,000 yuan basic security allowance (jiben shenghuo baozhangfei 基本
生活保障费) that they should have received. When it came to crop compensation fees, Ong 
(2014) found that farmers were compensated at the lower end of the compensation scale, 
where the amount of compensation was expected to be contingent on the economic 
productivity of crops. As a result, in reality, farmers in Hefei only received two forms of 
compensation, pension for retired farmers and 12,000 yuan one-off payment per person as 
relocation allowance. It is thus not surprising that farmers reported a worsened financial 
situation after resettlement (Ong, 2014).  
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More importantly, other than an inadequate amount of compensation, Ong points out that 
the compensation process is rather opaque and farmers are excluded from deciding what 
composes the compensation package. The decision process is limited to the local 
governments, and the final decision is made by the district and township governments. On a 
larger scale, the deteriorated living conditions are not limited to Hefei where Ong conducted 
her fieldwork. Ong (2014) references the 2011 Landesa survey, which reflects resettled 
farmers’ attitude to the process, covering 17 provinces. According to the survey, among 
villagers who lost their land during the resettlement process, around 20 per cent received no 
compensation at all. For those who received compensation, more than half expressed 
dissatisfaction, while only 25 per cent were on the “satisfied” side. As for the reasons for 
dissatisfaction, the majority stemmed from the inadequate amount of compensation, and 
others included being excluded from the compensation decision-making process, and the 
inferior living standards compared to prior to resettlement. Whether a similar level of 
disstisfaction is also the case in Tianjin and Zhejiang is analysed in Chapters 5 and 7, which 
discuss the responses of resettled farmers to the state-led urbanisation process under the 
NSC and NRR approaches. 
The deteriorated living conditions stem not only from insufficient compensation of tangible 
productive livelihood resources; moreover, they are a result of lack of compensation for the 
intangible livelihood resources. As summarised in the previous chapter, intangible livelihood 
resources include access and claims to resources and stock. In Ong’s (2014) research, she 
identified a key part of the intangible resources as the “courtyard economy” (tingyuan jingji 
庭院经济). Together with losing the rural housing is the loss of the backyard where farmers 
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previously grew their own vegetables and raised animals for domestic consumption. After 
resettlement under the NSC approach, as in Hefei, resettled farmers lose this part of self-
sustained food and need to acquire additional supplementary income to support their post-
resettlement livelihoods (Ong, 2014). This adds pressure and stress for the resettled farmers 
to participate in the new urban labour market. When they find that they do not possess the 
required skill-sets and experiences, this may cause psychological shock. Furthermore, failure 
to obtain new sources of income could result in further deterioration of post-resettlement 
livelihoods. Are there similar intangible resources in Tianjin and Zhejiang that are 
endangered? How do resettled farmers react to the loss of this part of livelihood resources? 
These are important questions relating to the expropriation and redistribution of land. 
Thus far, I have discussed the labour market mechanism, which shapes one of the livelihood 
components (capability), and the land market mechanism, which formulates the possession 
of another livelihood component (assets). What are the mechanisms that affect the third 
component - farmers’ activities in making a sustainable income?  
Under similar financial, natural, physical and cultural conditions, certain factors encourage 
some farmers to engage in innovative and entrepreneurial activities. Research conducted in 
Hebei Province, north-east China, shows that farmers are more likely to innovate where 
social resources are abundant. Social resources include “the building of effective social 
networks and sources of information, ‘enlightenment’ deriving from small-group 
interactions, and the construction of trust relations, self-help and cooperation” (Ye et al., 
2009). In a village setting, social networks are established based on credibility and 
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reputation in the local context, rather than law or written contracts (Ye et al., 2009). 
Therefore, when the boundaries of the villages are reshaped and the composition of 
members is changed, the previous trust mechanism may be endangered, which damages 
villagers’ social capital by compromising the effectiveness of them, including their credibility 
and reputation (Ye et al., 2009). Furthermore, the diminished social capital also scales down 
farmers’ ability to react to the social changes, which includes social networks and 
information flows (Ye et al., 2009). In my research in Tianjin and Zhejiang, what may affect 
the social integration of the newly established resettled community is the existence of 
credibility and reputation, as well as whether villagers are able effectively to establish new 
social networks if the previous social fabric is damaged during the relocation process. The 
following empirical chapters will investigate this issue.  
Po (2011) studied the co-operative model in Changping, a town near Beijing. The 
shareholding co-operatives established in Changping redistributed land in the form of shares 
based on community membership. The aim of the shareholding co-operatives was to reform 
the rural common property problems, caused by the collective ownership rights. This reform 
was also an empowering process, since it clarified the land ownership rights for individual 
farmers and entitled them to permanent rights to the shares. This process also empowered 
the village collectives as a whole by providing them legitimacy in defending the interests of 
individual farmers under their governance. While examining how the two approaches to 
state-led urbanisation affect land rights in Tianjin and Zhejiang, it worth paying attention to 
the boundaries of the village and how the land rights are redistributed to villagers after 
resettlement. As analysed above on village collectives, we might expect that village 
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committees as a collective entity protect the rights of individual villagers, especially the 
vulnerable groups.  
 
3.8 Relation of village governance and village redevelopment 
As I have pointed out the important role of the state in shaping and regulating the market 
mechanisms above, what also matters to the redevelopment of the village, and has not yet 
been explored by the existing literature, is the role of the village committee. 
Which levels of the Chinese local states are responsible for the development of the (former 
and current) villages? In the discussion of the strategies of the local state, most scholars 
focus on higher level governments. Hsing You-tien (2010) investigates how township 
governments use urbanisation as a strategy in reinforcing their governance, while Anna 
Ahlers (2015) focuses on the role of county governments, as well as the motivation behind 
their officials, for example in gaining career advancement if they perform well in the rural 
urbanisation project.  
However, township-level states may have lost some of their capacity of functioning due to 
budget pressures from higher levels of government, where the cadres in the township 
governments are redirected to the county- and village-level states (Smith, 2010). This draws 
the attention of this research to the lower level of the village committees. While some 
township cadres go to enforce family planning policies at the village, others deal with the 
paperwork and assessment from above (Smith, 2010). The township cadres conduct their 
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work in this way to meet assessment targets from the county level governments and to be 
promoted; however, such behaviours mitigate the role of the township government in the 
governance structure, while strengthening that of the village and countries.  
The governance at the village level is related to both how the village committee is elected 
and how the village is managed after the election, including the institutional layout and 
procedures of post-election village governance. Most of the village-level governance 
literature concerns the extent of the democratic nature of village elections, particularly the 
formalisation of the democratic process of decision making, management and supervision in 
the village (O'Brien & Han, 2009). However, Alpermann (2009) and Yao (2009) rightly point 
out that a democratic village election does not guarantee the equal redistribution of 
collectively owned village resources to villagers; in other words, “access to power” does not 
equal “exercise of power”. Due to the clash of interests between the township governments, 
village committees and village vested interest groups, the fair redistribution of the collective 
property remains a practical challenge for village governance, the root cause for many 
complaints and collective actions, and the condition for the realisation of the state-led 
urbanisation project (Alpermann, 2009). It is thus important to examine procedural rules for 
post-election village administration (Alpermann, 2009). 
Governance at the village level is also affected by the provincial policies and regulations in 
the form of implementing regulations drafted by the provincial governments (Tan, 2009). As 
the existing literature shows, economic incentives have important implications on village 
cadres’ performance in China, and village cadres tend to rank the state responsibility as their 
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priority before family duty, which is followed by community needs (Kung et al., 2009). The 
key institutional set-up and processes to assess include: first, the institutional relations 
between the village committee and other agents, including the village Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) branch, the township government and the production team (production team 
might be called as “village small groups” depending on the village); second, the village 
representative assemblies; third, financial management and transparency of village affairs 
(Alpermann, 2009). There has been extensive formal institutionalisation in the field of post-
election village governance which is evident by looking at codification at the provincial level. 
Chapters 6 and 8 particularly focus on questions of governance in the case study provinces, 
counties and – most importantly – villages, in order to show how these institutions shape 
and affect the rural development programmes.   
 
3.9 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have provided the necessary historical and theoretical background for 
understanding state-led urbanisation, particularly the different development models, the 
operation of the market mechanisms and the role of the state in shaping those mechanisms.  
The implications for the post-urbanisation livelihoods depends on how the market 
mechanisms interact with factors that affect the livelihoods of farmers. Capabilities interact 
with the labour market, possession of assets is shaped by the land market and resources 
redistribution mechanisms, and activities are affected by the business environment in the 
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new community. Focusing on the institutional mechanisms that shape the livelihood 
components, I have discussed how the changes in the labour market, in terms of sectors and 
industries, benefit groups with certain skills, experience, or education; how the 
transformation of the built environment, property ownership and land market favour certain 
groups; and how the incentive system in the governance system regulates these institutional 
mechanisms, as well as the role of governance at the village level. What makes a difference 
is the style of state intervention, whether it is initiated at the municipal level government or 
village level. I have explained the relationship between different levels of local states in the 
governance structure, and the incentive structure for cadres’ performances, which is the 
primary driver of the different style of state intervention.  
The ideas expressed in this chapter underpin the empirical analysis to be presented in the 
second half of this thesis. It is therefore important to note a few important implications that 
the sustainable rural livelihood framework and the displacement frameworks have for how 
research and analysis are undertaken. First, they demonstrate that empirical research at the 
level of village governance is essential, because village governance is where the variety 
emerges in terms of the formation of key institutional mechanism, like the labour market, 
land related policies and the layout of the resettlement communities. Second, this also 
means that analysis much be sensitive to questions of the drives behind the governance 
structure, which explains the behaviours of the village level governance entity. Navigating 
such complexities requires a methodological approach that can maintain a view of dynamics 
at the grass-root village level. The next chapter tackles this important issue.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Data Collection 
4.1 Research questions 
As stated in the introduction, the main question this thesis seeks to answer is: What is the 
impact of the two approaches to state-led urbanisation on livelihoods of resettled rural 
farmers? This research conducts a comparative study to examine the impact of rural 
development and urban expansion on the livelihoods of rural farmers. This implies also 
answering a range of secondary empirical and theoretical questions raised by the literature, 
which can help with formulating an answer to the main question. Specifically: First, who are 
the winners and losers in terms of post-resettlement livelihoods in each case study village? 
Second, what are the factors that affect and shape the post-resettlement in each village? 
Third, what are the drivers that formulate the factors and mechanisms that affect resettled 
villagers’ livelihoods? Fourth, what is the impact of the changing pattern of means of living 
on resettled rural farmers’ perception of their social status? 
This chapter outlines the methodological approach I adopt to address the above questions. 
It begins by providing a detailed account of the research design and processes of data 
collection and analysis. The first part of the chapter introduces the backgrounds of the case 
study villages and justifies the choice of fieldwork sites. The second part reviews access to 
the field and engagement to the participants, the subjectivity of the interviewer in the 
researcher-respondent relationship and outlines the other practical challenges faced during 
the fieldwork. It then explains data interpretation of the integrated used of qualitative and 
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quantitative data. . In the final section I present a critical analysis of case-based research and 
discuss my strategy for comparative analysis.  
The focus group of my research is farmers who were located in the villages that underwent 
state-led urbanisation, in which the farmers might be directly or indirectly involved. The 
majority of farmers interviewed in this research were relocated from rural housing to a 
resettlement community, either in the rural or urban area. Depending on the sites, other 
interviewees also included villagers who were located in the fieldwork villages but who did 
not resettle during the state-led urbanisation process.  
 
4.2 Research design 
The material for this research stems from 11 months of fieldwork in 2014 with six months 
spent in Tianjin municipality (Huaming town) and five months in Zhejiang province 
(Dongheng Village, Wusi Village and Qingyanliu Village). This research employed a range of 
techniques, including semi-structured in-depth interviews, less-structured follow-up 
interviews, group interviews, observation, and informal discussion with key informants. The 
in-depth interviews were mainly with ordinary farmers and village cadres, but also with 
officials in Deqing county and Chinese scholars. In addition, official (often internal) 
documents were collected.  
As this thesis compares two approaches to the state-led urbanisation process, focusing on 
their impacts on livelihoods as well as the organisation of local governance structures, I 
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selected my case studies on the basis of their alignment with the two approaches to state-
led urbanisation (NSC and NRR) and comparability between cases, as well as more pragmatic 
questions of access and logistics. Alignment was the key consideration, in particular due to 
the numerous towns and villages in China where the changes in some villages are more 
concentrated and condensed, while others might implement the state-led urbanisation 
related policies less thoroughly. As a result, villages that follow and implement most of the 
relevant policies in the state-led urbanisation process would reflect the NSC and NRR 
approach more accurately.   
To ensure comparability, I considered both similarities and differences while choosing case 
studies, in terms of the place and the population. For the place, a similar level of GDP per 
capita, locations in provinces on the east coast of China, and similar compositions of 
possession of assets before resettlement were key considerations, while the main difference 
lies in the fact that the resettlement in Tianjin was to an urban area whereas in Zhejiang it 
was to rural areas (a key element of the NSC and NRR approaches respectively]. For the 
population, the social composition of the villagers and the comparison of livelihoods 
composed of resettled villagers’ capabilities, assets and activities were in consideration. 
Particularly, when it comes to activities for making a living, it would be difficult to compare if 
resettled villagers in the field sites have completely different patterns of activities.  
 
4.3 Access and engagement 
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The fieldwork that provides the primary data for this thesis was conducted between March 
2014 and January 2015. My research design developed over multiple stages before and after 
entry into the field, changing in response to key decisions on a range of issues, such as 
questions of access, sampling and data collection techniques. Originally, I planned to go to 
two fieldwork sites (one in Tianjin and one in Zhejiang) rather than four, to ensure 
comparability between Tianjin municipality and Zhejiang province, but my plans changed 
based on interaction with the locals. By including the additional villages suggested by local 
villagers in Zhejiang to my research portfolio, the NRR approach is illustrated by reflecting 
more features and variations of the approach and therefore the comparison with the NSC 
approach is more accurate and detailed. This section introduces backgrounds of the case 
study villages, and access to the villages as well as engagement with the villagers. 
4.3.1 Backgrounds of the case study villages 
 Huaming Town (made up of 15 former natural villages with a population of 50,000) 
lies in the middle of Tianjin City centre and Binhai New Area, 12 miles from the city 
centre, in the administration of Dongli District. Adjacent to Tianjin city centre, 
Huaming town was not difficult to access. Huaming new town used 3476 mu of land, 
which saved 8595 mu of agrarian land. The Zhaijidi (housing land) Exchange 
Programme replaced villagers’ previous dilapidated rural bungalows in the natural 
villages with modern apartments (of 80 square metres each) in the concentrated 
community, which increased the household assets by 10 times on average. The 
traditional pillar industries before resettlement were logistics, construction and 
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agriculture, represented by a company founded by Huaming town, Huaming Group, 
with assets worth 40 million yuan and an annual output of 0.3 billion yuan. The new 
major industry in Huaming after redevelopment is advanced manufacturing, 
represented by the Airport Logistic Manufacturing Park, featuring aeronautical 
manufacturing, research & development and a duty-free park. 
 Dongheng Village has 761 households and a population of 2827, of which 540 are 
migrants from elsewhere. The population is divided into 22 village teams known as 
zu (组). The zu has been the rural grassroots self-organisation unit in rural China 
since the dissolution of People’s Communes after the Great Leap Forward period. 
Usually 20-30 households are in each team and the team is responsible for income 
distribution and accounting for households. Dongheng is situated in the southeast of 
Luoshe Town under the administrative jurisdiction of Deqing county, sometimes 
called the “backyard” of Hangzhou City. Dongheng Village profits from its major 
industries in quarrying, wine making, piano and small-scale wood processing. 
Agriculture is based on aquaculture of crab, shrimp, snapper, sericulture, and 
freshwater fish. According to data published by Deqing county, the village has 18 
private enterprises and 11 collectively-owned enterprises. Village GDP in 2007 was 
349 million yuan, of which 2 million yuan was collective income and village GPD per 
capita was 10,178 yuan. In 2011, after rural urbanisation, village GDP reached 480 
million yuan with a per capita village GPD of 14,478 yuan (Deqing government, 
2013). 
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 Wusi Village has 444 households and a population of 1484, divided into 14 village 
teams (zu), and lies in the northwest of Wukang town, in the west of Deqing county 
in Huzhou, Zhejiang. The pillar industry in Wusi Village was traditionally agriculture. 
According to data published by Deqing county, in 2012, after rural redevelopment 
and the establishment of the village as an ecological model village by developing 
rural tourism, the village GDP reached 1,450 million yuan, of which 1 million yuan 
was village collective income and the village per capita GPD was 19,509 yuan 
(Deqing government, 2013). The assets in rural tourism amount to 108 million yuan 
with a revenue from rural tourism of 22 million yuan, and had 75,300 visitors in 
2012. In 2002, Wusi Village started the land transfer scheme, and in 2007 
established the first village stock cooperative in Huzhou city. In addition, Wusi 
Village granted farmers land ownership certificates and 100 per cent of farmland has 
now been included the land transfer scheme.  
 Qingyanliu Village has a local population of 2000 and more than 15,000 migrants 
living in over 200 residential buildings. It stands at the east edge of Yiwu City, and 
comes under the jurisdiction of Yiwu County not Deqing like Dongheng and Wusi. 
Before 2005, Qingyanliu Village was a small village of 1500 population with a per 
capita annual income of less than 10,000 yuan. After completing the land 
transference programme in 2005 and transforming rural bungalows into 200 
modern buildings, the village has more than 2,800 registered online stores retailing 
3000 types of products worldwide. Qingyanliu Village is called “China’s No.1 online 
store village”. 
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4.3.2 Access to the field and to the participants 
To access the four villages, I used different strategies based on the context of each village. 
This section introduces the strategies used to access the villages as well as a brief 
introduction of each village (See Diagram 3 below), with further details about the villages in 
the empirical chapters that follow. Initial access to Huaming town and Dongheng village, the 
two main field sites in my research, were both via academic institutions. For Wusi and 
Qingyanliu village, I arrived in the village as a tourist with no contacts, then built up my 
connection with the villagers step by step.  
Diagram 4.1: Hierarchy between central and local states in China  
(Source: author’s own diagram) 
4.3.2.1 Access to Huaming town, Tianjin  
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I chose Tianjin as the fieldwork site because Binhai New Area is the third key growth pole in 
China. With the most funding and strategic support from the central state, selecting a village 
from Binhai New Area could most effectively reflect the NSC approach to state-led 
urbanisation.  
After identifying Binhai New Area as the initial destination for fieldwork site for the NSC 
approach to state-led urbanisation, I struggled to decide the exact village fieldwork site. 
Upon arrival in Tianjin, I had meetings and discussions with Tianjin Academy of Social 
Sciences where I was advised that Huaming town could best reflect the characteristics of the 
NSC approach in Binhai New Area in Tianjin. I accepted the suggestion because, as a model 
village, Huaming town is a case which implements the relevant policies of the NSC approach 
most thoroughly and therefore it reflects the most features of the NSC approach to state-led 
urbanisation.  
I approached Huaming Town by walking directly into the resettlement community, which is 
open to everyone. In Huaming, I used door-to-door and snowballing sampling strategies to 
find interviewees. I interviewed 73 villagers initially, and conducted follow up interviews 
with 18 of them, using audio-recording for 54 and taking notes for the other 19 who 
declined to be recorded. For interviews from the door-to-door strategy, the venues were the 
participants’ home. For interviews from the snowballing strategy, the venues were often on 
the street, in the park, where I met the participants. Duration of the interviews varies, most 
of the interviews lasted around 30 minutes to an hour. Group interviews lasted longer than 
individual interviews because participants were likely to be more open and talkative when 
 135 
communicating to other villagers and the interviews lasted around an hour. In the 73 
interviewed villagers, there was three group interviews with three to five villagers in each 
group.  
4.3.2.2 Access to Dongheng village, Zhejiang  
As in Huaming town, I also contacted an academic institution first in Zhejiang. My contact in 
the Tourism Department of Zhejiang University introduced me to an officia in the Deqing 
County government who suggested that Dongheng village reflects the NRR approach to 
state-led urbanisation the best.  
Having narrowed the areas I was interested in, I had to consider how to initiate access. In 
the four fieldwork villages of Tianjin and Zhejiang, only in Dongheng did I visit the village 
committee first before interviewing the villagers. Compared to other three villages, 
Dongheng village was relatively closed to outsiders. Because most of the factories and small 
businesses are concentrated in the adjacent Luoshe town, there are only a small number of 
businesses located in the village. The factories located in the village include piano making 
and furniture making, both of which tended to employ workers long-term. The small number 
of migrant workers were also well-acquainted with the residents in the village. As a result, 
there was a strong closed network established in the village, such that the villagers tended 
to be suspicious of unfamiliar people. To break into the network and develop a relationship 
with the villagers, I visited the village committee first. The head of the village committee 
introduced me to his team and his team showed me around the village. After becoming 
familiar with the village and having had conversations with some villagers, I started 
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conducting interviews on my own without the company of a village committee member. In 
Dongheng village, I interviewed 34 villagers initially, and conducted follow up interviews 
with 12 of them, using audio-recording for 28 and taking notes for the other 6 who declined 
to be recorded. Similar to Huaming town, interviews lasted around 30 minutes to an hour 
where group interviews lasted longer than individual interviews. Because Dongheng village 
is a small village, villagers in the individual interviews were often the same villagers in the 
group interviews where they introduced me to other villagers they were chatting to. I 
conducted four group interviews in Dongheng village.  
4.3.2.3 Access to Wusi and Qingyanliu villages, Zhejiang  
Unlike in Huaming town and Dongheng village, I did not use any official intermediary to 
access the two remaining fieldwork sites. I arrived at the sites as a tourist and customer of 
the rural tourism products 
These two villages were not in the original fieldwork plan, but I added them to my research 
after receiving suggestions from the interviewees in Dongheng village. During my interviews 
in Dongheng village, some interviewees mentioned that Wusi and Qingyanliu were 
undergoing the same process of rural redevelopment and encouraged me to visit the two 
places. Having done further investigation online, then consulted with more villagers and 
staff from the village committee, I decided that it was worthwhile to invest time and energy 
to expand the field sites. I decided to include the additional cases because they would enrich 
the case portfolio of NRR approach, highlighting more features for comparison with the NSC 
approach. This provided invaluable opportunities for exploring and investigating the two 
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additional villages in Zhejiang. The rural redevelopment models in the two additional 
villages, the interaction with the villagers, and the comparison between villages in Zhejiang 
as well as with the former villages in Tianjin increased the angles of comparison between the 
NSC and NRR approaches, as well as revealing the vital importance of the village committee 
in shaping development outcomes. This made it possible for me to discover perspectives 
that were not immediately obvious from the comparison between Huaming town and 
Dongheng village. In Wusi village and Qingyanliu village, I interviewed 21 and 25 villagers 
respectively, and conducted follow-ups with 8 and 9 of them in each village, using audio-
recording for 17 interviews in Wusi village and 20 interviews in Qingyanliu village, taking 
notes for the other 5 respectively who declined to be recorded. The duration of interviews 
was similar to Dongheng village and I conducted two group interviews in Wusi village and 
three in Qingyanliu village.  
4.3.2.4 Engagement with interviewees  
When it came to engagement with interviewees, the difference in background between 
most of the interviewees and me created several challenges. Differences included the 
educational background and life experience, although language was not a particular 
challenge. Where the majority of the interviewees had lived their whole life in the 
countryside with limited education, I had a more metropolitan background, higher 
education and international living experience. This meant that although most of my 
interviewees spoke Mandarin, they used different specific words and phrases in their daily 
life, and the topics they cared about most were not necessarily the ones I had intended 
 138 
focusing on. I used several strategies to address this challenge and reduce the distance 
between interviewees and interviewer, which include adopting the interviewees’ own 
phrases, paying careful attention to the topics that concerned them, building up relations 
through repeated contacts, forming alternative relationships as customers, and giving small 
gifts.  
4.3.2.5 Overcoming challenges 
Initially, while conducting the interviews, I used phrases from my interview question guide 
directly without rephrasing, and the villagers demonstrated that they did not understand 
what I was asking. For example, use of the term “social stratification” (shehui jieceng, 社会
阶层) in questions about the post-resettlement class structure of the village led to confusion 
as the villagers were unfamiliar with this scholarly term. To make sense to the villagers, I 
rephrased the question by breaking down the question into several separate questions, 
using actual social groups and real people rather than abstract terms, including: first, their 
perception of their relationship with urban people; second, if they had a choice, whether 
they preferred living in the resettlement community or moving out of the community; third, 
in their mind, what distinguishes them from urban people. It is important that interviewees 
understood clearly what I was talking about for two reasons. First, it reduced the distance 
between interviewee and researcher, encouraging the interviewee to speak honestly, which 
led to the second point on trust. If the interviewee has more trust for the interviewer, they 
are more likely to disclose more and more accurate information as well as their personal 
perceptions, which they might be unwilling to discuss with strangers. Reflecting on the 
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interaction with the interviewees, I adjusted the questions on my interview guide and the 
phrases I used for the following interviews and avoided situations when interviewees could 
not understand my questions.   
Furthermore, apart from adopting the phrases villagers used in their daily conversation and 
avoiding abstract phrases, I observed the conversations resettled villagers had with their 
fellow villagers, including the topics they most liked talking about, what they cared about, 
and the words and phrases they used during the conversation. By adopting these topics and 
phrases at the start of each interview, I effectively reduced the distance between 
interviewees and interviewer. I felt that these conversations made the villagers perceive me 
more as one of them, trying to understand their concerns and complaints, rather than a 
stranger from a totally different world who attempted only to collect information from 
them.  
As a native Mandarin speaker, I found that language was not an issue during most 
interviews, although I could not understand the heavy local dialect in a small number of 
interviews in Dongheng village in Zhejiang. In these cases, I asked other villagers to translate 
for me. While translating, the villagers who helped with interpretation often joined in the 
interview as well where the interviews developed into a group conversation. 
Compared with one-to-one interviews, I found that villagers felt more relaxed and tended to 
express their own perceptions as well as opinions more while talking in a group. Other 
advantages of group discussion included, first, when the villagers were chatting with their 
fellow villagers, they tended to compare each other’s situations, for example the amount of 
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compensation each household received; second, villagers were more likely to discuss issues 
that they might feel uneasy to talk about with unfamiliar researchers, for example whether 
they secured waged work and which type of work they secured; third, a group discussion 
usually lasted longer than a one-to-one interview, which suggests that it disclosed more 
information. On the other side, the disadvantages of a group discussion included, first, when 
the group was interested in a topic unrelated to my research, it was challenging to pull the 
group back to the topic, compared to drawing the attention of an individual back; also, if I 
interrupted the flow of their discussion, the group might be reluctant to continue the 
conversation. I did not find that villagers were reluctant to talk openly in front of fellow-
villagers; on the contrary, they seemed to be more forthcoming.  
Another tactic I used in reducing the distance between the interviewees and the research 
during the fieldwork was giving small gifts. Before going into the field, I consulted 
researchers who did fieldwork in the countryside in China and asked them the proper small 
gifts to give in return for interviews, and they suggested soaps for washing, and 
recommended brands that villagers might like. Other gift ideas included chocolates, pens 
and notepads and soft drinks. The gifts showed my sincere appreciation for the 
interviewees’ participation, for their time and energy, while not being so luxurious as to 
create a suspicion of bribery. In the villages where I conducted fieldwork, I often heard that 
the village committees bribed villagers or recruited a team of villagers to provide positive 
feedback on the rural redevelopment programme whenever there was an opportunity to 
promote the outcome of the reform in the villages. These occasions included fieldwork 
conducted by officials from upper-level states, researchers who contacted the village 
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committee, or visitors from other villages coming to the village to watch and learn in order 
to implement rural redevelopment programme in their own villages. In the above situations, 
the recruited villagers were usually offered 2,000-3,000 yuan each to speak according to the 
script and demonstrate that they were satisfied with the development results. To avoid 
being categorised as part of the village official group by the villagers, it was proper to offer 
villagers useful gifts with small material value.  
A small gift was also appropriate as it did not put too much psychological pressure on the 
interviewees to accept or reject the request. Normally, I told the participant that there 
would be a small gift at the end of the interview as an incentive. With the small amount of 
material value in the gift, on one hand, the interviewee would not feel obliged to 
participate, or embarrassed that they took part in the interview only because they wanted 
the gift. On the other hand, if the interviewee felt that it was improper for them to disclose 
their opinions of the rural redevelopment process, the small gift would not leave them with 
the impression that I tried to obtain the information by coercion.  
4.3.2.6 Managing the researcher-respondent relationship  
I took two approaches to manage the researcher-respondent relationship: one was directly 
disclosing my identity as a researcher, and the other was indirect disclosure where I formed 
an alternative relationship with the interviewees first, for example a client or visitor 
relationship, expressing my interests in conducting interviews with them as a researcher 
second. For the direct approach, the connection with the local academic institutions made it 
much easier for the villagers to accept my interview requests, and also reduced the distance 
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between the interviewees and the researcher. As for the indirect approach, as well as 
broadening my engagement with the community I also sought to deepen it, and to form 
relationships that were meaningful and productive in other spheres, rather than simply 
based around data collection. The interaction and engagement experience was rewarding 
and informative, which was complimentary to data collected from the semi-structured 
interviews.  
In Huaming town, I took part in the village’s rental business cycle. While looking for an 
apartment to rent, I contacted the local property agency. From the constant contact and 
conversation with the property agent, I learnt a great deal about several things about the 
resettlement community: first, the supply and demand relation in the property rental 
market; second, the holistic view of the resettlement apartment redistribution in reality; 
third, the composition of tenants in the resettlement community, including the occupations 
of other tenants, the duration of their contracts and the reason why they chose the 
Huaming resettlement community as well as their concerns and plans for the future. The 
above information would have been difficult to obtain if I had not engaged with the property 
agent and developed a long-term client relationship, building up trust with her. Because it 
was a business relationship, the property agent was inclined to talk more about her business 
and did not mind answering my questions. After telling her that I was conducting research 
and would like to talk to more local villagers, she was also very happy to help and introduced 
me to some of her clients, including local villagers and tenants.   
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In Wusi village, I visited some greenhouses running eco-tourism programmes, as a visitor. 
The identity as a visitor made it easy for the business owners to introduce me to their tourist 
services and products. After learning that some of them were also local villagers, I told them 
that I was also interested in their views of the rural redevelopment project, and they did not 
mind commenting on topics that were not directly related to their business. The 
conversation about research, extended from the client relationship, also strengthened our 
relationship and I remain in contact as friends with certain local business owners.  
In Qingyanliu village, I was first interested in the idea of e-commerce and asked villagers 
their knowledge of the development of the business in the village. After they introduced me 
to some of the Taobao business owners, this deepened my interaction with the locals and 
the e-commerce business owners in the village. Later, the conversation with business 
owners also attracted the landlords, who were local villagers, to join in. Therefore, I 
broadened the type of interviewees in Qingyanliu village from being interested in the 
operation of the new business in the village, and expressing my genuine desire to 
understand the process of redevelopment.  
In Dongheng village, because there was limited productive, social or cultural activities in the 
village, especially there were not many non-village members in the village, my status as an 
outsider was very obvious to the villagers. Therefore, I had to approach villagers directly as a 
researcher through the introduction of the village committee, at least initially, rather than 
forming other relationships with locals. This led to an initial difference in interviews of 
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villagers. I dealt with this by breaking down responses from the interviewees and used the 
part of villagers’ answers that are align with my interview question guide.  
 
4.4 Research ethics 
When it comes to the ethics of research, there are three concerns in this research, the oral 
consent form, recording, and being accompanied by a village committee member while 
conducting interviews in Dongheng village. First, all data collected and presented in this 
research has been anonymised, except where the informant was already a figure in the 
public eye who agreed to his/her name being used. During the fieldwork with villagers, I 
used oral consent rather than written consent forms, and I read the information sheet aloud 
to the participants. I decided not to use written consent forms based on the following 
considerations. First, as the focus group was resettled farmers involved in forced 
resettlement, the majority of this group were farmers, the elderly, and those who lacked the 
skills or desire to migrate to urban areas. This indicates that the literacy rate for this group is 
low, where villagers might not be able to read a written form accurately. Secondly, as asking 
for signature is usually a procedure for formal and legal processes, asking farmers to sign 
tends to increase the psychological burden for the participants, particularly raising concerns 
and worries over whether their answers would put them in danger. In this case, the 
participants would be more likely to give me answers that they expected that I would want 
to hear or not to reveal their dissatisfactions. Based on these considerations, I collected oral 
consent, which I recorded myself on paper, and read aloud the information sheet.  
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The second concern for ethics in this research relates to recording. Before I conducted the 
interviews, I asked the consent of interviews on recording. I recorded when they agreed and 
only took notes when they declined. The advantages of recording the interviews include: 
first, it allows me to have a full version of the interview transcript, which benefits the data 
interpretation process. Second, while played back the recordings, the tones interviewees 
used in during the interviews became clearer when I was not based in the fieldwork context, 
which enabled me to capture more nuanced information that was not conveyed by the 
words alone, including the attitude of the interviewees and, sometimes, the reliability of the 
answer provided by the interviewees.  
Another ethical concern is that I was accompanied by members of the village committee 
when first entered Dongheng village to conduct the first batch of interviews. Although I 
interviewed villagers by myself without company afterwards, the information given by 
villagers who were interviewed while I was accompanied might be disclosed to the village 
committee members, and as such may be less reliable for my purposes, but is highly unlikely 
to bring harm to any villagers, since the most common response to this is likely to have been 
a degree of self-censorship.  
 
4.4 Data collection 
4.4.1 Gaining consent  
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Before entering the field sites, I gained Research Ethics Clearance for oral consent for 
instead of a written consent form, which proved to be an effective and efficient strategy at 
gaining reliable data while retaining anonymity if villagers so wished. With oral consent, the 
interview participants’ signatures were not required, but I expressly asked the interviewees’ 
consent for the interview in conversation. Because many of the interviewees in my research 
were farmers with low levels of literacy, using the oral consent method reduced the distance 
between the interviewees and interviewer; at the same time, it allowed me to collect 
information from people who participated in the resettlement process but would not be 
able to sign their name either because they were illiterate or because they were unwilling to 
disclose their real identity while commenting on the topic.  
4.4.2 Formal and informal engagement in data collection  
Aside from the kinds of informal engagement and participant observation described above, 
my core data was collected in the form of semi-structured interviews with resettled 
villagers. This research used semi-structured interviewing because of the nature of the 
research questions and the need to gain comparability between the four fieldwork sites. By 
preparing a list of topics rather than exact questions, the flexibility of semi-structured 
interviewing allowed me to explore participants’ concerns and what they believe to be 
important, discovering at times unexpected facts and topics. Also, this method was able to 
reflect participants’ perception and attitudes beyond the facts per se (Bryman, 2004). By 
using this approach, I could also follow up the participants with new questions on the topics 
that they were concerned with, while not compromising the comparability of the research. 
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Moreover, this research required detailed description on the target group’s methods of 
access to the means of living, which varied depending on different individuals and 
households. Semi-structured interviewing allowed for the collection of various data, which 
would have been much more limited in a more structured interviewing strategy. The 
interview questions were divided into five broad sections (see Appendix 1), covering: 1 
Personal employment situation; 2 resettlement process; 3 compensation; 4 lifestyle and self-
perception of their social status after resettlement. During the interview process, I first 
asked respondents basic demographic and household information, for example, their age, 
current occupation, years of farming, hukou status. This information was used to split the 
data set in order to compare different groups by age, gender, hukou status and so on. 
During the fieldwork, I attempted to stick to the broad questionnaire structure, while not 
reading out each question on the interview guide explicitly, and cover every topic in each 
interviews. I also sought to give residents freedom to pursue their own lines of interest 
where these were broadly relevant to my research topic. If the villagers chose to comment 
on topics not directly related to my research, I attempted to figure out why they would care 
to talk about it. In the scenario that the topic was interesting to my research and I should 
have added it in my question guide, I encouraged the interviewees to comment on the topic 
and asked further questions to clarify the scope of the issue. In cases where I judged that the 
topic was not related to my project in any way, I guided the interviewees back to answering 
questions on my interview guide.  
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Apart from semi-structured interviews, I also conducted two types of observation during the 
fieldwork, objective observation and subjective observation. For the former, I paid attention 
to the built environment and people in the village. I took pictures of the built environment 
and observed the layout of the streets, residential properties, commercial outlets, 
transportation and the entertainment facilities. When it comes to people in the village, I 
detected their daily routines, behaviour patterns, how they interacted with each other, 
where they went shopping for groceries and entertainment, as well as at a more personal 
level, including the way they talked, greeted each other and dressed.  
As for more subjective observation, I kept a side note of my impressions and perception of 
the field sites. Keeping these notes had two advantages. First, leaving a space to keep a 
record of the impression was a reminder not to confuse the facts and my own impressions 
when I was recording my objective observation, which were composed of facts, numbers 
and texts. Second, keeping a note of the researcher’s subjective impression of the field was 
also a source of information. It became clear to me later on when I had multiple fieldwork 
sites, that the comparison of my subjective impression of the field was also a good source of 
informal information. Based on the comparison, I discovered cues that I did not pay 
attention to at the first place, which led to further fruitful thinking and investigations. For 
example, before I arrived in Qingyanliu village, both the name of the village and the 
reference from the villagers suggested that it was a rural village. However, immediately on 
arrival in Qingyanliu, I observed the neatly organised apartments and streets, and 
subjectively, I perceived the resettlement community as not much different from the urban 
residential communities. The layout of Qingyanliu resettlement community as well as the 
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operation of the community reminded me of Huaming town, rather than Dongheng or Wusi 
village. This became relevant because Qingyanliu village is a combination of the NSC and 
NRR approaches to state-led urbanisation, which shed new light on the comparison between 
the two approaches. In Qingyanliu village, the large-scale resettlement is in line with the NSC 
approach, but the reservation of the village committee is a feature of the NRR approach.  
4.4.3 Interviewee selection and sampling  
To select interviewees, this research employed door-to-door sampling and snowball 
sampling strategies. In the case of Tianjin, the whole village resettled to the same building in 
the newly built town while in the case of Zhejiang, those who resettled in rural areas moved 
into the same building as well. Therefore, I located the buildings for resettled farmers first 
and knocked on every other door to conduct interviews. Accompanying the door-to-door 
sampling strategy, I also occasionally used snowball sampling, asking those whose doors I 
had knocked at to introduce their relatives and friends with resettlement experience to me. 
The snowball sampling strategy expanded the data set and also helped me earn trust from 
the new participants. However, the disadvantage of snowball sampling lies in its possibility 
of generating bias, since participants are more likely to share the same background, limiting 
the coverage of the research. To mitigate the bias, I identified the socio-economic 
background and their demographic characteristics while using the door-to-door sampling 
strategy; then employ a targeted snowball sampling strategy to people in different positions 
on the social spectrum. Interviews were generally held in people’s homes or in the street, or 
in the park nearby, where the residents could feel relaxed and in a familiar setting.  
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4.5 Data interpretation 
I used a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis of the various sources of data I 
obtained from the field. The main approach to the interpreted data was comparative 
analysis and case studies. The sources of data include semi-structured interviews, follow-up 
interviews, informal engagement with the villagers, field notes, observation, key contacts, 
and the documents as well as brochures I fetched from the fieldwork sites.  
4.5.1 Qualitative analysis 
The majority of the data from fieldwork was semi-structured transcript. To analyse the 
qualitative data generated from semi-structured interviews, I developed a set of codes. First, 
I categorised the content of transcripts according a set of pre-determined categories before 
fieldwork, as well those which had emerged as I conducted the research; then I searched for 
common themes that repeatedly appeared in the transcripts. After that, I built up my 
analytical framework, conducting further interviews to adjust the categories and make 
comparison with the previous analysis.  
While I kept notes and recording of the interviews, I also noted down interesting and usual 
situations I observed in the field notes that were not covered by the interview guide. I found 
this was particularly helpful while I was attempting to recreate the conversations with the 
interviewees while writing up the thesis. By reviewing the interviews, the scenes and 
memories, I often found something new and interesting that I had not noticed while working 
in the field. I also maintained some key contacts from the field. When I had information that 
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I was unsure about, I contacted them through phone calls, asking their opinions. They were 
also a good source of updated information of the latest development in the villages after the 
end of my fieldwork period.  
4.5.2 Quantitative analysis and multi-strategy approach 
Another strategy employed is combining the qualitative and quantitative data analysis 
methods. In the interview, before the semi-structured interview, I collected quantitative 
data by asking basic social background questions. By analysing this information in terms of 
descriptive statistics, I was able to group my interviewees’ interview answers and explore 
more patterns. By focusing on these broader patterns rather than the micro-level exact 
answers, I overcame difficulties in comparing different data based on different fieldwork 
contexts. 
4.5.3 The relational comparative approach to case studies  
My topic is inherently comparative and also case-based, on the assumption that analysing 
and comparing the four village case studies in the two approaches to state-led urbanisation 
can yield findings that are relevant to wider questions of the implications for livelihoods. 
Compared to the traditional comparative approach, this research takes a relational 
comparative approach. A traditional comparative approach focuses on describing and 
explaining different socio-economic phenomenon between the comparable, including 
places, social groups and societies (Ward, 2010). The comparative approach has several 
advantages: first, analysing and comparing multiple patterns and scenarios can stimulate 
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discoveries that would not be identified in a single case study; second, comparing reasoning 
explains phenomenon that can hardly be understood in a single case study (Pickvance, 1995: 
36); third, comparison also highlights the meaningful variables in a case study by reducing 
the complexity of real life, which is constructive in further theoretical discussion (Sartori, 
1991). It is worth noting the trade-off between the number of case studies selected and the 
variables in comparison (Przeworski, 1987), as well as considering both internal analysis and 
external analysis. While internal analysis focuses on understanding each single case, external 
analysis explores the similarities and differences between cases (Pennings et al., 2006). 
However, other scholars have identified the weaknesses of the traditional comparative 
approach, including Sayer (1984) and Pennings et al. (2006). Although the traditional 
comparative approach, connecting internal and external analysis, is adequate in discussing 
elements embedded in a phenomenon, for example governments, social groups and 
institutions, it often fails to explore the driving forces behind the phenomenon. Other 
weaknesses include, first, the challenge in comparing different geographical scales and 
multilevel government structures (Savitch and Kantor, 1995); second, the separation of the 
variables in comparison, leading to discrete analysis (Pennings et al., 2006); third, limited 
understandings of causation that focus only on certain aspects of the case study, for 
example either economic development or social welfare (Pennings et al., 2006).  
Based on this ground, Sayer (1984) and Pennings et al. (2006) argue for the use of a 
relational comparative approach, focusing on causal powers and liabilities. The relational 
comparative approach identifies the drivers of causal relationships based on comparison 
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(See Diagram 4.2 below). In particular, behaviours and motivation of the drivers shapes the 
relationship between the driver and the causation relationship.  
Diagram 4.2: Relational comparative case studies  
 
(Source: Pennings et al., 2006) 
Using the relational comparative approach has several benefits for this research. In my 
research, the impacts of NSC and NRR modes of state-led urbanisation on livelihoods seems 
sharply different, in terms of the built environment, the compensation composition, the 
labour market constructed and the reaction of resettled villagers. Nevertheless, using a 
relational comparative approach, I focus not only on comparing the trajectories between 
case studies and their interconnection, but also, and perhaps more importantly, on the 
drivers and mechanisms behind the trajectories of each case study. The result of such 
analysis is fruitful. While the existing literature separates the analysis of the state behaviour 
and the study of the livelihoods of the resettled population, this research connects the two 
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parts of the research. Not only does this research identify the important role of the village 
committee in driving the divergent impacts on resettled villagers’ livelihoods after 
resettlement, it also discovers the key mechanisms that shape the relationship between the 
crucial driver, the village committee, and the broader state-led urbanisation process, and 
the consequent livelihoods of the resettled villagers. Therefore, the relational comparative 
approach helps the comparison to focus on the two approaches to state-led urbanisation 
(NSC and NRR), given the various contexts of villages at different sites. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter explained the methodologies employed in this research. As outlined above, e 
data collection is primarily based on qualitative interviews and ethnographic research 
conducted with residents in four villages, located in two provinces in China. Underlying the 
research is the assumption that a comparison of the two state-led approaches might yield 
insights about the relation between the livelihoods of resettled villagers and the particular 
state-led urbanisation approach, particularly the role of the state, that are applicable 
beyond the cases themselves. My approach to case comparison is based on Pennings et al.’s 
(2006) concept of “relational comparative approach”. This research recognises villages as 
comparable, especially the behaviour of the village committee, organisation of the local 
state structure, mechanisms of livelihoods, including the labour market, land asset forms 
and redistribution methods, response of villagers to the resettlement process and 
formulation of the new identity of the resettled villagers. The analysis of the role of the state 
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in constructing market mechanisms, the interaction of market mechanism with resettled 
villagers, and the formulation of new identity are case based and can hardly be 
“transferable” to other contexts. The comparative analysis of the two approaches and four 
case studies is therefore likely to reveal similarities and differences between different state 
approaches to state-led urbanisation process as well as the implications for livelihoods.  
Alongside practical considerations, I selected two village case studies, Huaming town in 
Tianjin municipality and Dongheng village in Zhejiang, based on their comparability, while I 
selected the other village cases studies in Zhejiang during the fieldwork based on 
information collected from the interviews. While all four of the villages are located in the 
east coast of China with established village administration, they differ in terms of proximity 
to the city centre, resettlement process and time, local economic context, the importance of 
the village committee and its relation to other level of local states. Although the comparison 
does not identify all the different dimensions, it provides a strong comparative lens for 
observing the interactions and impacts of the different factors in specific contexts.  
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 will analyse and compare the cases across the three sub-questions 
identified in the introduction, with the former two chapters focusing on Huaming town in 
Tianjin and the latter two on villages in Zhejiang province. The first empirical chapter 
examines the role of the state in the NSC approach to state-led urbanisation in Tianjin. The 
second empirical chapter focuses on the livelihoods of resettled villagers in Tianjin, using the 
livelihoods framework to analyse their possession of assets, capabilities, and activities in 
making a sustainable livelihood, as well as self-perception and identity formulation. The 
 156 
third chapter is parallel to the first, as it examines the role of the state in the NRR approach 
to state-led urbanisation in Zhejiang. The fourth empirical chapter is parallel with the 
second, as it unveils the livelihoods of resettled villagers in the three villages in Zhejiang as 
well as their changing self-perception and identity. Finally, the concluding chapter 














Chapter 5: The New Socialist Countryside mode of state intervention in Tianjin 
5.1 Introduction  
Chapter 3 argued that the combined use of the rural sustainable livelihood framework and 
displacement frameworks, with special attention on governance, reveals the drivers of 
various livelihood implications. This chapter discusses the role of the state in the Building a 
New Socialist Countryside (NSC) approach to state urbanisation paying special attention to 
the actions of local states at various levels. Considering the role of the state, it analyses the 
existence, motivation, behaviour and implications of state intervention during state-led 
urbanisation.  
This chapter applies the Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement (DIDR) 
framework to analyse shock and stress, and brings Cernea’s (2007) IRR model to the Tianjin 
context, where the risks are re-grouped and new shocks and stressed are added against the 
specific livelihood context and threats in Huaming town with NSC approach to state-led 
urbanisation. For example, Factor 5 (increased morbidity and mortality) from the Cernea 
(1997) model is excluded, as this thesis focuses on the economic, social and cultural 
perspectives of impact, and since children and young adults (<18 years old) were not 
included in the fieldwork. This chapter categorises the seven remaining risks into two stages, 
during the resettlement process and afterwards, and focuses on two aspects of the impacts, 
landlessness and joblessness, where the former has consequential effects of homelessness, 
food insecurity and loss of access to common property. This thesis not only examines the 
risks and the response of the state, but also uses the livelihoods framework in the next 
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chapter to reflect the active response from the resettled population. In the discussion of 
livelihoods after resettlement. This chapter examines the process of marginalisation and 
social (community) disarticulation and extends interpretation regarding social stratification. 
To highlight the development of livelihood risks, stresses and shocks under the transitional 
context from rural villages to urban resettlement communities both during and after 
resettlement, this chapter assesses state intervention at each stage. First, it explains why 
Huaming town was chosen for development and urban expansion; then it outlines the 
development of Huaming town, as driven by the leadership of the provincial government, 
which reshaped the configuration of the rural space and changed the key market 
mechanisms as mentioned in earlier chapters. To transfer rural land for urban use, the 
labour market was reorganised given the changed cluster of industries, the land rights were 
transformed from collective-owned to state-owned for construction purposes, and the 
villagers were resettled to a concentrated urban community. However, these conversions 
created risks, stresses and shock at the individual/community levels. The chapter moves to 
discuss the generation of risks, stresses and shocks at the individual level from two aspects, 
the mismatch of the new mechanisms and the established lifestyles at the individual level, 
and the loss of value of the previous rural assets during the transition.  
This leads to the next chapter, Chapter 6, where I present empirical findings on the 
outcomes of livelihood risks, stresses and shocks at individual level in NSC approach in 
Tianjin, as well as individual and communities’ strategies in coping with them. 
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5.2 Setting up the Tianjin Binhai New Area model 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Huaming town, a national-level strategic development zone, is 
located in Tianjin. However, as Tianjin is not the only strategic area for North China, it is not 
immediately clear why Tianjin became rather than other northern cities. Nor is it obvious 
why Huaming town was chosen by the Tianjin municipal government for development and 
urban expansion. In particular the motivation behind scaling up the project to national level, 
which meant establishing Huaming town as a national model of state-led urbanisation in 
China, is not clear. In order to understand these strategic decisions, it is necessary to 
consider the development background of Tianjin Binhai New Area (TBNA), the process 
through which Huaming town was selected as a model village for the state-led urbanisation 
project, as well as the transformation of the governance structure that is related to Huaming 
town. 
5.2.1 Tianjin Binhai New Area 
One of the most important drivers behind the establishment of TBNA was the interaction 
between cadres from the central government and Tianjin municipal government, in which 
lobbying by the Party Secretary of Tianjin to the then-Premier Wen Jiabao, and the latter’s 
personal ties to Tianjin, were key factors.  
The primary development idea of TBNA dates back to 1986 when the Tianjin municipal 
government established the TEDA – Tianjin Economic Development Area. However, the 
national development strategies focused on the south, west and central regions of China in 
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the following two decades, including projects like the Shenzhen Economic Development 
Zone, Western Development in 1999, and Rise of Central China in 2004 (Zhu & Sun, 2009). It 
was not until 2002 that the Party Secretary of Tianjin, Zhang Lichang, was elected as a 
Politburo member and invited central government cadres to visit TBNA, including the then-
President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao (Zhu & Sun, 2009). Moreover, Premier Wen had 
personal ties with the region, as he was born in Tianjin and attended Tianjin Nankai High 
School. The development plan of Tianjin, the Overall Urban Development Program of Tianjin 
(2004-2020), was approved by the State Council after Wen’s visit in 2005, and the State 
Council went on researching the development plan for TBNA (Zhu & Sun, 2009). 
TBNA is now a multi-layer entity composed of 9 functional zones, 2 ports, 19 subdistricts, 7 
towns, 2 districts and 1 administrative committee. The administrative reform since 2009 
abolished the previous Tanggu, Hangu, Dagang districts, but Dongli district and Jinnan 
district, partly occupied by TBNA, remain. Administrative districts are local governments, 
reporting directly to the Tianjin municipal government. Subdistricts (jiedaobanshichu 街道
办事处) were formed from the previous villages, with some integrated into others, at the 
same administrative level as villages. In addition, Tianjin Port and South Tianjin Port were 
subordinated to Tianjin State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) and run like a state-owned enterprise (Zhu & Sun, 2009). The nine functional zones 
are as follows: Advanced Manufacturing Zone, Airport-based Industrial Zone, Binhai High-
tech Industrial Development Zone, Seaport-based Industrial Zone, Nangang Industrial Zone, 
Seaport Logistics Zone, Coastal Leisure & Tourism Zone, Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City and 
Central Business District.  
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5.2.2 Model villages and precedent Xiaojinzhuang model 
History repeats itself. A similar story happened 40 years ago in the village of Xiaojinzhuang in 
Tianjin, also set up as a model village as a result of the interaction between central leaders 
and Tianjin municipal leaders. Dating back to 1974, during the Cultural Revolution period, 
Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, then Minister of Culture, promoted the anti-Confucius campaign 
against political enemy Lin Biao. Tianjin municipal cadres encouraged Jiang Qing to visit after 
identifying Xiaojinzhuang as a model village for Jiang’s campaign, bringing Xiaojinzhuang to 
the national level politics (Brown, 2012). 
Xiaojinzhuang was a village located in the north of Tianjin, 30 minutes’ drive from Baodi 
county. After the difficulties in promoting the campaign in another larger village where 
farmers were unaware of Confucius’s works and unmoved by the campaign, Tianjin 
municipal cadres thought a smaller sized village would be easier to control, so they 
encouraged Jiang to visit Xiaojinzhuang (Brown, 2012). For the farmers, a visit of a central 
leader, particularly Mao’s wife was an honour. Wang Zuoshan, the then Xiaojinzhuang party 
secretary, hosted the visits of Jiang and other central cadres, and promoted the Cultural 
Revolution to demonstrate his loyalty. He was promoted to County level, even becoming a 
standing committee member of the Fourth National People’s Congress in 1975 (Brown, 
2012). To impress Jiang, Wang and villagers engaged in poetry-writing and opera-singing 
instead of farmwork (Brown, 2012).  
The fall of Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four, as well as nationwide decollectivisation 
programmes, meant that Xiaojinzhuang missed its chance of transforming into a prosperous 
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village (Brown, 2012). Studying this historical case offers us insights into the contemporary 
case on points we might not otherwise notice. There are three points: first, similar to 
Xiaojinzhuang, Huaming town in Binhai New Area is also next to Beijing, the centre of 
political power; second, the Xiaojinzhuang case shows the important implications of cadre 
motivation for the development path of a village; third, the Xiaojinzhuang case also 
highlights the relationship between the upper and lower levels of local states, especially the 
consequences of a top-down-only approach to village governance for the livelihoods of 
farmers. Although the development of the TBNA was promoted by the Tianjin municipal 
cadres, the transformation of Huaming town is part of the expansion of the development 
area, and the expansion of the Tianjin urban area has incorporated both labour and land in 
Huaming into the development zone.  
5.2.3 The speedy transformation of Huaming town 
The development of Huaming town was under the leadership of the then-Tianjin-mayor 
Huang Xingguo. The reason behind choosing Huaming town as a model for state-led 
urbanisation was in response to the demand for land for the Airport-based Industrial Zone, 
which is an integrated function zone of TBNA. The pace of transformation of Huaming town 
from a small rural town of suburban Tianjin to a model town of state-led urbanisationwas 
extremely rapid, not only in terms of the transformation of the built environment and the 
industrial cluster, but also in terms of the changing livelihoods of rural residents. The 
relocation of the rural residents, as well as the transition of their productive activities, 
lifestyle and leisure activities altogether took 2-3 years (Ma & He, 2015). The transition has 
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been multi-faceted, where the built environment was transformed from dispersion to 
concentration, and the industrial layout from agricultural to non-agricultural. 
Image 5.1 Huaming town functional zones map 
 
(Source: Huaming town brochure) 
Huaming town is a sub-district-level town in Dongli district, which has 9 sub-districts in total. 
In Huaming town, there used to be 15 villages. After resettlement, the villages were 
displaced into one resettlement community (See Image 5.1). Moreover, the village 
committee administration was abandoned and replaced by a newly founded urban 
neighbourhood committee, appointed by Dongli District. Huaming town is also re-ranked at 
sub-district level, which is managed directly by Dongli District. As for the previous village 
committee, the strategy of gradual fading out is employed. After re-structuring of the 
administration, the village committee is reserved temporarily and co-exists with the newly 
established urban neighbourhood committee, participating and cooperating with the urban 
neighbourhood committee in managing the daily operation of the new urban 
neighbourhood and shareholding reform. Like the existing literature suggests, it is Dongli 
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district, which is at the county level that is responsible of organising the investment 
opportunities, governance restructuring and implementing other plans from Tianjin 
municipality. 
Members of the resettlement committee expressed in interviews that they had explained 
the resettlement process to villagers door-to-door and face-to-face before resettlement 
began. However, not all villagers agreed with the resettlement committee’s statement. 
While some expressed their expectation for a clean and neat urban living environment and 
reckoned that resettlement had improved their living conditions, particularly as it satisfies 
their demand for new housing, others were dissatisfied with how they were informed about 
the process. Some resettled farmers considered the resettlement process to be opaque, and 
complained that they were only passively informed and involved, which is reasonable given 
the short timeframe of the resettlement project. As one female villager in her late 40s with 
no urban skill-set said, “We ordinary villagers did not realise what was happening while 
resettling, and it was too late when we became aware what was going on: the new 
apartments were all allocated. Now our status has changed, we lost our farming land and 
got no money.” (Interview HM003).  
5.2.4 The new Huaming Town resettlement committee  
The new Huaming urban neighbourhood committee is a resident self-managing 
organisation, 1 for each 3000 households; committee members are elected by residents. The 
committee is composed of four offices. Party politics office is responsible for organisation of 
the CCP governance work, task assessment, military and women related work. Economic 
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development office handles economic planning, attracting investment, accounting and 
auditing. Social work office focuses on managing social welfare and charity, culture, hygiene, 
disabled people assistance. At last, urban governance office oversees security, environment, 
food safety, Huaming Town Street governance (See Diagram 5.1). The committee has four 
governors who are previous town-level and district-level cadres, responsible for the four 
departments, and other 5-9 committee members. 
Diagram 5.1 Huaming town new urban neighbourhood committee 
 
(Source: author’s own diagram) 
Apart from the new urban neighbourhood committee, Huaming town also established 
neighbourhood and residents team and asset management companies. As for the 
neighbourhood and residents team, each 8 to 11 buildings (around 300 households) is one 
neighbourhood; each 1 to 2 building doors (around 30 households) is one resident’s team. 
The head of neighbourhood and the head of resident’s team is elected by each 
neighbourhood and residents team. 
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As for the asset management company, each village established one company, making 14 in 
total. For example, in the case of Guan village, it had 36 shareholder representatives and six 
investors. The shareholder representatives were selected via democratic procedure, where 
every 10 households recommended one representative, to make up the 36 shareholder 
representatives. The asset management companies asked Huaming town government to 
manage a part of their assets, where the Huaming town government gave profits back to the 
company and the company shared them with individual villages. In this way, individual 
farmers’ shareholding income came to depend on the assets of the asset management 
company with which they are associated, i.e. their previous village membership. For 
instance, in 2013, dividends for farmers from the former Guan village were 8000 
yuan/person per year but only 1000 yuan/person for former Huzhang villagers. This was 
mainly due to the fact that the Guan village asset company had assets of nearly 0.9 billion 
yuan; in comparison, Huzhang village asset company had assets of around 15 million yuan. 
The big difference in assets can be attributed to villages’ possession of assets before 
resettlement, which was a result of different economic development in each village.  
 
5.3 Carrying out the resettlement plan in Huaming town  
In carrying out the grand development plan in Huaming town and establishing Huaming as a 
national model, the challenge of livelihood risks, stresses and shocks lies in the use of land 
and coverage of the cost. The Tianjin municipal government approached the development 
through “land balance” and “capital balance” policies. The major focus of the policy 
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guideline was to make sure the new urban assets distributed to villagers equalled the value 
of their previous possession of rural land, and the funding for the urbanisation project was 
abundant.  
As explained in Chapter two, “land balance” indicates the balance of increasing urban 
construction land and the decreasing rural construction land. This was implemented in 
Huaming town since 2005, where the household responsibility system was retained and the 
total amount of arable land kept the same. In Huaming, the land balance concerns rural 
construction land (12,000 mu) rather than farmland. In the implementation of the state-led 
urbanisation project in Huaming town, the increase of urban construction land matches the 
decrease of rural construction (Yang & Ruan, 2011). The other initiative, “capital balance”, 
represents the funding model of Huaming development, via bidding at auction (zhao pai 
gua, 招牌挂). The development project was funded mainly by revenue from operating the 
land led by the real estate developers, where rural residents moved into the apartments first 
and real estate developers collected the revenue from business rental income from the 
Airport-based Industrial Zone (AIZ). According to the plan, the cost of construction 
amounted to RMB 3.7 billion yuan, which is covered by the RMB 3.8 billion yuan revenue 
from the corporate tax and rents paid by companies in TBNA. However, in reality, sufficient 
income has not yet been generated to cover the cost, and the RMB 2.2 billion from the 
Development Bank still needs to be repaid, of which RMB 400 million should have been 
repaid in 2008 and RMB 600 million in 2009 (Yang & Ruan, 2011). 
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To make this plan work and achieve “capital balance”, the industrial cluster layout in the 
Airport-based Industrial Zone needed to be restructured from agricultural industry to non-
agricultural sectors in order to generate rent. Compared to the agricultural sector, the 
manufacturing and R&D sectors generate more return, as well as, in theory, streams of 
employment for the resettled farmers. On the other side, to achieve “land balance” and the 
transition of rural construction land to urban construction land, land reorganisation was 
required, consolidating dispersed land and updating its administrative status. However, the 
decision making structure within the TBNA is complicated, and conflicts exist in the 
reporting hierarchy. This is due to the overlapping of functions between administrative 
departments, particularly between the TBNA and each independent district, and between 
the central government and Tianjin municipal government. Although the administrative 
structure was reformed in 2009, where the previous Tanggu district, Hangu district and 
Dagang district were abolished, the two districts that were preserved, Dongli district and 
Jinnan district, now partly overlap with the TBNA not only spatially but also in terms of 
administrative governance.  
Before the administrative reform in 2009, TBNA Administration Committee was simply a 
coordinating body, subordinate to the Tianjin municipal committee and Tianjin municipal 
government, and without its own fiscal budget. After the administrative reform, the TBNA 
Administration Committee gained administrative power over the districts in its 
administration. However, as Dongli district and Jinnan district partly overlap with TBNA, they 
were not abolished during the reform, and as Huaming town is located in Dongli district, the 
overlapping of administrative function over Huaming town still exists. In the case of 
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Huaming, the Administration Committee of TBNA stands between the Tianjin municipal 
government and Dongli District government. Because Dongli District and the Administration 
Committee of TBNA are at the same administrative level, the bureau level, Dongli District 
does not need to follow instructions from the TBNA Administration Committee.  
The process of the resettlement was mainly planned by the Tianjin municipal government. 
Apart from setting up the urban neighbourhood committee, the municipal government also 
guided and supported the project by designing the operation system, theories, carrying out 
policies, operation modes and research.  
5.3.1 Change of land rights and the village boundary 
Apart from being driven by the industrial cluster expansion, the land rights change was also 
driven by the provincial state’s endeavour to improve the efficiency of the use of rural land. 
In the dual-track land system, while sale of buildings on urban land are allowed in the land 
market, those built on rural land are banned from the market. Buildings for residential use 
are called property-limited houses (xiaochanquan fang, 小产权房). Property-limited houses 
are only legally allowed for residential use, but cannot be sold or mortgaged (Zou et al., 
2014). Therefore, to make the rural land available for industrial use and to construct the 
resettlement community on it, the land rights had to be changed from collective to state 
ownership.  
As Diagram 5.2 below shows, there are two types of land rights, state-owned urban land and 
collective-owned rural land. The focus of land expropriation is farmers’ farmland 
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(agricultural land in the graph) and household plots of land, where the latter is one type of 
rural construction land. Because the expansion of the Airport processing zone requires 
urban construction land, the collectively-owned rural land needs to be transformed into 
state-owned land. By setting up asset management companies as mentioned above, village 
assets are still collectively owned by the village company where the shareholders are the 
villagers; therefore, it is not a de-collectivisation process. However, this process involves 
land expropriation and the reshuffle of the spatial allocation of land, which creates 
disruptions.  
Diagram 5.2: State and collective land rights in Huaming Town  
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(Source: author adapted from Zou et al., 2014)    
Associated with the breaking down of the existing pattern of land use is the dissolution of 
individual village boundaries. The three parts of the administrative transformation (san gai yi 
hua, 三改一化) since 2011 in Huaming town include, first, from the collective village 
economy to shareholding company; second, from rural hukou to urban hukou; third, from 
village committee to urban residents’ committee. As villagers used to live on the land that 
was scheduled to be merged into the Airport-based Industrial Zone, they were required to 
move out of the land to the resettlement community as a result.  
For resettlement, Huaming town established a concentrated urban community where 
villagers from 12 villages, including 10,000 households and around 35,000 villagers were 
resettled to the same community (Tianjin Land Bureau, no date). The newly built urban 
community has 22 compounds and 384 buildings in total. The 22 compounds are identical, 
with new similar names. Along with the reshuffle of the villages, the administrative 
boundary of the village was disassembled; the institutional body (the village committee) 
dismantled; and the village membership, which is the invisible boundary of the village, 
disappeared.  
Although most of the resettlement was carried out in the unit of village where villagers from 
the same village move together to the same compound, there is also a mixture of villagers 
from different villages in the same compound, as well as in the same building. This is partly 
because the number of apartments in a compound is usually larger than the number of 
households from one village, and partly because of the way in which resettlement was 
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carried out and the incentives to encourage resettlement. Those who agreed to resettle 
earlier were moved earlier, and those who agreed later were moved later. More 
importantly, the idea of moving farmers from different villages to the same "concentrated" 
urban community is also a requirement and feature of the urban integration approach to 
state-led urbanisation. The urban built environment was created by the Tianjin Bureau of 
Planning and Design, which took an urban-centric approach featuring functional zones, 
themed towns, concentration of resources and concentration of living. The administrative 
status of Huaming town was changed from “village” (cun 村) to “neighbourhood 
community” (shequ 社区).”  
Without the administrative boundary of the village, village membership was also broken 
down. This had two types of impact on villagers’ livelihoods, the material impact on their 
assets and the intangible impact on their identity. As the former rural collective property 
ownership was managed within the unit of village, collectively owned resources such as land 
were distributed by membership of the village. The fact that villages were integrated into 
the resettlement community meant that the collectively-owned properties had to be 
distributed to individual farmers before the village was dismantled, which left only a very 
short period of time for clarifying individual land rights, drafting the plan for resources 
redistribution and redistributing the collective properties in the form of urban apartments 
and financial compensation. As soon as farmers signed the contract and accepted the deal, 
their membership of the village expired. Whether farmers were satisfied or not, the deal 
was not re-negotiable. Because the village boundary, the operational body of the collective 
property ownership and the village membership were all replaced by individual ownership in 
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the resettlement community, the collective property ownership no longer generated 
sustainable profits for villagers after resettlement. The income generated from the asset 
component was therefore decentralised from the collectively owned assets to individually 
owned assets. This is very different from the Zhejiang cases which I discuss in Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 8.  
The early dissolution of the village committee, the mixed village community and the lack of 
informal feedback channels for ordinary villagers to have their voice heard significantly 
compromised the negotiation power of the villagers during the resettlement process. 
Although villagers also gained a new aspect of identity after resettlement, that of the 
compound in which they now resided, they very often continued to identify themselves with 
their original village in casual chatting: “I am from Guan village”; “I am from Xiangyang 
village. She is from Guan village as well.” (Interview HM007). In addition, for those who are 
from the same village, identifying themselves with the original village adds a sense of 
belonging and roots. That original village to which they are attached is also a bond that links 
villagers and what they share and have in common. Although it was stated in the official 
document that the resettlement is voluntary, with a fixed development schedule in place it 
is unlikely that the resettlement was truly voluntary. Wherever the incentive scheme failed 
to motivate villagers to resettle, there were collective actions or silent complaints. Farmers 
may think that the compensation is not adequate in covering the loss of their previous 
assets, or reckon that they may bargain for more resources by playing against the plan via 
postponing to resettle. 
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Having discussed the cause and implementation and the new configuration of Huaming 
town, including the built environment, village boundary, labour market and the changed 
land rights, the following sections examine how individuals were compensated during the 
process. In particular, they analyse how risks, stresses and shocks of livelihoods at individual 
level are generated through the mismatch of the new mechanisms and the established 
lifestyles, and the loss of value of the previous rural assets during the transition. After a brief 
overview of the livelihood setting before resettlement, the following sections examine how 
farmers were compensated during the process and the livelihood setting as well as market 
mechanisms after resettlement.  
 
5.4 The livelihood setting before resettlement  
In 2005, the contribution of the agricultural sector in Huaming town to the local economy 
was lower than that of the industrial sector, including vehicle repairing, chemical 
engineering, hardware, machinery, food, tourism and transportation industries (Ma & He, 
2015). In terms of the employment structure, 90% of the rural residents at least partly 
participated in non-agricultural sectors (Ma & He, 2015). The pace of integration of land and 
labour to the development zone was hindered by the rural administratively registered land 
in Huaming town. Although the Huaming area was functioning in many ways like an urban 
area, accommodating industrial urban workers from the Airport-based Industrial Zone (AIZ), 
the administrative level and boundary was stuck in the previous rural registration.  
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From the industrial perspective, land under the rural administration was not efficiently used, 
since the 15 villages of 13,268 households were scattered across the town, occupying 36% of 
land in town, which is a higher percentage than the construction land and land used for 
warehouses (Ma & He, 2015). The education level of Tianjin farmers ranked the 5th highest 
in China, where 7.6% of farmers had obtained high school and above education, according to 
China Ministry of Education. According to the national social sciences database, the 
education level of young people in Tianjin was higher than those who are older than 39 
years. 92% of the younger age group had a junior high school education or above, and 30% 
are at least high school educated, compared to 17% for the elder age group, while 10% of 
the young age group have college level or above education credential, comparing with 3% 
for the older age group (Pan & Wang, 2006). This suggests that the state-led urbanisation 
project in Huaming town would benefit those who have already integrated into the urban 
economy the most, while the livelihood implications on the group who used to live on 
farming are unclear.  
 
5.5 The compensation package 
In Huaming, the compensation package included urban resettlement apartments, a cash 
payment and social welfare entitlements. The resettlement apartments aim to compensate 
resettled people’s loss of rural housing and household plots, while the cash is to compensate 
the loss of farmland and social welfare is to provide social security.  
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5.5.1 Urban resettlement apartment compensation 
The exchange of rural housing to urban resettlement apartment is based on the size of the 
previous rural housing, the measurement took in the housing assessment in March 2003 
(Huaming town internal document). While there are two types of rooms, the main room and 
attached room, compensation for the main room is 1 square meter for 1 square metre of 
new apartment, and compensation for the attached room is 2 square meters for 1 square 
metre of new apartment. In addition, families which have resident children over 18 years old 
or who had previous rural housing over a certain size are entitled to an extra 15 square 
metres per person. The lower band quota stated in the policy is 30 square metres/person, 
therefore, even people who previously had smaller housing can reach an average 30 square 
metre/person standard. Also, an extra 8 square metres are given to each household for free.  
Therefore, a three-person family should receive an urban home of 98 square metres, 
although, of course, not all of the resettlement housings were built at exactly 98 square 
metres. Therefore,  mostresettled householdsreceived two apartments in exchange for 
their lost rural housing and household plot, including one big apartment (70-200 square 
metres), and a small one (30-60 square metres). For villagers who prefer cash compensation 
over urban apartment for their rural housing, they are compensated with the rate pf 1,000 
yuan – 2,850 yuan per square metre.  
The major disputes in compensation with the urban apartments centred on the issue of how 
much the new urban apartments are worth. According to the Tianjin municipal government, 
compensating farmers with urban apartments is a way of increasing their possession of 
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assets (Tianjin government, 2014). While farmers’ old rural houses were worth around 
20,000-50,000 yuan, each new urban apartment is worth 8-20 times that, at over 400,000 
yuan. Therefore, famers’ possession of housing assets increased by 10 times on average 
after resettlement. Nevertheless, if the compensation is calculated by the size of land 
farmers have lost, that is a different story. Taking consideration of the market price of land 
on the market in Guan village, which was worth 2–4 million per mu, and assuming the 
average construction size of each urban apartment is 1 mu, farmers should have obtained 7-
13 times the value an urban apartment, amounting to 2-4 million yuan after resettlement.  
Moreover, apart from the tangible value which could be materialised, collective property 
often carries invisible values which are more vulnerable to change, for example the 
insurance function of land. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the land property serves 
as unemployment insurance, pension and medical insurance for farmers. This might also be 
the reason why some resettled farmers feel insecure after resettlement, because they can 
no longer rely on self-production from farming to make a living. Rather, they are forced to 
rely on financial resources, including their wage, rental income or subsidies from the state.  
5.5.2 Cash compensation 
The cash compensation was given to resettled people mainly for their land. Resettled people 
could also choose cash compensation for their rural housing if they did not take the 
resettlement apartment. During the fieldwork, I did not meet anyone who took cash 
compensation for housing, since most interviewees regarded properties as worth more 
money than the cash compensation offered. Depending on the size of their land and their 
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choices in housing compensation, the cash compensation varied among households. What 
they did have in common is that most resettled people complained that they received less 
than they were promised, and less compared to other villages in other resettlement projects 
next to Huaming town.  
Some villagers chose to receive the cash compensation directly while others chose to take 
the interest every year from that money with an interest rate of around 4.5%, in which case 
the resettlement programme invested it collectively on behalf of the farmers. Most families 
received two apartments after resettlement, living in one and renting out one. They can also 
receive dividend from revenues generated from the collective land as a one off payment of 
1000 yuan per household member. 
However, the implementation of the compensation varied between individuals. Some 
villagers described the insufficient amount of compensation they received compared to 
what was promised: “At first, we were told that we would get 35,000 yuan cash payment for 
the lost land, but we actually only received 5,000” (Interview HM003). Others complained 
about the limited amount of the compensation itself: “The compensation money is too little, 
only 100,000 yuan” (Interview HM019). Especially when villagers compared their 
compensation package to that of other villages, they expressed resentment: “For other 
places, the compensation for the rural housing is 100,000-200,000 yuan, but it is only less 
than 100,000 yuan for us” (Interview HM008). Comparisons, discussions and complaints are 
a part of the resettled farmers’ daily conversation, as the following examples show:  
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“The compensation rate for Guan village is around 200,000yuan/person, but we received the 
compensation 10 years ago, which was only 60,000 yuan/person. We regret agreeing to 
resettlement. I saw the official document afterwards, which said that we could get 300,000 
yuan each person, but we only received 60,000 yuan each person, so where did the money 
go? The city, district, village, the production team all took some money from our 
compensation package, and there is not much left when it finally arrived in our hand” 
(Interview KG017). 
“The compensation money is not enough. If they say we should be compensated for 10 yuan, 
we only got 5 yuan. Not to mention that we do not have land to farm anymore. The 
compensation for land is supposed to be 200,000 yuan per mu, but we received less than 
20,000 yuan” (Interview HM033).  
5.5.3 Other compensation  
Farmers’ previous rural social welfare was also transformed into the urban form of social 
welfare after resettlement. Their medical insurance, pension, minimum living wage, 
employment insurance, disability insurance and military arrangements were incorporated 
into the urban system. For example, the minimum living wage was raised from 430 
yuan/month to 600 yuan/month after resettlement, while pension was raised from 580 
yuan/yuan to 1,100 yuan/month, which is at the standard of the rural-urban residential 
pension level (chengxiang jumin yanglao baoxian城乡居民养老保险), which is lower than 
the urban level. Farmers start to receive the 1,000 yuan/month when they have reached the 
retirement age (male 60 years old, female 55 years old). If Farmers are willing to pay for a 
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certain amount of pension by themselves, they could be transferred to urban town worker 
pension level (chengzhen zhigong yanglao baoxian城镇职工养老保险) where they are 
entitled to 1,680 yuan/month after they are 60 years old (caixin.com, 2014). 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of migrants, the pension deal for resettled people in 
Tianjin is still better than to that in other provinces. According to a female interviewee in her 
50s who came to live with her son, a migrant, for a month, in the Tianjin resettlement 
community, those who are older than 57 receive a monthly pension around 700-800 yuan, 
while in rural Shandong, the monthly state pension for those who are older than 55 is only 
55 yuan a month. The interviewee also expressed that if she fell ill, she would go back to 
Shandong for treatment because a larger part of the expenses could be covered by her 
social insurance there (Interview HM007). As for medical insurance in Tianjin, it has two 
parts. First, it includes the existing members in the urban and rural minimum living insurance 
and rural five insurance. Second, it covers the previous members of the urban worker 
medical insurance scheme, including the urban laid-off workers. Although the medical 
insurance package in Tianjin contains better value than that in rural Shandong, the 
transference of hukou status from Shandong to Tianjin still faces barriers.  
Although the compensation package of housing, cash and social insurance aims to transfer 
farmers’ previous rural assets into urban forms, it has drawbacks. First, it is difficult for it to 
cover the full value of farmers’ previous rural assets, because certain functions of the rural 
assets were invisible, for example rural land as unemployment insurance, pension, or space 
for generating self-sufficient food and reducing living expenses. Second, it does not mention 
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at all the “soft” side of the compensation, for example the implications of the changed 
labour market layout on individual farmers, the impact of the changed community layout on 
the social fabric in the resettled community and the activities of resettled farmers. The 
following sections examine these issues and highlight the shocks and stress at the individual 
level caused by the transition at the provincial level.   
 
5.6 Separation and formalisation of space - function zones 
Prior to resettlement, in Huaming town, there were no separated function zones. The 
production space and residential space were integrated where farmers could do several 
types of part time work at the same time, including household workshops and domestic 
work, in a more informal organisation of production space and residential space. Compared 
with that, the new spatial layout after resettlement is more organised. The formalisation of 
space and separation of functional zones allows large scale industrial setup; however it does 
not allow the combination of paid work and domestic work at home. Therefore, it challenges 
the previous routine of the farmers. Also, the formal layout and the industrial cluster 
suggest strict labour work schedules after resettlement; for example, workers are required 
to work within a timetable, taking breaks in turn and sometimes work night shifts, which are 
not included in farming related activities.  
Huaming new town has three functional zones, including the residential area, industrial area 
and agricultural area. However, the major industries in Huaming mostly require high skilled 
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non-farming skills. Four major industries are concentrated in the advanced manufacturing 
area: electric power equipment, rails and vehicles, aerospace equipment and electronic 
information. Strategic industries in the advanced manufacturing area are new energy, new 
materials, biomedical, and creative industry. All of these typically require skilled labour.  
As for housing, apart from the resettlement community, Huaming Town also includes a 
commercial housing area and a 20-square-kilometre Industrial Development Area. This area 
is very different from Huaming resettlement community, as it has a more pleasant living 
environment, better community layout, and a higher quality of apartments. Huaming 
community area was the former rural area, built after the demolition of the rural housing, 
whereas the Airport Economic Development Zone is an independent area, using land from 
Dongli District. Another two communities, Wanke and Mingju, are state-subsidised housing, 
given as a benefit to employees in this area by the AIZ. In these communities, “The price is 
relatively low, the residents’ quality [suzhi] is high, and they are all working”, according to a 
reception agent employed there. Compared to the commercial communities in the Airport 
Economic Development Zone, there are also corporate dormitories for their staff working in 
the zone, including both of blue-collar and white-collar migrants. 
 
5.7 Formalisation of labour market – the changing industrial cluster  
The major labour market in the area around Huaming exists in the Airport-based Industrial 
Zone. As mentioned above, most of the companies in the Zone are in sectors like advanced 
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manufacturing industry, R&D, telecommunication, aerospace and pharmaceutics, 
microelectronics, steel and metal, automobiles and components, chemical engineering, 
modern medicine, and new energy and high technology. More than 70 of the world’s top 
500 enterprises have invested in the TBNA (Binhai New District Government, 2015), which 
has become one of the regions in China with the highest foreign investment and provides 
280,000 employment opportunities, including in both Chinese state owned enterprises, 
Chinese private enterprises and foreign enterprises where the majority is Chinese state 
owned enterprises.  
The changing industrial sectors of the labour market suggests the requirements for workers’ 
skill-sets and working routine have also changed. In the Airport-based Industrial Zone, the 
employment opportunities either require labour work or management/white-collar work. 
The difference lies in the education level. The similarity is that both types of work needs 
workers to adhere a tight working schedule, normally from 9am to 5pm. In the case of 
factories, workers are on a three-shift scheme, which means they could have two night shifts 
every week. Compared to the urban work schedule, the farming routine is very different 
where farmers are able to arrange most of their days by themselves.  
The employment training programme provided by the government concentrates on airport 
related activities due to the cluster of aeroplane-related companies in the area. The training 
aims for both manufacturing positions and management positions, including operator 
qualifications, welding qualification tests, vocational qualification certificates, occupational 
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skills testing, talent assessments, re-employment training, production safety knowledge and 
skills training, safety manager training, special equipment and operation certificate training.  
For men, the popular skills training programmes are welding, electrical work, and 
construction work. For women, popular programmes include joining the air crew. These 
programmes are not restricted to resettled people, but are also available to rural migrants. 
The former type of programmes typically requires men who are young and can learn fast. 
The latter requires women who are young, with at least college education and who meet 
strict physical criteria, for example in height and weight. Most of the training programme 
target people aged under 40.  
Age is an important factor in successfully securing a training and work position. Because 
most of the unskilled positions do not require experience, what is important is that the 
workers could act fast and comply with work discipline. The young people are usually 
perceived as being more energetic and more likely to obey orders from their seniors. Also, 
they are far away from retirement; therefore, the company would not have to worry about 
taking the responsibility of pensions in the near term. As a result, the unwell, the old and 
women are still mostly likely to be left behind in deploying their capabilities to make a living 
in the resettlement community. Particularly for those in their late 40s and 50s, they have 
difficulties in securing a work position, yet are not old enough to receive a pension, which 
severely limits their income-generating opportunities.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that the beneficiaries of this training service are again usually 
migrants in their 20s, and it is rare to see resettled villagers in the Airport Development 
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Zone, apart from taxi drivers. The resettled villagers in Huaming who encounter difficulties 
in finding work are mostly women in their 40s or 50s, and most of them do not benefit from 
skill training programmes. They used to work in farming. After resettlement, they have no 
household plot to farm and start to look for work in the urban labour market. This group of 
people must change their career trajectory due to loss of rural land, but often fail to find 
work because of their unmatched urban skill-sets; more importantly, compared to 20 
something migrants, they are perceived as less competitive and less ready to learn new 
skills. 
For the training programmes that accept people older than 40, the skills in training are less 
required in the urban labour market. One female villager in her 40s joined a programme on 
packing nutritious lunches for schools. She said that after training, however, there was no 
related work available (Interview HM034). This shows that although it is possible for 
resettled villagers to learn new urban skills, the requirements of the work afterwards often 
limit these opportunities, especially for older people.  
However, their participation rate in the training schemes is not high. 62% of the rural 
residents reckon that the government is not providing any assistance for them to land any 
employment (Yang& Ruan, 2011). Those who attend trainings are typically young people. 
Most of them are migrants from other provinces who are looking for work in the Airport-
based Industrial Zone, rather than the local resettled people. On one hand, this can be 
attributed to the weak promotion of the opportunities in the resettlement communities. 
Because the training and employment centres are located in the Airport-based Industrial 
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Zone, and if there is already high demand from young migrants, the centres have no 
incentive to go out into the resettlement communities to look for less motivated resettled 
farmers. On the other hand, many interviewees said that they think those types of 
employment are hard work with low pay, which are suitable only for migrants and they do 
not want to do the work. This rejection of various types of low-paid urban work is discussed 
in detail in Chapter 6.  
Tianjin Port Free Human Resources Development Ltd. was set up by the Airport Economic 
Development Zone committee to provide training for migrant workers in the AEDZ and the 
resettled villagers who work there. On one hand it is a recruiting agency, connecting workers 
with enterprises in the Airport Economic Development Zone. On the other hand, it also 
provides training for those who would like to earn more money by improving their skills.  
As we can see from the above discussion, the new urban configuration creates a mismatch 
of skill sets and the labour market for those who used to live on farming. One option for this 
group is to set up their own small businesses. In the resettlement community, outside of the 
Airport Economic Development Zone, there are snack stalls on the main street in the 
resettlement community (See below image 5.2). The business owners include both local 
villagers and migrants. One snack stall owner revealed that she had a job in the factory in 
the village before resettlement. The factory was dismantled during the resettlement and she 
took the chance to move on and set up her own business, because she feels freer working 
for herself. The street snack vendors are not allowed in the commercial housing community, 
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which is one of the reasons why people regard the living condition in the commercial 
housing community as better than that in the resettlement community.  
Image 5.2: Snack Stands in the Resettlement Community in Huaming Town, Tianjin 
(Source: author’s own photograph)  
When the non-urban skilled farmers realised the challenge for them to survive in the urban 
labour market, they turned to possession of assets to seek for more income. As the 
compensation in Huaming town is a one-off deal, almost all social groups tend to obtain 
more resettlement apartments. 
 
5.8 Negotiation strategies to receive more compensation 
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Responding to the resources received, different social groups have applied a range of 
strategies to maximising the amount of resources they received from the resettlement 
process. Obtaining more resources during the resettlement process is a particularly 
important matter for resettled villagers in Huaming town in Tianjin, given the fact that the 
compensation is a one-off deal where the window for asking for compensation is closed 
when the resources have been distributed. The compensation in negotiation usually 
concentrates on the resettlement apartments due to the high value they embed, and there 
is scope to claim for more square metres by claiming the measuring of the previous rural 
housing was unfair.   
When the project was first carried out, some residents were unaware of how their hukou 
status was related to their possession of land rights. With only primary education, one 
woman in her mid-forties, with wrinkles around the eyes and intensely tanned skin from 
long-time exposure to the sun, commented: “We were asked by the village committee to 
change our hukou status, and I saw others did it, so I did it” (Interview HM031). She lived on 
farming before resettlement and is now selling vegetables on the street while waiting to pick 
up her granddaughter from school. She said that if only she had known the process before 
resettlement, she would not have agreed to change her hukou status so early. Rather, she 
would have waited until later in the hope that the terms of the compensation would be 
sweetened. For the others who waited, the results were not always the same, since some 
received better deals, while others got even worse deals. Whether waiting would bring a 
better deal depends on a combination of factors, including the village that the villager is 
affiliated with, the stage of development when they declined the first offer and the number 
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of villagers who used the same strategies at the same time. The uncertainty over obtaining a 
better deal indicates that using waiting as a strategy is a big gamble for villagers, and it 
brings high levels of livelihood risks, stresses and shocks for resettled villagers.  
As a replacement asset for land, the resettled apartments are the key livelihood restoration 
resource in the compensation package. Moreover, since the relocation is a one-off deal in 
the case of Tianjin, number of apartments people gain from the process would have a long-
term impact on their future livelihoods. As explained above, the number of resettled 
apartments that people receive depends on the size of their previous rural housing. While 
the compensation policy itself typically appears fair to villagers, inequality is generated 
during the implementation by varying levels of access to insider information, connections 
with the core circle of the village committee and awareness of the resettlement process. 
Therefore, resettled people identify that good connections with the local production team, 
the institution responsible for measuring the size of their previous housing, would bring 
them more benefits:  
“While it was promoted as exchanging rural housing land (zhaijidi) for urban housing, in 
reality, the exchange ratio is 2:1 (two square metres of rural housing exchanged for one 
square metre of resettled housing). While calculating, only the big room used a ratio of 1:1, 
other small rooms used a ratio of 2:1. But if you have connections, all of your rural housing is 
exchanged with a ratio of 1:1. In other villages, even the street was also calculated as a part 
of their rural housing!” (Interview HM003). 
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For ordinary villagers who do not have connections with the production team, they are often 
very sensitive about what cadres in the village committee and their relatives have gained:  
“The current head of the village committee gained four apartments from resettlement and 
his relatives got 4-5 apartments. He used to be poor and have nothing. Now his fills his 
apartments with precious antiques.” (Interview HM003).  
In this example, 4-5 apartments are twice as much as what ordinary villagers receive as 
compensation. This highlights the privileged treatment the village cadres receive. 
Particularly, not only the cadre himself, but also his relatives who are ordinary villagers, 
receive more apartments due to their connection to the cadre. This quotation also compares 
the financial situation of the cadre before and after resettlement, which suggests that he 
took advantage of the development opportunity. Whether this statement is accurate or not 
is unknown, but from the fact that most villagers care deeply and are informed about what 
the cadres gained, it suggests that there is at least some internal oversight mechanism, as I 
go on to discuss below.  
5.8.1 Village cadres 
In order to obtain more urban apartments from the resettlement process, different groups 
of villagers have different strategies. The above discussion shows that village cadres are 
under the close watch of ordinary villagers. On one hand, they are responsible at the grass-
roots level for implementing the resettlement process, in terms of both organising the 
villagers and redistributing the village assets; on the other hand, being watched by villagers 
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in the village, their scope of corruption is limited. For cadres, only those who are in post 
during resettlement would have the privilege of redistributing the assets, which might make 
former incumbents jealous. A previous cadre who served in the village committee for more 
than 20 years and retired in 2006 said that, unlike the current cadres, he was not making 
money when he was in post: “Now, a farmer representative earns 50,000 yuan per year, they 
take the money from our land.” (Interview HM014). Interviews with other villagers tend to 
confirm his view that “The Party is good, but people who carry out these policies only think 
for themselves" (Interview HM033).  
Another way for the cadres to obtain more resources is by putting the ownership of the 
assets under their relatives. A mother whose son works in the Dongli district government 
also said her livelihood has improved after resettlement and they received four apartments, 
two more than most villagers (Interview HM029). It seems possible that households with 
family members working in the planning and implementing process of resettlement could 
receive more apartments, either through actual corruption or through insider knowledge of 
how to use the system to their own advantage. 
5.8.2 Political elites 
One assumption is that those people who work in the process understand the system better, 
which means that they know how to take advantage of the resettlement policies. This 
internal knowledge is either learnt through experience, analysis or contacts from network. 
During my fieldwork, there was a workshop introducing the resettlement experience of 
Huaming town to production team cadres from villages in other provinces. One key point 
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repeatedly addressed by the speaker was the importance of taking advantage of the policy. 
For example, if the rural household had two rural houses with one big and one small, the 
young couple with their child (3 persons) would usually live in the bigger one and their 
parents (2 persons) in the smaller one. The speaker suggested that the young couples should 
exchange apartments with their parents before registration for resettlement, in the case 
that three people living in the smaller apartment would lead their average square metre per 
person to falls below the standard level and they could purchase the extra metres at a 
subsidised price; therefore, obtain more resettlement space, which could be transferred into 
an additional apartment. Moreover, another tip the speaker gave the visiting village cadres 
was not to be too strict while measuring the size of villagers rural housing: “open one eye 
and close the other” (Zheng yizhi yan, bi yizhi yan, 睁一只眼闭一只眼). The speaker said on 
one hand, it is not easy for villagers to make a living and this is their only chance to gain 
more resources; on the other hand, keeping villagers happy and cooperative will make the 
resettlement process smooth and completed on time. It appears that only the political elites 
and village cadres who are in the inner circle of the village committee knows the gaps in the 
policy where it is possible to take advantage. Although the compensation or resettlement 
policies may not be discriminative or unequal by themselves, then, the exclusive access to 
insider information creates inequality between the elites and the ordinary villagers. 
This is well illustrated by this assertion by one villager,  
“Ordinary people who were rich and had some assets lost their assets during resettlement; 
people at top positions in the village who did not have anything and were poor became rich 
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through the resettlement and have many antiques in their home. The head of the village 
gained four apartments from resettlement and his relatives got 4-5 apartments. The 
important thing is to have power. The key for getting a good compensation package is to get 
a good connection.” (Interview HM003). 
5.8.3 Ordinary villagers  
Compared to the elite strategies discussed above, the strategies that resettled people came 
up with in gaining more housing seem more spontaneous. Their strategy was typically to 
defer the timing of signing the resettlement agreement: “If you agree to resettle later, you 
can get more urban housing. For example, my nephew, he agreed to resettle early, so he only 
got one apartment for his three person family. If he agreed later, he could have got at least 
two apartments, one big and one small.” (Interview HM003). Another villager commented, 
“That is partially true. I agreed pretty late, and still have nothing. The key is to have a good 
connection at the same time. I had a big house and lots of rooms, which they did not 
calculate for the new housing.” (Interview HM042).  
Apart from lack of knowledge of how the resettlement system works, the resettled villagers 
also appear to be poorly-informed about the resettlement process and lack participation in 
the decision making process. They expressed that they had no idea what was going on and 
when they realised that they lost their rural hukou and land, it was already too late to grab 
more livelihood resources in the resettlement process. There are several possible 
interpretations of the lack of awareness of ordinary villagers regarding the resettlement 
process, which include the possibilities of being misinformed, cheated, or simply unfamiliar 
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with the process and how to find out. The lack of participation in making the resettlement 
plan led villagers to accuse village cadres of corruption in the resettlement housing they 
obtained, and to question why the distribution of resettlement housing is based on the size 
of previous rural housing not the number of family members. They questioned it after the 
resettlement is completed and attributed it as the idea of the village cadre, who has a small 
number of family members and a large rural house. This suspicion was also reflected in their 
attitudes towards cash they received, which they suspected of having been reduced by local 
levels of government each taking a cut.  
 
5.9 Farmers’ response to land loss: Take collective action 
When non-violent strategies to maximise gains do not lead to the expected results for 
villagers, some take alternative approaches, which is to take collective or individual action. 
For villagers who failed to receive the resources they expected, by comparing to their 
neighbours or what they perceived beforehand, or if they perceived the resource 
distribution process as unfair when the comparing the compensation to the rural resources 
they had before, villagers regard group action or complaining as a potential method of 
receiving more resources. Some view it as effective, while others attribute the success of 
collective action to individual capability. As the resettlement compensation in Tianjin is a 
one-off deal, they are also more active in seeking for more resources while it is being 
distributed: 
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“Our land has not been put into the village asset management company, we only have the 
change to receive financial compensation around 10,000-3,000 yuan when we take collective 
actions; if we do not do anything then we do not get any money” (Interview HM004). 
Collective action is a group behaviour of showing dissatisfaction and complaints by a group 
of villagers going together for petition or violent protest to the local government. Usually 
they would go to the higher-level governments if their complaints are not addressed at local 
level. In contrast, some farmers take individual protests in various forms. One form is 
becoming a "nail household" (ding zi hu, 钉子户). A nail household is a household which 
refuses to move to the new apartment during the resettlement process due to various 
reasons. They might be dissatisfied with the compensation terms, have psychological 
attachment to the old housing or be trying to leverage their bargain to ask for more 
compensation by delaying the project progress. As one interviewee said: 
“There are also nail households who refused to move. They did not get what they want. They 
think the compensation is unreasonable because some part of their rural housing was not 
measured into resettled housing. The nail households are those who are capable and know 
how to speak, otherwise, you would suffer. Those who are less capable can only move when 
asked, no matter how much they are compensated” (Interview HM038). 
Use individual and collective actions as a way to claim for more resources typically does not 
cost anything and villagers have nothing to lose. By contrast, legal services would usually 
have high costs, and when the battle is against the government, they have a bigger chance 
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to lose. There are no other available, effective, free feedback channels to communicate 
what villagers want to the local authorities: 
"All the local state does is talking and promoting, they do not do things. No one knows where 
did the money go? We have no money and available legal service to go against the 
government. We have no connection and no power, we can only tolerate it. There are too 
many people in the production team. The revenue from the expropriated land is not even 
enough to pay them salary. We have been farming, raising ducks for a whole life, many 
problems with bones and waist. It is painful all day. They give 1,000 yuan to the elders 
because they are afraid that we might take collective action. People do not take action if 
they get money; they would take action if they do not get money.” (Interview HM003). 
Among numerous approaches of interpreting the disconnection between the village level 
cadres and individual ordinary farmers, one way is the lack of informing procedure during 
the relocation process, and the other is the absence of trust in the newly established 
resettlement community. For the former, although cadres went door-to-door to persuade 
villagers and explain the situation, the extremely short period for farmers to respond to the 
call of the state generated risks, stresses and shocks to their livelihood, which required them 
to rearrange their routines and priorities immediately. For the latter, the idea of launching 
an asset management company for each village is a reasonable approach to preserve the 
physical assets at the village level; however, dissolution of the individual village committees, 
reshuffle of the residential patterns and the establishment of the new management team 
disrupts the established mechanisms and damages the trust and goodwill that existed in the 
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previous villages. Carrying out the task without establishing trust first, nor a clear and 
transparent procedure, amplifies discontent at the individual villager level.  
 
5.10 Oversight mechanism - “Red-eye” as oversight mechanism 
According to the categories of corruption in China proposed by Sun (2004), ordinary villagers 
in Tianjin reckon that the behaviour of village cadres is prebendalism, particularly privilege 
seeking (yiquan mousi, 以权谋私) and misappropriation (nuoyong, 挪用) of public funds of 
at least 5,000 yuan, as well as graft, particularly bribe taking (shouhui, 受贿). Villagers 
assume that cadres confiscated a part of the compensation funding for their private use and 
coordinated with the real estate developers to gain windfall profits. They even calculate the 
amount that they are supposed to receive based on information from higher level 
governments’ documents and what they received in reality.  
Why would the spokeswoman for Huaming introduce ways of “milking” the system to cadres 
from other villages and ask them to tell the methods to villagers? What is worth noting here 
is that the village committee is at the lowest level in the state bureaucracy, with no control 
over the resettlement process or the resource redistribution in this case. This indicates that 
the same powerless village committee and villagers are ultimately on the same side, and the 
village committee operates not only for personal gain, but to help villagers to maximum 
their benefits as well.  
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Although there is a lack of official oversight over the compensation distribution, the 
malicious envy, known in Chinese as “red-eye” (Zhang, 2013), may serve as well as an 
informal method of monitoring the compensation distribution process. Resettlement and 
the compensation distribution is a process of resource reallocation. In addition to the fair 
share compensation for the land and rural housing they lost, villagers understandably want 
to gain more resources wherever possible, particularly when it is clear to them that their 
livelihood is going to rely on those resources, and it is a one-off compensation where there 
would be few future chances like this when the order is restored, such that it would be 
interpreted by villagers as the opportunity of lifetime. Under this pressure, villagers pay 
close attention to whoever obtained more resources than them. On one hand, they seek 
secret ways of receiving more resources. In most cases, they keep quiet when the need is 
satisfied and make trouble when it is not, while in other cases, they make trouble and 
pretend to be exploited in order to gain more resources, and remain quiet even when they 
are exploited just to stay out of trouble. On the other hand, inevitably, this creates an 
informal monitoring method of sorts. The pressure makes the powerful village cadres play 
more by the rules and make an effort to maintain a good relationship with villagers, sharing 
“the pie” when necessary.  
This works best in small villages where everyone knows everyone, and the credibility of 
individuals depends on other people’s perception. In the cases where the individual 
boundaries are broken and the multiple villages are resettled to one resettlement 
community, it is less likely for the informal channels of oversight mechanisms to evolve, 
because the influx of new residents and the expansion of the administrative boundary 
 199 
decreases the pressure of word of mouth; therefore the oversight system increasingly relies 
on law and formal supervision functions.  
For example, Mr Xiang, who had served in the village committee for more than 20 years, and 
who retired in 2006 expressed that the village cadres who was in position during the 
resettlement process had access to the most resources allocated to the village, compared to 
their predecessors. Unlike the current cadres, he did not make money while he was in 
position. “Now, a farmer representative earns 50,000 yuan per year, they take the money 
from our land. The Party is good, but people who carry out these policies only think for 
themselves" (Interview HM014; Interview HM033). This quotation shows that the ordinary 
farmers regard the cadres in the village committees and at the local level are more corrupt 
than that at the central level. It also shows farmers’ deep belief in the Chinese Communist 
Party’s commitment of serving the Chinese people. While an important factor shall not be 
neglected is this farmer’s age. In his 60s, this farmer has clear memory of the Chairman Mao 
era and the deep belief in the Party might be a result of the nostalgic recall.   
Village cadres in Tianjin were typically perceived negatively by their villagers. Mrs Li, a 47 
year old woman who had previously worked in a factory, commented on the village 
committee as follows: 
“The elected officials have no education, but live in a big house. Each official has at least 4-5 
apartments. People with connections choose the second floor, which is supposed to be 
arranged for elder people who are less capable to climb the stairs. "Why the housing is 
distributed in this way (by size rather than number of household members)? Because the 
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head of the village has many rural housings but few household members, so they calculate 
the cost by person and distribute the urban housing by the area of previous rural housing. It 
is unreasonable (bu he li 不合理). Especially it is unreasonable for households with lots of 
people but few rural housing before resettlement” (Interview HM047).  
In the case of Huaming town, as it goes through a process where multiple villages are 
resettled to one community, the oversight responsibility transfers to the formal channels 
while the villagers are still in the previous mindset of relying on informal channels of 
information and talking about the behaviours of the cadres in private conversations. 
Nevertheless, the function of their informal oversight and discussion is reduced if not 
disappeared. During this process, individuals are likely to have the feeling of loss of public 
voice and not being heard until formal feedback channels are properly established. In 
Tianjin, there is no designated channel for complaining. As the village committee plays an 
important role in execution but not in designing the process, the village committee is not 
empowered to change the compensation quota, method or timing, which explains the lack 
of interaction of the village committee with villages, particularly the lack of feedback 
channels.  
Compared to Huaming town, in the Zhejiang villages of Dongheng and Wusi, as the 
individual village boundaries are preserved and the size of the village as well as the 
leadership of the village remain similar to that before development, the informal oversight 
mechanism still takes place and this is where villagers feel that they participated in the 
decision making process. By contrast, villagers in Tianjin perceive that everything happened 
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to them without their being informed. Acknowledging the existence of the informal channels 
of feedback and oversight in the original individual villages is the first step in establishing 
new formal feedback and oversight channels to replace where the previous informal 
mechanism is dismantled during the resettlement process. Without establishing the new 
formal feedback channel in the urban-centric approach, ordinary villagers would keep 
suffering from the experience of no participation and lack of voice in the development 
process. 
This section shows that the ordinary farmers in Huaming town did not have a say in the 
decision making process. Still, they have an opinion and are dissatisfied with the 
compensation result. What is more interesting is that they do not blame the compensation 
system where their consensus was not collected and they were not invited to participate in 
the decision making process. Rather, they associate their dissatisfaction with the village 
committee cadres, which seems to imply that the village cadres have the power to decide 
how resources are reallocated and have the will to take advantage from the process.  
 
5.11 Conclusion  
This chapter depicts the set of livelihood risks, stresses and shocks in the NSC approach to 
state-led urbanisation, paying special attention to the connections between the transition of 
governance structure in Huaming town and the transformation of the key institutional 
mechanisms. The municipal and district level state led top-down approach to urbanisation in 
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Huaming town, represented by“land balance” and “capital balance” ,requires a change of 
land rights and the re-organisation of rural life in such a way that the benefits may not be 
equally distributed to all the resettled farmers. While establishing the new urban 
neighbourhood committee might match the urban administrative structure, the dysfunction 
of previous rural village committees cause the absence of representation and protection for 
the vulnerable group.  
This chapter shows how the NSC approach to state-led urbanisation has played a 
transformational role in shaping the market mechanisms in Huaming town in terms of the 
context of employing human capital, possession of assets and activities. This chapter argues 
that the transformation of the institutional mechanism landscape requires a different set of 
human capitals to make a sustainable livelihood in the new urban resettlement community, 
which includes different skill-sets in the human capital and property assets in the form of 
urban housing rather than rural farmland. This transition of institutional mechanism 
landscape provides favourable conditions for those who have gained urban skill-sets and 
experiences to thrive better than those with few urban skills and who are used to living 
solely on farming related activities. These favourable conditions include the urban work 
schedule and urban living environment.  
In terms of possession of assets, after the transition from rural context to an urban 
environment, to construct a sustainable livelihood requires different set of capitals. Rather 
than natural resources, urban livelihood requires possession of urban capital. This change is 
due to the absence of farming land, housing land, rural backyard, and the consolidation of 
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rural housing in the new environment. These changes have direct and indirect, short-term 
and long-term effects on the resettled people’s livelihoods. This further extends to the 
available of assets resource, which impact on the resettled farmers’ capability of utilising the 
assets, their income-generating activities as well as their diversification of livelihood 
strategies. This is not necessarily caused by the unequal terms regarding the compensation 
package, but is more often due to the differences in access to the insider information, 
awareness of the process, how well and early individuals are informed beforehand, and the 
absence of a systemic information disclosure system during the implementation of 
resettlement. When it comes to the new layout of the rural community, from individual 
villages to a concentrated village without the previous village boundaries, the social relations 
and network between villagers are also subject to extensive change.  
The response of villagers include their strategies of obtaining more property asset during the 
resettlement process. When strategies do not work, some social groups might choose the 
option of violent collective actions. The other response of villagers including monitoring 
corruptive behaviours of the village cadres. However, the village committee might simply 
not have the power to make all decisions related to the resettlement process. The upper 
level states intervene in the process in an intangible way, either in the campaigning stage, 
compensation designing stage, or governance implementation stage. All these are closely 
related to the stress and shock that produced in the resettlement process. Nonetheless, as 
they do not have direct interaction with farmers, farmers tend to associate all the decisions 
and processes with their direct contact during the resettlement process, which is the village 
committee.  
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This chapter is in comparison with Chapter 7 on Zhejiang, where the changes of the 
mechanisms originate at individual village level rather than at the provincial level, and the 
preserved previous individual village boundary does not require the re-establishment of 
trust between the village management team and individual villagers. The most prominent 
difference between development that originates from the provincial level and the village 
level is the fact that, at the provincial level, as demonstrated in this chapter on Tianjin, large-
scaled resettlement and the requirement of large-scale relocation causes risks, stresses and 
shocks to individual livelihoods settings and the breakdown of the trust and social fabric 
between members of the village.  
After the description of the transition of the market mechanisms and the analysis of how 
they affect the livelihoods of individual farmers and households in this chapter, the next 
chapter uses empirical data from fieldwork to showthe specific implications of the 








Chapter 6: Impacts of the NSC approach on livelihoods in Tianjin 
6.1 Introduction  
As discussed in the NSC mode of state-led urbanisation, althoughlivelihoods of resettled 
farmers have been improved in terms of overall rising living standards and integration into 
the urban identity, there is multi-faceted impact on different groups’ livelihoods. The 
impacts include types of resources, channels of access, and various capabilities of coping and 
responding. For some vulnerable groups, the impact is negative when it comes to obtaining 
a sustainable livelihood from a longer-term perspective, and positive for those who have 
urban-related skill-sets and work experience before resettlement. These particular 
vulnerable groups include the unskilled group that used to live on farming before 
resettlement, business owners/entrepreneurs, the less socially connected, women, and 
farmers in their 40s-50s.  
This chapter applies the rural sustainable livelihoods framework to analyse the livelihoods of 
the resettled farmers. As outlined in Chapter 2, a livelihood framework summarises the well-
being of humans in terms of their access to different types of capital and their ability to 
utilise that capital. Applying the livelihood framework to analyse the livelihoods of the 
resettled farmers provides benefits as follows. First, it takes a bottom-up perspective which 
makes it possible to understand livelihoods in the real life of resettled farmers. Second, 
apart from an economic perspective, the livelihood framework also has a social focus, 
particularly in terms of the interaction between social/cultural capital and economic capital. 
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This is helpful in understanding the impact of the resettlement process at the community 
level in the countryside.  
The first part of this chapter identifies the gain and loss of livelihood resources, with the 
focus on the primary type of capital needed to make a sustainable living in the new urban 
environment of the resettlement community. Then, it moves on to examine the existing and 
new ways that resettled farmers have to enhance their livelihoods by utilising available 
resources. This discussion will be composed of sub-discussions on the labour market, land 
market and social stratification. 
To ease comparison, I have separated post-resettlement findings by province, examining the 
effects on livelihoods first in Huaming town, Tianjin municipality in this chapter and then in 
the three villages in Zhejiang province in chapter 7. In each chapter, I focus first on the 
general effects of state-led urbanisation on the livelihood components, to establish whether 
the livelihoods of resettled farmers improved overall, before examining the social impact on 
new social stratification.  
 
6.2 Assets  
As summarised in Chapter 2, the asset factor describes what people possess and control in 
order for them to employ livelihood strategies: their economic capital, human capital, social 
capital and natural capital (Johnson 1997; Scoones, 1998). Economic capital includes cash 
and means of production; human capital includes the skills, knowledge and physical 
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condition of the labourer; social capital describes the social networks of the labourer; 
natural capital describes the natural resources and the related services (Johnson 1997; 
Scoones, 1998). There are many facets of access to an asset, which could be direct or 
indirect. Direct access concerns the interaction between livelihood components; for 
example, the access to certain types of assets makes it possible for farmers to engage in 
income-generating activities. Indirect access concerns the interaction between different 
types of assets.  
Similar to the capabilities component, it is important to notice the different components of 
urban and rural livelihoods assets. Where rural livelihoods rely more on natural resources, 
for example land, and sustainable livelihoods concern using natural resources sustainably 
(Johnson 1997; Scoones, 1998), urban livelihoods rely more on income in the forms of cash 
and assets (Satterthwaite & Tacoli, 2002). Also, De Haan (2000) argues that the urban poor 
relies more on their labour, related to their human capital or capabilities; therefore, the 
livelihoods of the urban poor are more associated with labour-related conditions, for 
example wages, working time and working conditions. With increased capabilities through 
education and skills training, the barriers to enter the urban labour market are mitigated, 
and people should have better access to wage employment, while with mitigated 
institutional restrictions, people should have better access to assets (Rutherford, 2002; 
Harper, 2002). 
As a result, for farmers who are resettled to the urban built area, the transformation of the 
form of their livelihood assets is critical in shaping their post-resettlement livelihoods. As 
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discussed in Chapter 2, most assets also carry invisible values: for example, land also 
functions as unemployment insurance, medical insurance and pension for farmers. This 
invisible value is not likely to be evaluated by a market price as it has no productivity value; 
however, it is crucial for the livelihood security of the vulnerable groups, usually consisting 
of the ill, the old, the young, the unemployed and women. Women are considered 
vulnerable because of their traditionally weaker position in the household power balance in 
China. If the invisible value of rural assets is not transformed into urban assets, these 
vulnerable groups will lose out, exposing them to livelihood insecurity and increased risk. 
Particularly, for those who cannot make a living based on their capabilities in the new urban 
built environment, obtaining sufficient assets is critical for them to create a sustainable 
livelihood. On the other hand, for villagers who remain in the rural area (as in the Zhejiang 
cases, examined in Chapters 7 and 8), the change of livelihoods assets and the consequent 
disruption of livelihoods activities is likely to be more moderate. 
According to the NSC grand design, resettled farmers exchange their rural housing for urban 
apartments. The aim is that this helps resettled farmers settle down in the urban area and 
lifts them out of poverty. However, moving into the urban community increases the living 
expenses of farmers. Furthermore, this has different effects on different social groups, 
contingent on their ability to generate income from other sources and activities.  
6.2.1 Gain of rental income  
In Huaming town, according to the official compensation scale, resettled households are 
supposed to receive two urban apartments in the resettlement community, one big 
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apartment with a size of 60-100 square metres with two bedrooms and a living room, and 
one small with a size of 30-45 square metres with one bedroom with no living room. 
According to the compensation method, resettled households can live in one apartment and 
rent out the other apartment to generate rental income. In reality, the matter is complicated 
by questions in the three steps in transforming access to urban apartments into rental 
income: first, whether the household actually receives two apartments; second, for 
households who have received two apartments, whether they can all fit in the first one and 
spare the second one for rental income; third, if they have the second apartment available 
to rent, whether they could find tenants. This section examines these three stages one by 
one.  
The number of compensation apartments, particularly the number of apartments that 
actually bring in rental income, has a profound impact on the livelihoods of resettled 
farmers. In Huaming town, it appears to be the case that those groups which have urban 
skill-sets or are well-connected are also the ones who receive more available apartments to 
rent out (typically because they already possessed larger houses before resettlement, and 
because they understood better how to maximise their gains from the resettlement 
process). By contrast, the group without urban-matched skills and no connections, typically 
the already poor, receive fewer apartments. This means therefore, that the existing income 
gap between the two groups created by their capability is reinforced during the 
redistribution of collective assets.  
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Apart from the fact that failure to use the second apartment to generate rental income 
could jeopardise the livelihoods of resettled people, delayed receipt of compensation could 
also affect the quality of post-resettlement livelihoods. This includes resettlement housing, 
cash and property deeds. Almost one third of the interviewees entitled to two apartments 
had not yet received the small one, and some had not even received their first apartment 2-
3 years after resettlement. This was because some of the resettlement apartments were still 
in construction at the time of field study. Resettled people were given cash compensation to 
rent apartments during the transition period, but this did not help them bring in an income. 
This indicates inaccuracy in the planning stage of matching the resettlement process and 
construction of the resettled community. 
While the majority of the households received two resettlement apartments, some received 
more than two, and others managed to obtain only one. The resettled villagers usually rent 
out the small apartment as a part of their monthly income, although some households only 
receive one apartment, removing their chance of making income from renting. Villagers who 
understand the resettlement policy and how to maximize their gain of resettlement housing 
by fully using each household member’s space quota and swapping apartments with their 
parents and relative, acquired more than two, and could thus gain more rental income. 
Tenants typically consist of migrant workers and managers from the TAEZ. According to the 
local real estate agent, the property rental market is very active in the resettlement 
community with a balanced number of migrant worker tenants and business owners looking 
for rental housing. Therefore, when the resettled residents have spare apartments, it is not 
particularly difficult to rent them out. 
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However, not every household with two apartments was able to use their resettlement 
housing as an asset to gain income, since the second apartment was often occupied by 
family members rather than being available to rent. For households with more than 3 family 
members, they did not have many options. In reality, for a household with 2-3 family 
members, it was feasible to live only in the large apartment, but for a household with more 
than 3 members, the first apartment was usually physically too small with two bedrooms. 
Moreover, even if the whole household could fit in one apartment, this meant that 2-3 
generations would live together, which compromises the living quality of resettled farmers. 
The potential to expand living space of resettled farmers was also removed after 
resettlement, as villagers had previously also had the flexibility of building extra rooms, and 
separating space into different rooms in their rural homes before resettlement. Therefore, 
for households with more than 3 family members, they have two choices, either to live in 
both of the apartments, meaning no rental income, or to squeeze in one apartment and rent 
out the other, but with considerable cost to their living quality.  
For households with young adults soon to get married, if the children could not afford urban 
commercial housing, they have little choice but to leave the second apartment for the adult 
children. Before resettlement, when the adult children married, the family would build a 
new house, or add an extra floor or wing to their house for the new couple, doing much of 
the work by themselves to reduce the cost if they had a tight budget. After resettlement, the 
urban community layout eliminated the option of building new housing for the young couple 
by the family themselves, since the resettled villagers cannot build extra rooms when they 
live in a block of apartments. The only way to acquire a new apartment is to purchase one, 
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either a resettlement apartment or commercial apartment. Since the pricing of both 
resettlement and commercial apartments is based on the market, opportunities for the 
resettlement household to reduce the cost by using their own labour, negotiating, or by 
using their social networks are removed. The only currency in the market is cash. Therefore, 
to buy a new apartment, the resettled farmers need to explore alternative income sources, 
like waged employment.  
This leaves the elderly parents with the situation of no rental income. These parents are 
usually also the ones who have difficulties in participating in the urban labour market, as 
most of them have been farming for their entire life. Therefore, the livelihoods of this group 
are endangered. Mr. Wang, in his 50s, who used to farm and is now working in the new 
urban neighbourhood committee said that his daughter married and they decided to live in 
the additional apartment that was initially planned to generate rental income for the 
household; as a result, the household lost the source of income. This may first appear as a 
household strategy where the family made the decision to split up and the newly married 
young couples live in the additional housing. However, the young couple chose to live in the 
second apartment because they could not afford their own housing, as was typical, and 
selling the additional apartment to purchase a new apartment in a new location was not an 
option due not only to the small size but also the low market value of resettlement housing, 
which is usually lower than the commercial housing.  
There are several reasons for the lower value. First, the resettlement apartments are only 
allowed to be traded on the housing market from five years after the farmers moved in, 
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before which farmers do not receive the deeds of the housing. If there were mutual 
consensus between the purchaser and farmer to seal the deal before the five year period, 
the buyers would have to take the risk of policy change meaning that the resettlement 
housing will still be illegal to purchase on the housing market after five years. Most buyers 
therefore seek a large discount by sealing a deal beforehand. Second, the living conditions in 
the resettlement community are not as organised and pleasant as those in the local 
commercial housing communities, where developers hire professionals to design the layout 
of the community. Third, there is a shared perception in the resettlement community that 
the quality of the housing in the resettlement community is poorer than commercial 
apartments. From observation, the villagers’ perception is correct. Both of the interior 
structure and external decoration of the commercial apartments are of higher quality than 
that in the resettlement community apartments.  
Allowing children to live in the rental-income-generating housing is a gift from the parents, 
which is viewed as self-sacrifice for the happiness of their offspring by most Chinese parents. 
Having lost the expected income, the elder parents would choose to seek waged work, for 
example Mr. Wang found himself work in community service. However, the type of work 
that farmers with no urban skill-sets could find is limited. In Mr Wang’s case, he has a 
daughter, but still provided accommodation for them, whereas in rural China, it is usually 
the son’s family that provides a house for the newly married couple. In this case, because his 
son-in-law is not local and could not afford to purchase an apartment anywhere in Tianjin, 
Mr Wang gave the second apartment to the new couple.  
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Building a new rural house for adult children before resettlement could, even if cost-saving 
measures were taken, consume a family’s accumulated savings. Resettling rural villagers to 
the urban area and compensating them with two urban apartments could have provided a 
solution to this traditional rural custom and released the pressure from farmers to build new 
apartments. However, since in the Huaming case the rental income from the second 
apartment was designed to be the income source for resettled villagers, if the household has 
adult children, the household has to choose between rental income or buying a new 
apartment for their offspring. Since they could rarely afford the latter, most households with 
soon-to-be-married adult children choose to leave the second apartment for their children, 
give up on rental income and looking for alternative income sources. Rental income is 
particularly important to parents who are nearly retired or retired or who have almost no 
urban skills-sets, like computer literacy, office skills, and education credentials. The newly-
marrieds occupying the additional housing means that their parents would not receive the 
additional income, which makes them totally reliant on pensions and struggle for their 
livelihood.  
6.2.2 Rental income enough to cover increased spending 
Before resettlement, land functioned as an asset generating sustainable income and a field 
for the domestic production of food. After resettlement, losing farmland means not only the 
loss of income but increasing living expenses caused by the suspension of farm-based 
domestic production, and resettled people have to purchase what they used to be able to 
produce in the household. Furthermore, resources that were free in rural area incur charges 
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in the urban community. For example, villagers used to be self-sufficient with vegetables 
they grow from the farm, and have free water. After moving to the urban complexes, they 
need to pay money for water, gas, electricity and the new community management fee. 
More than a quarter of interviewees expressed a sense of increased pressure on finances. As 
Mrs Wang, a woman in her 40s, commented, “The services fee is too expensive, 150 yuan 
more than last year, 423- 626 yuan this year for a 40 square metre room. The cost of living is 
more 10,000 yuan a year. Living pressure is much higher. We did not pay for the service fee 
while living in the rural village. Living expenses are much higher, even if one earns more.”  
Image 6.1: Supermarket in Huaming Town 
(Source: author’s own photograph)  
For all the resettled households, they have to face the fact that living in an urban 
environment increases living expenses. Farmers who used to sell the vegetables from their 
farmland now have to buy them from the supermarket in the local community (See Image 
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6.1 above). As shown in the picture above, the vegetables are wrapped in plastic and sold in 
an organised fashion, the same as those in a supermarket in the city, and the costs are high. 
The difference is that, for households which received two urban resettlement apartments 
and managed to spare one for renting, they have a new income source from rent to cover 
the increased expenses. It is less optimal for households that do not have the additional 
apartment to bring in rental income. This means that they need alternative income sources 
to cover the increased expenses. Many turned to the urban labour market. Nevertheless, 
the question is whether they could secure employment there.  
6.2.3 Low level of social welfare  
Those who were unable to gain a rental income from a second resettlement apartment were 
often dependent on social welfare, particularly if they were elderly or unable to work. 
However, this did not provide a particularly secure livelihood. 
For the elderly, the majority of them received a pension after resettlement but they 
regarded the pension as insufficient to cover their monthly expenses, so they needed 
income from other sources. The amount of pension received was dependent on the amount 
already saved in one’s pension account. Before resettlement, villagers lived in the rural area 
and many had not been in a pension scheme, rather they expected land to provide 
livelihood for themselves in their old age. After resettlement, villagers were offered the 
opportunity to join the scheme by paying the full saving amount at once or in periods. The 
amount of pension they received also depended on the level of the scheme they chose. The 
lowest level in the pension scheme gave farmers back 600 yuan per month, while the higher 
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level gave back 1,000 yuan per month. Also, there is a small amount of people who did not 
join the pension scheme after resettlement, they do not receive pension. Most resettled 
people are in the rural collective medical insurance. 
“Pension is only 1,000 yuan, which is too little, not enough for us to make a living. It is 
enough if we do not buy medicine; otherwise it is definitely not enough. We do not have 
medical insurance. This 1,000 yuan consists of 750 from the nation and 250 from the 
production team. There are too many people in the production team. The revenue from the 
expropriated land is not even enough to pay them salary. We have been farming, raising 
ducks for a whole life, many problems with bones and waist. It is painful all day” (Interview 
HM003). 
6.2.4 Loss of rural farmland, rural housing land and household plots 
While resettlement leads to a gain of tangible assets, the urban resettlement housing, 
farmers also lose tangible assets – their rural farmland, housing land and household plot – 
with important implications for their livelihoods. The loss of tangible assets leads to a loss of 
intangible value. One of the invisible functions of land before resettlement was as an 
unemployment insurance for farmers: for migrants, it is an unemployment insurance where 
they can fall back when laid off in the urban labour sector or deciding to return home; for 
the non-migrant young, elder and female farmers, it is a space for them to provide self-
sufficient food for the household. After moving to the urban community, villagers lost their 
land, as well as the space for producing their own food.  
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“I used to work at home and could do whatever I wanted: even a working aged man could 
not compare with me in farming. After I moved here, I have nothing to do. In the past, at 
least I could grow food for the family to eat, but now we have to buy everything" (Interview 
HM035). This quotation is from Mrs. Wu, a woman in her 50s who looked after her 
grandchildren at home after resettlement. After resettlement to the urban complex, Mrs. 
Wu and many other villagers do not have space to grow their own food or expand their 
housing for domestic production. As there is nowhere to work at home, many of these 




Refer back to Chapter 2, the capabilities factor is measured in both material and non-
material ways (Chambers 1989), including, on the one hand, people’s ability to gain 
employment and income; on the other, the wellbeing of people while they are doing things, 
for example their “self-esteem, recognition, security, happiness, exclusion etc.” (Sen, 1987). 
In the urban context, farming related skill-sets are not in demand due to the absence of 
farmland in the cities. Instead skill-sets which match the urban environment are more in 
demand in the post-resettlement context. In Huaming town, the new urban built 
environment leaves no space for famers to deploy their existing agriculture-related skills; at 
the same time, it requires farmers to have urban skill-sets and experience to fit in the new 
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urban labour market, which is drastically different from the requirement before 
resettlement in the rural context.  
The desirable skill-sets are mostly education based. Most of the new opportunities in the 
Airport Logistic Zone require at least a college education, while some better paid work 
requires specialism in a particular area. There are also other manual employment 
opportunities, such as cleaning and gate guarding. Nevertheless, even these types of 
positions require workers to align with the strict work timetable and discipline where the 
work is over long fixed hours, and to be willing to work for a manager in a factory. This forms 
a strong contrast to the prior work schedule of being a farmer, where villagers had worked 
the vast majority of on their own land to their own timetables. One result of the factory 
work schedule is that workers in the factory have to live in the dormitory provided by the 
company in the Airport Logistic Zone, which does not fit well to the living conditions of 
middle-aged resettled farmers with dependent children or grandchildren.  
From the “migration as household strategy” perspective, resettled people have not out-
migrated before in part because they were adjacent to the urban labour market in Tianjin, 
where it was not difficult to commute from the village if working in Tianjin city. Therefore, 
while the NSC’s argument of creating more urban opportunities for resettled people might 
be true, the usefulness of resettlement in improving the access to the urban labour market 
is questionable, in terms of both distance and skill-sets. For farmers who did not migrate 
because of the lack of urban skill-sets or motivation to work as factory labour, they would 
actually benefit more from staying in the rural area. Being resettled to the urban area where 
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they could not work while losing land to provide self-sufficient food is effectively a 
disruption of their existing livelihoods without the prospect of improvement. Especially 
when the process is rapid, for those who cannot identify themselves with the urban labour 
market, it also has a profound impact on their identity and well-being. Without protection, 
this latter group of farmers would be left behind in the new urban resettlement community. 
Not only does this affect an individual’s ability to make a living, at household level, it also 
redefines the role of each family member in the household based on their new financial 
contribution. At village level, new social groups are shaped based on the redistribution of 
livelihoods material resources. Most often, it is the social groups at the bottom of the social 
spectrum that are likely to lose out. 
6.3.1 Impact on women - changing intra-household relationship 
As discussed above, losing land means losing fields for both economic production and 
domestic production for rural households. The increasing involvement of women in 
agriculture in recent years and the major responsibility of domestic production in the aim of 
reducing household expenses indicate that women would suffer more than men.  
From the perspective of household structure, who gets what largely depends on who does 
what. Before resettlement, women’s contribution to the household was more visible, in the 
form of self-produced food, raising domestic animals, household cleaning and caring for 
children. However, after resettlement, due to the loss of farming land and backyard of the 
rural housing, the same functions can no longer performed by women. They still perform 
childcare, but with the reduction of other functions, their economic contribution to the 
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household is less visible after resettlement. This reduced contribution in eliminating 
household expense means women are likely to have less bargaining power in the household. 
In Huaming, as some women who worked in domestic production and on the farm tend not 
to have urban skill-sets, this means they increasingly have to rely on cooperation with other 
members in the household. Thus, the strength of their negotiating position would be 
damaged (Agarwal, 1997). 
Without women providing alternative economic production for the household, the resettled 
household becomes increasingly dependent on other incomes. But different from the wage-
dependent households theory, in the case of Tianjin, rental income is a buffer before 
households have to rely on wage income, and this can therefore be seen to defer the 
proletarianisation process for many resettled people.  
6.3.2 New urban skill-sets  
With urban-centric planning carried out by the Tianjin Urban Planning Bureau, Huaming 
town features functional zones, concentration of resources and efficient use of land, of 
which the concentrated community is allocated adjacent to the Tianjin Airport Economic 
Zone (TAEZ). TAEZ is one part of the Tianjin Free-Trade Zone, covering an area of 119.9 
square kilometres, of which the other two components are Dongjiang Free Trade Port Zone 
and Binhai New Area Central Business District.  The major industries that TAEZ focuses on 
include the aerospace industry, equipment manufacturing, information technology, aviation 
logistics and R&D (Tianjin government). This creates employment, increasing demand both 
for workers with high skill-sets and experience and for unskilled labour. For the high-skilled 
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urban work, the airport logistic development zone where the airbus factory is located 
requires skilled workers specialising in high technology. To work in this sector, only villagers 
who have acquired related education and work experience could fit in. As most of the 
villagers used to be in agricultural employment, this demand of labour cannot be met by the 
resettlement community and the companies therefore import skilled workers from other 
provinces.  
On the other hand, the development zone also generates unskilled work, for example 
cleaning and gate keeping, with much less demand for urban skills and higher education. 
Although this might seem like a good fit for many of the resettled people, surprisingly there 
is also a lack of supply of labour for this type of work, and again the hiring companies import 
migrants from elsewhere to work for them. The unskilled work also includes manufacturing 
work in factories, which is also done by migrants from other provinces. In comparison to a 
typical white-collar salary in Tianjin of around 3,000 yuan per month, a typical salary for 
unskilled workers is around 1,000 yuan per month. According to interviews with resettled 
farmers in Huaming town, 1,000 yuan per month seems like a low salary to most. During the 
interview, one unemployed woman in her 40s answered that “The salary for that work is too 
low. It is not worth the hard work” (Interview HM011).  
Before resettlement, those who could find employment in the urban labour market had 
already secured work for which they commuted from the village or migrated. For villagers 
with higher education, they were already competing with their peers in Tianjin city, and 
some worked in the Tianjin government or banks in the city. People in this group were 
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usually in their late 20s or 30s. For villagers without a higher education background, many of 
them worked as taxi drivers in Tianjin. This group is usually aged around 40 – 50 years old. 
Alternatively, for the less educated but highly motivated villagers, they might have found 
themselves joining the service sector, working as a sales person in a shopping centre in 
Tianjin. For all the above three groups, they earned more than 2,000 yuan per month at 
least before resettlement. Particularly for the first group, those who are educationally 
qualified for high-end white collar work and management positions, their average earning 
could compete with their counterparts in Beijing. Therefore, the low-end labour market 
created by the resettlement process is not attractive for those who have already secured 
work in the urban labour market.  
By contrast with the resettled villagers in Huaming town, to whom unskilled wages in the 
TAEZ seemed low, a 26-year old migrant woman from Henan province expressed happiness 
with her work in the factory and life in the dormitory, which was better than anything 
available for her back home. It was not easy living away from home, but she had an income 
which was enough to cover her expenses and the freedom to do whatever she likes 
(Interview HM033). This comparison shows that although the unskilled resettled farmers 
could fit the skills requirement in the low end of the urban labour market, they do not 
necessarily accept the offer.  
Furthermore, even if resettled people were willing to take unskilled jobs in the TAEZ, they 
face stiff competition from rural migrants from other provinces. One employer complained 
about the insurance package they would have to pay for if they hired resettled villagers, 
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while they are free from the obligation if the worker is a migrant, because of hukou 
restrictions. Moreover, facing competition from migrants from other villages and provinces, 
particularly their low cost living expenses and expectations, resettled farmers are not 
competitive in the low-end urban labour market. As most of the migrants are from provinces 
that are less developed compared to Tianjin where the average salary is lower, migrants are 
willing to work for lower pay than resettled people because the average salary in Tianjin is 
higher than back in their home villages in other provinces.  
Resettled people who have urban skill-sets, past work experience in the urban labour 
market, and formal education usually keep their previous work before resettlement, 
including those who partly worked on the farm and partly worked as waged workers before 
resettlement. Unlike those who lived on farm work and have only agricultural skills, who 
have a hard time in finding waged work in the urban workforce after resettlement, they not 
only do not suffer negatively impacts, but it is often a chance for them to take advantage 
from the process to improve their livelihoods.  
A small number of resettled farmers used to live on combined farm work and waged work. 
They are more likely to transit into full-time waged work successfully after resettlement. 
They either work in the same industry or use similar skill-sets, often taking advantage of the 
connections they built up during their previous work. Mrs. Fan, a resettled woman in her 
40s, is a typical case of those still using the same set of skills who took advantage of the 
connection to the industry she had been working in since before resettlement. She drove an 
electronic taxi in the resettled community. Before resettlement, she used to do both farming 
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and taxi driving, becoming a full time driver after resettlement. After resettlement, Huaming 
government formalised the electronic taxi industry, and established a new programme to 
exchange electronic three-wheeled cars for safer electronic four-wheeled cars, providing 
training for all the drivers, as well as requiring drivers holding driving license to be allowed 
taking customers. The transition for Mrs. Fan was natural with her previous driving and 
customer service skill sets, and she took the new opportunity of becoming a four-wheeled 
electronic taxi driver immediately it was established. As Mrs. Fan is not farming anymore, 
she can fully focus on driving. Comparing farming and driving in terms of income generation, 
Mrs. Fan benefits from leaving farming and expressed her passion about the extra income 
the new work mode brings in: “I like this job, much better than farming, and it brings much 
more income than farming” (Interview HM039).  
Looking back to the prior case of Mrs. Wu who worked as a farmer before resettlement, it 
would have been much more difficult for her to make the transition to an electronic taxi 
driver. First, Mrs. Wu does not have driving skills. By the time she could obtain her driving 
license, the limited training opportunity would probably have expired. Second, even if Mrs. 
Wu had a driving license, she does not have Mrs Fan’s connection with or contacts within 
the industry, which means that she would not receive the information about the 
opportunity immediately, likely leading to missed opportunities. 
During my interviews, around 25 per cent of resettled people already worked as waged 
workers before resettlement. For some of them, it was possible to use the previously built-
up connections and start their own businesses with different skills than those used for the 
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waged work before resettlement, but through successful use of their urban network of 
contacts. A successful case was 38-year-old Mrs. Lee, who had been running a property 
agency in the resettled community for three years. She used to work as a taxi driver before 
resettlement, but after resettlement, she lost her old customers and it became increasingly 
difficult to gain businesses due to people’s changed pattern of commuting. Fortunately, she 
spotted a new opportunity in the property rental market, identified the demand for rental 
housing from migrants in the Huaming community and started her property agency business 
with a partner, building up the new business with help from some of her old customers.  
Maintaining a good relationship with these contacts, including an accountant and a property 
agent in Tianjin city, was essential to the success of her new business venture.  
Compared to Mrs. Wu, Mrs. Lee used her connections built up during her previous work to 
help with the new business. Also, Mrs. Lee is college educated, and Mrs. Wu has only 
primary school education. Apart from the connections and capital to start the business, Mrs. 
Lee’s education also meant that she was better in identifying opportunities in the urban 
market, developing it into a business, and communicating effectively with customers. In 
each of these successful cases, the prior acquisition of urban-related skills and urban 
contacts before resettlement was essential in leading to a positive outcome. 
6.3.3 Connections with the city before resettlement 
For villagers with urban related skill-sets that can fit in the urban labour market, 
resettlement does not have much impact on their ability to deploy their capabilities, and it 
benefits them the most. They usually acquired qualifications and urban work experience 
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before resettlement through education rather than receiving training after resettlement. 
When it comes to the living conditions, this group often expressed appreciation for the 
improved conditions, such as the concrete road, the urban layout, increased security, urban 
residential buildings with running water and automatic toilets. Compared to the other two 
groups (farmers with no urban skill-sets and business owners) that lamented the increased 
living cost of urban life, this group revealed that they are willing to pay for the increased 
convenience and the neat environment because they have a higher income than the others. 
Ms Zhang said that the rural living condition was unpleasant where there was muddy roads 
and shared toilets; she feels grateful to move into the urban environment where it is clean, 
organised and she has her own bathroom (Interview HM14). During the resettlement 
process, the education background and work experience enables these people to 
understand the system, so that they know how to claim the most from the compensation 
package. After resettlement, the improved metro and bus connection between Tianjin city 
and the resettlement community makes it more convenient for them to go to work; at the 
same time, development of the Airport Logistic Zone and the related industrial parks in the 
adjacent area has significantly increased the supply of work for this group of people. More 
importantly, their salary income from the urban labour market provides them with cash 
liquidity to rent out the resettlement apartment, invest in more apartments or move out 
from the resettlement community and join the urban community. Therefore, the capability 
to do high skilled urban work not only increase this group’s income, it also enhances their 
possession of property assets, discussed in the next section.  
6.3.4 Opportunities for the unskilled to work in the urban environment  
 228 
In the resettlement community, some villagers who did not or could not participate in the 
urban formal labour market joined the informal sector. A woman in her 30s sold popcorn 
from a three-wheeled bicycle in the street. When asked how she set up this business, she 
answered that she was working nine to five in a local factory as an ordinary labourer working 
on the production line, which dismantled after resettlement. She wanted to have more 
freedom and be in charge of her own time, so rather than working in the factory, she set up 
this popcorn business and became her own boss (Interview HM024, Image 5.2 in Section 
5.7). However, even this type of unskilled informal sector employment requires an initial 
capital investment (assets) and some degree of knowledge of consumer demand (capability). 
 
6.4 Income-generating activities 
6.4.1 Activities in enhancing access to capitals in different spheres 
Activities (strategies) to make a living is the third component of the livelihood framework. As 
discussed in the literature review Chapter 2 that rural-urban migration is one form of 
livelihood diversification strategy for rural residents (De Haas, 2010). However, in Huaming 
town, after villagers were resettled to the urban resettlement community, rural-urban 
migration is no longer an option of livelihood diversification strategy for them. In addition, 
with the loss of farmland and space of household plot, the resettled farmers in Huaming 
town also lost the self-sufficient food, which served as a livelihood diversification strategy 
for the farmers. While it is true that after resettled to the urban community, there are more 
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new opportunities of livelihood diversification opened up for the villagers, for example 
working as a wage worker in the Airport Economic Development Zone from home, and 
investment in urban apartments. Nevertheless, again, the new livelihood diversification 
opportunities require a different set of human capital and possession of assets for villagers 
to practice in reality. Therefore, these New opportunities are more accessible for those who 
have urban skill-sets and urban experience, and less accessible for those who did not acquire 
urban skill-sets and urban experience before resettlement. The difference of livelihood 
diversification choices between the better-off and worse-off groups further extended the 
intra-village inequality in terms of resources redistribution.  
What is also interesting here is that, unlike the proletarianisation process happened in the 
Western countries where farmers became wage worker after being incorporated to the 
cities, resettled farmers without urban skill-sets were not turned into wage worker in the 
urban labour market in Huaming case. Rather they relied on rental income as their income 
source. This categorises them as neither farmer nor proletarianised urban worker, but as an 
asset class struggling for their livelihoods.  
After from the intra-village gap between groups with urban skills and groups without urban 
skills, another gap was being created in gender. Beall (2002) pointed out that gender and 
generation also shape people’s livelihoods and their livelihoods strategies. De Haan (2000) 
also noted the gender disparity in the urban livelihood strategies, of which women are more 
likely to work in the less regulated and lower paid sectors than men. In Huaming town, as 
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women were those who worked on the farm and took the responsibility of domestic work, 
the loss of the previous livelihood diversifications has more impact on women.  
6.4.2 Entrepreneurial activities 
In Huaming town, the changed layout of the urban industries produces destructive synergy 
with entrepreneurial capabilities. For farmers who have the drive to build their own 
businesses and particularly for those who already owned their businesses before 
resettlement, many of them could not adapt their business to the disruptively new 
environment after resettlement and had to abandon their planned or actual businesses.  
Few existing businesses could adapt to the new business environment and take advantage 
of the new opportunities generated in the new environment. After resettlement to 
Huaming, not only did villagers lose the land where their enterprise was usually based, but 
there was no special subsidy for entrepreneurs or business owners to compensate them for 
this. Most of those who were self-employed and running their own business remained in the 
same business after resettlement, but only very rarely were able to expand their businesses. 
Those whose businesses used to occupy a large amount of land were most seriously 
damaged in the resettlement process. One extreme case was Mr Lin, who used to cultivate 
sea fish. After the land for his fishing pools was expropriated at the end of 2010, his million 
yuan business was destroyed: 
“I was forced to resettle. They cut the electricity and water in the factory. The circulation 
system stopped and my fish died. There was no compensation for my business, also what 
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was destroyed cannot be compensated. It is unlikely that I would have the chance to set up 
my own business again. Establishing a business takes years of accumulating and hard work, 
which is not easy. Once it is gone, it is very difficult to re-establish it” (Interview HM031). 
The lack of compensation for businesses is because the compensation was designed only for 
the land and constructed buildings on the land, and does not include activities which take 
place in the buildings. For businesses like fish cultivation, the most valuable part of the 
business is the fish, which is not counted in the compensation policy. This is possibly as a 
result of lack of participation of business owners in the policy-making process for 
resettlement. The reason behind the absence of business people in the decision making 
process of the resettlement plan and compensation package can be largely attributed to the 
essence of the NSC approach to urbanisation, which prioritises urban development above 
rural livelihood enhancement (unlike the NRR approach). This will be discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter.  
Mr Lin found waged work in an office in the Airport Economic Zone. Not only is he 
somewhat ashamed of working for others while he used to own his own business, he also 
complained about the considerable dropping of the standard of living after resettlement: 
“Before resettlement, I used to buy seafood like crab and prawn whenever I want to eat 
them, but now I need to think about the price” (Interview HM031). Loss of businesses led to 
the loss of financial freedom and change of lifestyle for Mr Lin. The business environment in 
the resettled community was also increasingly regulated after resettlement, which meant 
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increased rents. One driver-turned-real-estate-agent, Mrs Lee, commented on the empty 
businesses properties in the resettlement community:  
“Previously, as long as you had a place, you could run a business, but now it is much more 
formal; see the big store, no one could afford the rent. It is 200,000 yuan for 3 floors, and 
they do not rent out only one floor, even though we only need 20 square metres of space” 
(Interview HM008).  
The increased rent pushes resettled business owners to the street and the informal sector. 
Nonetheless, there are also some issues with running a business informally. The new urban 
living environment also changes the consumer demand of resettled villagers. The business 
models that worked back in the rural context thus often do not work in the urban context. 
For example, one male villager used to run a three-wheeled bicycle business, transporting 
villagers between villages. After the villages were concentrated to one urban community 
and villagers could reach each other on foot, the demand for his business disappeared. 
Another example of how the built environment changed demand was that of a male villager 
in his mid-40s who used to run a corner store selling and repairing mobile phones. The 
business was built on the demand from local villagers, and he took the advantage of the 
longer commuting time from the village to the city centre, providing convenience for 
farmers. He reflected that the business model was no longer competitive after resettlement 
because resettled villagers now had quick access to the city centre with reduced costs of 
time and money, so that farmers could purchase and fix their phones more cheaply anytime 
they liked (Interview HM014).  
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Because of the loss of business for business owners during resettlement, we might expect 
that their loss of business is compensated in some way, rather than merely the land where 
their businesses are built on. However, as mentioned, there was no special subsidy for 
entrepreneurs or business owners. As the resettlement process is mostly a top-down 
process where people who designed the NSC plans and implemented them are cadres from 
township level and above, they take a grand development perspective of the new town and 
province, rather than focusing on residents’ individual economic interests. Business owners 
and entrepreneurs in the former village are thus treated as ordinary villagers. But they have 
additional economic interest compared to the ordinary villagers, which include the prospect 
of their business and the capital they invested beforehand. Again, these are invisible in the 
resettlement process of measuring assets for compensation, but are nevertheless important 
for them to sustain their livelihood.  
 
6.5 Social stratification  
6.5.1 New social groups based on skill-sets 
Social and cultural capital can also be vitally important in determining access to resources. 
Are the identity and class of rural farmers are still defined by their rural origin, social and 
cultural capital like before? Chapter 3 outlined the Chinese class history where rural 
residents were given a “rural” label through the hukou system and classified as inferior to 
their urban counterparts from the 1950s on. Is this still the social structure in the 
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resettlement community? What has changed? How has it changed? This section examines 
the new and existing social and cultural capitals possessed by the resettled farmers; more 
importantly, it discusses how the change of these capitals affects social stratification in the 
new resettlement community, as well as the rural-urban relations in China.  
The new dynamics in the urban labour market divided resettled farmers into three groups 
based on their skill-sets and urban experience: those with no urban skill-set, those with 
limited urban skills and highly skilled urban workers. For those who solely worked on 
farming, they are more likely not to have the skill-set required in the urban labour market, 
despite the fact that they might be extremely high-skilled at agriculture. As the built 
environment is designed by urban-centric planning, which is clean, neat and organised, any 
sign of rusticity has been eliminated. Resettled villagers used to have housing land and a 
spacious plot for each household where they planted self-sufficient food, raised livestock or 
set up family workshops doing sewing. After resettlement, they lost their farming land and 
space for poultry farming and self-sufficient vegetables. The lack of reserved farming land 
for individual planting increased expenses for the resettled households, leaving them with 
no choice but to purchase groceries from the supermarket or corner stores in the urban 
community, or to dine in restaurants. In fact, reserving a plot of land in a concentrated place 
would have served two aims: reducing the living expenses for farmers, and reducing the 
emotional shock caused by the loss of land after resettlement. An interviewee in her mid-
40s in Huaming town staring at a large plot of land that has been marked as construction 
land but was still awaiting for approval told me “I used to farm on this plot of land. Now we 
are not allowed to farm, nor is this land used for other purposes. It hurts to see that there is 
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nothing going on in the land. The land is wasted” (Interview HM005). The removal of all 
traces of farming in the resettlement community had a significant impact on the self-identity 
of women such as this. 
6.5.2 Transform villagers to urban people 
Adjacent to Huaming Town, the new Tuanbo Town is almost identical to Huaming in terms 
of the NSC programme, and the design and implementation of the resettlement policy, but 
began resettlement slightly earlier than Huaming (and thus may be an indication of 
developments to come in Huaming). Tuanbo is interesting in that it now features the 
“Community Continued Learning Project” which aims to educate the resettled farmers in 
order to facilitate their transition into urbanites. According to a survey conducted by the 
Tuanbo Town government, the education level of resettled farmers in Tuanbo is relatively 
low: among those aged 16-60 years, 23 per cent have more than senior high school 
education, while 41 per cent are junior high school-educated and 36 per cent have only 
primary school or less education. Based on the survey, very few resettled people read books 
in daily life; chatting, watching TV and playing cards are their major forms of entertainment, 
which is broadly consistent with their lifestyle before resettlement.  
So far, the Tuanbo Town Adult Culture & Technology School has eight training courses, 
which have trained more than 3,200 people. Apart from the concentrated training for 
residents, community members can study in their own time by using the online learning 
platform and space provided by the school. The training includes “how to adapt to lifestyles 
in modern society”, “social morality” and “family manners”. These topics strongly imply that 
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the current lifestyles and manners of farmers are inferior to urban ones, and that resettled 
people need to transit and adapt to the new lifestyle. Although this gap between former 
farmers and urbanites is intangible, it is hinted at in every facet of their life, from the living 
environment to the training programmes, which reinforces their lower class position.  
As well as moving closer to the urban identity, the process of becoming more urban is also 
for some resettled people a journey of self-improvement and achieving their dreams, which 
consequently enhances their self-esteem and happiness. On the other hand, for farmers 
who cannot adapt their skill-sets to the urban labour market or develop new skills that are 
essential to make a living in the resettlement community, they feel powerless and as though 
they have less control over their own destiny. Some seem to have internalised the idea that 
they are worth less than urban people. When asked for their opinion on the worsened 
livelihood of villagers, some villagers attributed their suffering to their own individual 
capabilities of being able to adapt to the new environment. Many said that they “mei ben 
shi”, which means that they lack the capability to create a better life for themselves. This 
lowers their self-esteem by attributing social and structural imbalances to individual 
reasons. 
This is part of a process in which many rural people have internalised the reform-era state’s 
discourse that farming is backward and traditional, and worth much less than being urban 
and modern. So resettled people, uprooted suddenly from their farming, now blame 
themselves for not being able to fit into the urban labour market. This perception is also 
accompanied by the state rhetoric of “urbanising” (shi min hua, 市民化) and “civilising” 
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(wen ming hua, 文明化)the resettled villagers, which suggests that the resettled villagers 
are inferior to their urban counterparts. This political rhetoric, pervasive particularly since 
the 1990s, blames structural problems on individual farmers, particularly those in the 
deprived groups, and relates strongly to the “low suzhi” rhetoric that describes rural 
migrants during the spontaneous urbanisation.  
Moreover, this has a further impact on social stratification in the resettled villages. While 
the resettlement process benefits the urban-skilled group and provides them with enhanced 
mobility, this group is more likely to move out of the resettlement community in the 
medium- to long-term. By contrast, the circumstances for the rural-skilled group are 
worsened, so that they enjoy less mobility and fewer opportunities, and they tend to be 
stuck in the resettlement community, since they cannot hope to afford to move out. This 
movement shapes the homogeneity of the resettlement community, where most of the 
residents ultimately living in the community are previous farmers who face challenges in 
adapting to the new urban environment, and who suffer from permanently lower social 
status than those in other urban communities.  
6.5.3 Stuck in the resettlement community  
"I will not sell the apartment in Huaming Community and buy an apartment in Airport 
Economic Zone to invest. We have enough apartments to live in, and no more money to buy 
new ones. If we sell the apartment, how much can we sell it for? Who wants it?" (Interview 
KG001). 
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In Tianjin, most resettled farmers are tied to their resettled apartments in the resettled 
community. The price of the resettled apartments in the housing market is lower than 
commercial housing due to the risk of depreciation of the value of resettlement housing and 
the lack of property deeds. Therefore most resettled people are unable to move into other 
urban communities. 
Most resettled people expressed their desire to move to the commercial housing 
community in the Airport Economic Development Zone if they had the chance. They 
regarded the living conditions in that community as better than their own; also, the 
commercial housing has more potential for appreciation. These examples show clearly 
people’s desire to leave the resettlement community and illustrate the reasons why this is 
not possible: 
“I would like to sell the resettled apartment and buy an apartment elsewhere, but I have not 
received either of hukou or the deeds of the resettled apartment (fang chan zheng房产证). 
What they gave us is an ownership certificate (产权证), which cannot be used in the housing 
market. It is said that they will be ready in two to three years, but when we first moved in 
three years ago, we were told that we would get it in three years. It is three years already 
and we still have not got it” (Interview HM036). 
“More and more people would like to sell their resettlement housing. Resettled people here, 
with no skills, no income, they would sell the house and only leave one apartment to live. 
They use the money to do a business, or invest in the capital market. Turnover of the tenants 
here is very high, which stimulates the housing rental market. Not many non-local people 
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come here for investment, we do not have deeds (fangchan zheng房产证), so they are not 
sure about whether their investment will be paid back” (Interview HM020). 
“Some sell the housing here, and buy houses where they work. Young people would like to 
sell housing here and move somewhere else. The elderly have familiar friends from the 
previous villages and not tend to move out. Most of the properties here have no deeds, so 
the market price for these houses is low” (Interview HM021). 
For the few who successfully sold their apartments in the resettled community and 
purchased housing in the Airport Economic Zone or other areas, they usually do not need 
the rental income to support their livelihoods, as their main income source is their waged 
work. One member of a couple who had migrated from Shanghai to the Airport Economic 
Zone and does management work there commented: “I received two apartments from 
resettlement. We bought another one in the Airport Economic Zone, and I will move there 
when it is decorated. We’re not sure whether to sell this apartment or rent it out. We have 
received the property deeds certificate, maybe because we resettled early” (Interview 
HM044).  
A man in his 30s, a very rich villager, looking for opportunities to invest, explained:  
“The properties with government subsidies next to the resettlement community are 
expensive at 8000-9000 per square metre, like the ones developed by Huayuan and Zeyuan, 
because they have schools nearby. Housing price rose from 3800-4500 yuan per square 
metre to 8000-9000 yuan in the last five years, and I believe the price will continue to 
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appreciate. Commercial housing next to the resettled community is 10,000 a square metre, 
and 10,000-20,000 a square metre for those in Tianjin city, which is still much cheaper than 
in Beijing. Another new Huaming community is still under construction. I am looking forward 
to buying properties in Huayuan and Zeyuan, which have better housing quality and are 
earthquake-proof” (Interview HM022). 
Most of the resettled people who rely on the rental income generated by the resettled 
apartments cannot afford the commercial property prices in other areas even if they were to 
sell all of their apartments. Furthermore, if they did sell, they would lose their income 
source. From the perspective of space and the class structure, resettled people are thus 
defined by the location of their habitat and there is no upward mobility for them to move 
out. This is not much dissimilar from the previous rural-urban division, where farmers were 
given rural labels as their identity and compared as culturally inferior to their urban 
counterparts. Although they have urban hukou now, resettled farmers are still far from fully 
urban residents, due to their rural origin and the experience of resettlement.  
6.5.4 Cultural capital and “suzhi” 
The label of “low suzhi” has been associated with rural origin, which is reflected as the 
inferior social status of farmers compared to urban residents (Anagnost, 2004). This 
comparison is especially visible in the urban area where rural migrants who work in the 
cities are discriminated against in virtue of their rural origin. The discrimination has many 
facets, focusing for example on the way they dress, their accent, their behaviours and 
belongings. The association of “low suzhi” with farmers is based on their rural origin. After 
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resettlement, however, villagers are no longer rural-based. Should we expect to find 
farmers’ changing self-perception of their social status?  
While their memory of the past leads many to compare the post-resettlement life with that 
of farmers in the pre-reform era, where the new situation is much better and they try to 
make a living with what they have, nonetheless their new urban identity becomes 
associated with an interpretation of unfairness and behaviours of milking the system, as 
those who are more “capable” (you ben shi 有本事) and with more “suzhi” can make a 
better livelihoods after resettlement. In Tianjin, with the moral education from the pre-
reform era in mind, most former farmers tend to live prudently and believe that they are 
responsible for bearing the bitterness of reform. After complaining about the small monthly 
income, one villager said, “I have enough income to survive, which is much better than the 
days before reform. I spend what I have”. For the group in their 60s and 70s, with memory 
of their rural “vanguard” identity in the CCP, resettled farmers perceive that any hardship 
and unfairness they experience, including for example their exclusion from the urban labour 
market, are caused by the corruption and faulty implementation of central policies by local 
states and local state actors. They would rather believe in the good intentions of the central 
state, and focus on the fact that, compared to the pre-reform era before 1978, their 
livelihoods have been improved considerably.  
6.5.5 Loss of village collective identity and sense of village community 
Apart from being labelled as “low suzhi” who need to be further “urbanised” and “civilised”, 
resettled villagers also face loss of village collective identity and the sense of village 
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community. Inevitably, the loss of the old identity and adaptation to the new identity create 
psychological stresses and shocks. In Huaming town, the large-scale resettlement moved 
villagers from the former 15 villages into one concentrated village community where in one 
compound, there are villagers from a mixture of villages. Before resettlement, villagers used 
to identify and address themselves as the village they are from. After resettlement, while 
some villager still address themselves as before, others start to identify themselves with the 
name of the new resettlement compound they reside. This creates identity confusion for 
resettled farmers, which is a form of psychological stress. One interpretation for the 
resettled villagers who adopted the new identity is that the new identity explains their 
location clearer than sticking to the previous identity, which makes more sense to others. It 
shows that the new layout of the urban community and resettlement community space are 
shaping the language and identity of the resettled villagers where the previous village 
collective identity is fading out from the daily conversation. Together with the village 
collective identity, the rural-urban identity is also diminishing with the shaping power of the 
new urban layout, space and the slogans in the resettlement community. One particular 
slogan used in Huaming town is “same land, different life” (yiyang de tudi, buyiyang de 
shenghuo , 一样的土地不一样的生活). The slogan suggests villagers that their life is 
different after resettled to the new urban community, which could be interpreted as one of 
the reasons why villagers started to think and identify themselves in a different way. To 
accept that the new life is better is to deny the normality of the past life, and this could be a 
source of psychological stress for the resettled villagers. And when they experience setbacks 
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in identifying themselves with the new identity, they lost the old identity to fall back to, 
which generates psychological shock.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter summarised the empirical findings from the fieldwork, analysed the effects of 
resettlement on farmers’ livelihoods, and how different social groups react to the threats, 
shock and stress in their post-resettlement livelihoods in the NSC approach state-led 
urbanisation in Tianjin. Essentially, the resettlement is a process of livelihood resources 
redistribution. To secure a sustainable livelihood, the three key steps include gaining urban 
resettlement apartments, participating in the urban labour market and diversifying the 
livelihood income.  
However, these processes have various effects on different social groups where the previous 
vulnerable groups experience the deterioration of livelihoods after resettlement. Villagers 
who lived on farming before resettlement are most negatively affected by the resettlement 
process. Two major reasons contribute to the implications. First, as the type of asset 
changes from rural to urban, the new form of asset does not generate synergy with farmers’ 
capabilities. This means that the group with no urban-related skills can hardly act on the 
assets, nor can they translate the assets to livelihood enhancement through income-
generating activities or livelihood strategies. They are lack of voice and strategies in securing 
multiple urban resettlement apartments, particularly in terms of accessing the apartments, 
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obtaining adequate number of them, translating then into livelihood income. Second, there 
is a lack of participation by resettled farmers in decision-making regarding the resettlement 
process and components in the compensation package. These two points concern the 
planning and implementation stages of the NSC policies, which are the focus of the previous 
chapter. Among which, women farmers suffer from the loss of farming land and backyard 
where the loss of space compromises their productivity. 
In contrast, the well-educated, skilled group is more likely to obtain multiple urban housing. 
For the former, gaining income from the urban labour market is usually the most direct 
alternative for this group to turn to. Being pushed to the urban labour market, people who 
used to live on farming do not usually possess the skill-sets that required in the urban labour 
market; therefore struggle to succeed in the urban labour market. While the skilled group 
benefit from both of the land market, labour market and the new layout of the urban 
environment. Again, the group which previously lived on farming is the most vulnerable 
during this process. They are pushed to pursue alternative income sources, and failed to 
succeed in the urban labour market. Particularly for farmers in their 40s-50s as the chance 
for them to develop their skills is small. The business activities of the previous business 
owners are refrained by the relocation and lack of compensation for the value of their 
business apart from the compensation the land where they businesses built upon.  
In terms of the livelihood strategies, the previous successful sustainable rural livelihood 
strategy is no longer supported by the new livelihood resources in the urban resettlement 
environment. The previous livelihood strategy combination consists of migration with skills 
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to enter higher paid urban labor markets, production on the farming land, and social 
networks to gain access to work opportunities. The new livelihood strategy combination is 
composed of gaining rental income, reduce living expenses, participating in the urban labour 
market, social network and investment activities in the urban housing market. This requires 
resettled farmers to have capabilities to act on the opportunities and adapt to the new living 
conditions. These capabilities are largely shaped by education, of which the group relied on 
farming is lacking, while the urban-inclined group benefit from. In summary, the group that 
used to live on farming obtain less tangible and intangible resources from the resettlement 
process, and lack of the correspondent capabilities to act on these assets nor expanding 
their livelihood strategies. Moreover for the unskilled group, there is no synergy between 
the livelihood components, nor the different types of assets for the most vulnerable group, 
which the programme is initially designed to help. They are lagged behind at each step of 
gaining the redistributed livelihood resources. Yet, they have the least voice and power in 
changing the situation.  
At the community level, the collective identity is lost during the large-scale resettlement in 
Huaming town with NSC approach, which incorporated different villages into one 
concentrated community. The process of adapting to the new identity as urban citizens and 
resettled villagers creates psychological stresses, shocks and tension for resettled farmers. 
Whether the post-livelihood experience for the same groups would be the same in the 
Zhejiang case with NRR approach? The next two Chapters answers this important question 
where Chapter 7 examines the role of the state intervention in NRR approach and Chapter 8 
focuses on the implications on livelihoods with NRR approach.  
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Chapter 7 New Rural Reconstruction mode of state intervention in Zhejiang 
7.1 Introduction 
Parallel to Chapter 5, this chapter discusses the role of the state in the New Rural 
Reconstruction (NRR) approach to state-led urbanisation, paying special attention to the 
actions of local states at various levels. Considering the role of the state, it analyses the 
existence, motivation, behaviour and implications of state intervention during state-led 
urbanisation. Because of limitation of space, this chapter does not discuss each Zhejiang 
village in every section; rather it selects the most suitable examples in each section for 
discussion.  
Both this chapter and the next focus on Zhejiang province and the NRR approach to state-led 
urbanisation in China, in comparison to the study of Tianjin and the NSC approach in 
Chapters 5 and 6. While this chapter argues that state intervention during the process has 
considerable impact on the livelihoods of villagers, especially different levels of the local 
states and the role of the village committee, the next chapter takes the perspective of 
individuals and households and examines the impacts of resettlement upon their livelihoods.  
Compared to Chapter 5, this chapter brings Cernea’s (2007) IRR model to the Zhejiang 
context, where the risks are re-grouped with new shock and stress added against the 
specific livelihood context and threats in China, particularly, in the three villages in Zhejiang 
under the NRR approach to state-led urbanisation. Factor 5 (increased morbidity and 
mortality) from the Cernea (1997) model is excluded. This chapter categorises the seven 
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remaining risks into two stages, during the resettlement process and afterwards, and 
focuses on two aspects of the impacts, landlessness and joblessness, where the former has 
consequential effects of homelessness, food insecurity and loss of access to common 
property.  
The rest of the chapter examines each level of the local state. First, this chapter depicts the 
competition scheme at two levels in Zhejiang province, provincial state selects county 
models and the county level state selects model villages. Then it outlines how the 
development of the three villages, Dongheng, Wusi and Qingyanliu, led by the leadership of 
each village committee, reshapes the configuration of the rural space and changes the key 
market mechanisms as mentioned in earlier chapters. To transfer rural land for urban use, 
the labour market is reorganised given the changed cluster of industries, the land rights are 
transformed from collective-owned to land shareholding programmes, and the identities, 
lifestyles and self-perception of villagers are changed. This chapter approaches the above 
three processes from two perspectives, the emergence of risk/threats, and solutions to the 
risk/threats. From the risk perspective, this chapter suggests that the conversion and the 
landscape and mechanisms in the villages create disruption and shock at the individual and 
community levels. Therefore, it pays attention to the activities and behaviours of the village 
committee in increasing or mitigating the risks and threats to the livelihoods of villagers.  
Having identified the causes of livelihood threats and risks, this chapter examines the 
behaviours of the village committee in increasing or mitigating threats and risks by providing 
plans, compensation, assistance, shared common resources and new access to their villages.  
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7.2 Relations between different levels of local states 
As outlined in Chapter 2’s discussion of Cernea’s (1997) IRR model, development-induced 
involuntary resettlement creates threats to the livelihoods of the resettled population, 
among which the greatest threats are generated by economic and social uprooting. Cernea 
(1997) concludes that there are eight risks that threaten the livelihoods of displaced people, 
based on case studies globally. These are: 1. Landlessness. 2. Joblessness. 3. Homelessness. 
4. Marginalization. 5. Increased morbidity and mortality. 6. Food insecurity. 7. Loss of access 
to common property. 8. Social (community) disarticulation (Cernea, 1997, p1572). As Cernea 
(1997) correctly points out, to mitigate livelihood risks and restore displaced people’s 
livelihoods, it is crucial that the state make appropriate intervention in reconstructing and 
restoring displaced people’s livelihoods after displacement and there is a requirement for 
risk reversal strategies along with financial subsidies. To understand the implication of 
uprooting for post-resettlement livelihoods, it is essential to associate the level of state and 
creation or mitigation of livelihood risks.  
Particularly, he discusses the limitation of the cost-benefit approach to reconstruction of 
livelihoods, including the inability of the framework to explain the way displaced individuals 
react to economic and social deprivation, to predict the adverse effects and planning, and to 
provide resolution for problems. In summary, good governance aims to minimise the 
number of people affected by displacement, and to address this from the earliest stage from 
the perspective of development rather than liability. State support for the displaced 
population’s livelihood restoration is typically composed of three parts: compensation for 
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the cost of resettlement and lost assets; assistance during the transition period to the 
resettlement site; and shared benefits of the additional economy created by the more 
efficient use of rural resources (Cernea, 1993). The restoration of livelihoods concerns not 
only how the access to common property resources is lost, but also how access to new 
resources is created.  
7.2.1 Zhejiang province selects model counties  
In order to understand the strategic decisions of the approach to resettlement in villages in 
Zhejiang, it is necessary to consider the rural development guidance and frameworks at each 
state level, including the provincial, city, county and village levels, as well as the relationship 
between these levels (See Diagram 4.1). This section examines the policy frameworks at 
each local state level and how they are related to the development plans in the particular 
villages. This section argues that the existence of the village committee makes a different in 
the structure and organisation of local states, where the direct implications are the setting 
up of competition schemes, fund allocation and cadre motivation. The rest of this section 
will discuss the operation process of the above factors in order.   
Since all three villages under study here are located in Zhejiang province, the investigation of 
NRR at the provincial level policies can provide only limited understanding of the differences 
in outcomes between different villages. When it comes to the middle levels of local states 
from city to county, both Deqing county and Yiwu County are in the group of pilot areas for 
land rights reform, which indicates that policy differences at medium local level may be 
expected but limited. These differences can be traced through comparison between 
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Qingyanliu village in Yiwu and the other two villages in Deqing. However, since Dongheng 
village and Wusi village are located in the same county, it is not immediately clear why the 
development and resettlement strategies are different in those two villages. This draws our 
attention to the village level policies, where the village committees work as grass-root 
governance units.  
At county level, because both Deqing county and Yiwu city are in the land rights reform 
scheme, the two local administrations focus on the design of the land reform. Apart from 
the design of land rights, other important factors include access to rights, loss/retention of 
tangible and intangible value of land, equity/inequity in the redistribution process of the 
new land rights, and whether resettled people have the capability to act on their land assets. 
Moreover, beyond land rights, other kinds of capital are also highly important to the post-
resettlement of villagers, concerning their capabilities, human capital, cultural capital, social 
capital, income generating activities, diversification strategies and social stratification. I 
categorise these factors into three discussions in the following parts of the chapter 
including: first, access to land rights and whether it is equal; second, the development plan 
of the new labour market; third, generation of the new identity and social connections.  
During the state-led urbanisation process in Zhejiang, the role of the village committee is 
critical because it is this grass-roots organisation that directly manages the access to land 
rights, develops the new labour market based on the context of its village, and initiates 
education and training schemes, which formulate resettled farmers’ new identity, 
perception and social stratification. In comparison to the Tianjin case, where the functional 
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role of the village committee was replaced by the urban neighbourhood committee, on one 
hand, there is a lack of grass-roots organisation which adapts the new labour market or land 
rights-related policy; on the other hand, farmers’ demands and responses could not be 
collected through informal channels to guide the formulation of policies. Therefore, this 
chapter particularly addresses the role of the village committee in the discussion of the NRR 
approach to state intervention during the state-led urbanisation. In carrying out the 
“Building a New Socialist Countryside” policy framework, different levels of states have 
various roles. As mentioned above, the central government designs and policy framework 
while it depends on local states for implementation. For local states, each level takes 
different responsibilities during the implementation process.  
7.2.2 Zhejiang province launches new cadre evaluation system  
For the provincial level states, their main responsibility is interpreting the national 
framework and adapting the framework to conditions in each province. The interpretation 
of the national policy framework varies among provinces contingent on the stage of 
development they are at, their own development pathway, the existing socio-economic 
conditions, the rural-urban divide in the area, their position in the national development 
strategy, as well as their closeness to the central government. As for the decision making 
process at provincial level, it is largely orchestrated by the provincial leadership. While some 
provinces interpreted the “Building a New Socialist Countryside” policy as an instruction for 
marketisation and urbanisation, with the urban area as the benchmark and the countryside 
needing to catch up to the urban standard, as in Tianjin, other provinces abandoned the 
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urban approach, applied the “New Rural Reconstruction” framework, and developed an 
interpretation based on the maintenance of the vast rural area. Zhejiang province is a typical 
example of this latter approach.  
Zhejiang province linked the NSC policy to economic development and developed a new 
provincial level framework of “Beautiful Zhejiang”. Rather than boasting “urban civilisation” 
with the attempt to introduce it to the countryside, the slogan in Zhejiang is “clear water 
and green mountains are gold and silver” (lvshui qingshan jiushi iinshan yinshan 绿水青山就
是金山银山). It was formulated by the current president Xi Jinping, then Secretary of 
Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee, in 2005 (Qiushi, 2014). This slogan later became the 
development guidance for Zhejiang province. The above highlighted quotation is the last 
part of the slogan, the full version of which is “We want both the clear water and green 
mountains, and the gold and silver. We prefer the lush mountains to the gold mountains, 
while the lush mountains are gold and silver mountains.” (women jiyao lvshui qingshan 
jinshan, yeyao yinshan. Ningyao lvshui qingshan, buyao iinshan yinshan, erqie lvshui 
qingshan jiushi iinshan yinshan我们既要绿水青山，也要金山银山。宁要绿水青山，不
要金山银山，而且绿水青山就是金山银山). While “clear waters and green mountains” is a 
metaphor for environment protection, “gold and silver mountains” is a metaphor for 
economic development. The slogan captures the relationship between economic 
development and environment protection, and advocates a new balanced sustainable 
relationship between the two aspects (Qiushi, 2014). In the past, the state’s understanding 
of economic development has been based on the sacrifice of the environment and eco-
system, but the new development guidance from the Zhejiang provincial interpretation 
 253 
demonstrates that protecting the environment is one important source of economic 
productivity where a balanced eco-system is a foundation for eco-economy, including eco-
agriculture, eco-industries, and eco-tourism. It aims to transform the development model in 
Zhejiang from one based on natural resource exploitation to one based on the development 
of natural resources in a sustainable way (Qiushi, 2014). 
The realisation of the guidance depends on its execution, which is a result of the 
coordination between different levels states in Zhejiang province. The execution of the 
guidance is guaranteed by the mechanisms and institutions between the different levels of 
states, among which the most important is the cadre evaluation system, which guides the 
behaviour of local officials by outlining the frame for promotion and punishment.  
Along with the development guidance is a series of concrete measures carried out in 
Zhejiang at the provincial level. One important measure is reforming the cadre evaluation 
system, which guides the behaviours of the cadres and channels their motivation to the 
development agenda of the province. In 2006, Zhejiang province launched the reformed 
cadre evaluation system based on the new development guidance, which aimed to integrate 
successful environment protection and public opinion into the evaluation system. The new 
system introduced two new approaches, as well as new factors to the existing approaches to 
the evaluation process. The two new approaches were public opinion surveys and actual 
performance evaluations, compared to the traditional political performance evaluation. 
First, the survey assesses the opinion of residents on the changes in the rural and urban 
areas, new rural reconstruction, social welfare, food safety, safety production and public 
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culture and service. Second, when it comes to the actual performance evaluation, it embeds 
factors like energy consumption per ten thousand yuan rate, and measures of 
environmental quality. Moreover, new factors were also added to the existing assessment 
indicators. These included ecosystem protection, energy saving, new rural reconstruction, 
entrepreneurship and innovation, public service, education, sanitation and employment.  
The reform of the cadre evaluation system had two aims: one was to address the 
importance of environmental protection, while the other was to reflect public opinion to a 
greater extent. However, the policy guideline and cadre evaluation system is the same for 
each county at the provincial level. The substantial rural development plans are made by 
each county and village, based on the individual conditions. This provides space and 
flexibility for the counties and villages to come up with development plans that are the most 
suitable for the context and condition of the counties and villages.  
In 2016, for the first time, Zhejiang province published the counties ranked in the first six out 
of 18 participant counties, based on their performance of “beautiful village” construction, 
and Deqing county ranks No. 2 (Deqing News, 2016). The high position of Deqing county is a 
result of the high number of 11 provincial level model villages in Deqing. This ranking and 
the assessment in cadre evaluation are motivations for county-level cadres to act on the 
development guideline and transform development models at county and village levels. The 
performance of counties is largely contingent on the execution of development programmes 
at village level within the county. Counties with the most villages transforming the economic 
development model to an ecological-based economic model, and making progress on eco-
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system protection and village culture preservation, tend to rank highly. Therefore, the next 
part of this chapter examines the behaviours of county-level states in the process of state-
led urbanisation and their relationship with the villages. The competition scheme set up at 
the provincial level is not the only such scheme in Zhejiang. At lower levels, counties also set 
up competition schemes seeking the best village performance, while the villages themselves 
launch competition schemes to promote village cultures and filial piety within the village by 
offering prizes for villagers to win.   
7.2.3 Deqing county selects model villages  
Located in north Zhejiang, Deqing county has 8 towns and 150 villages with a total 
population of 436,981 (Deqing government, 2015). Wukang town, the central area of Deqing 
county, is 30 minutes’ drive from Hangzhou city centre, 40 minutes’ drive from Hangzhou 
International Airport, and less than two hours to Shanghai, Ningbo and Nanjing. Launched in 
1999, the objective of Deqing’s “China harmonious beautiful rural home” project was to 
redevelop the 150 villages in the county in 10 years. The standard was established in four 
dimensions: environmental, economic, social and institutional. The environmental 
dimension was to clean the village and improve the ecological environment in the village. 
The two main tasks of environmental dimension in 2009 were green engineering and 
garbage recycling. The economic dimension focused on the upgrade of agricultural industry 
by building the countryside recreational tourism brand and strengthening the collective 
economy. The social dimension was to extend urban infrastructure, urban public services 
and social welfare to rural areas. The institutional dimension was to introduce innovation in 
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the rural property rights system and create new ways of using rural land, labour and capital 
(Deqing government, 2015). 
Among the four dimensions, only the environmental dimension was a requirement for all 
166 villages in the county. For the other two dimensions, Deqing county set up an incentive 
scheme. Each year, the county-level government assesses the achievement of villages, and 
for villages labelled as the first 50 model villages, each villager is rewarded with 2000 yuan. 
The strategy of Deqing county was thus to begin with individual village “dots”, and connect 
into “lines” of villages. According to Deqing county’s introduction of the policy, the 
development of “China harmonious beautiful rural home” project was planned in two steps 
(Deqing government, 2006). In the first three years from 2009 to 2011,the aim was to 
construct 50 model villages and brands; in the second three years, to connect “dots” into 
“lines” and connect “lines” into a “net”. 
My research identified two villages in Deqing county labelled as model villages, Dongheng 
Village and Wusi Village. Each village has followed a different strategy for development: 
Dongheng Village is characterised by its redevelopment of abandoned mines, while Wusi 
Village brands itself as a rural tourism hub. This chapter will discuss the two villages in 
Deqing county first and compare them to Qingyanliu, a village outside Deqing county where 
resettlement was driven by the county government, but where the village committee also 
played an important role in creating new income sources for the village after the original 
county-level plan failed.  
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Compared to the Tianjin case, where the province promotes the development programme 
with the national slogan “Building a New Socialist Countryside” (NSC), Deqing County in 
Zhejiang Province set up a county-level programme under the national-level project, “China 
Harmonious Beautiful Rural Home” project (zhongguo hemei jiayuan中国和美家园). 
Huzhou is a prefecture-level city in northern Zhejiang province, and Deqing is one county 
under the jurisdiction of Huzhou. Huzhou itself is not discussed in this section, since I focus 
solely on Deqing county because Deqing was selected as the pilot area rather than the 
whole of Huzhou city. Not only does the “China Harmonious Beautiful Rural Home” 
programme showcase Deqing County’s interpretation of the national project and adaption 
to local conditions, it has also set up funding schemes in an attempt of the county to 
establish itself as a national model in solving the “three rural problems” (farmers, agriculture 
and rural areas) discussed in Chapter 2.  
Ahlers (2015), in her study of the importance of county-level local states in the NSC 
programme, shows that, for county level officials, opportunity for career advancement is the 
motivation behind their ambition of performing well in the rural urbanisation project. This 
indicates that the career progression prospective could also be the motivation for officials in 
Deqing County to perform. To impress the upper level states, cadres in Deqing County set up 
the village competition scheme in order to motivate village cadres and select the most 
promising village to invest and add to their portfolio of political performance.  
Deqing county interpreted the “beautiful village” policy framework from the provincial level 
and came up with its own understanding of the framework, which it summarises as 
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“beautiful landscape, integrated rural and urban area, civilised village culture and 
prosperous lifestyle” (quanyu meili, chengxiang yiti, xiangfeng wenming, shenghuo meihao
全域美丽、城乡一体、乡风文明、生活美好). At county level, there are three stages in 
implementing the development goals, including cleaning the living environment, introducing 
sewage treatment, and developing the eco-economy based on the existing industries. 
Started from institutionalising the living environment cleaning scheme, Deqing county 
quantified the standard. It required, first, that each village clean the streets in the village 
twice a day, once by humans and once by cleaning machines; second, it facilitated one 
garbage bin for every 4.5 households and one street cleaner for each 83 households; third, it 
organised cleaning of the roads. The quantified and institutionalised requirements 
differentiated this scheme from previous endeavours, and made a difference in cleaning the 
living environment in the county. Deqing county then initiated sewage treatment, which 
restored the eco-system in the village. Based on the enhanced natural environment, Deqing 
county provided a strong foundation for villages to develop an eco-economy. It promoted 
the idea of “farm-garden city and countryside” (tianyuan chengxiang田园城乡) to 
encourage village explore the cultural, tourism and eco-resources in the village and develop 
them into an integrated eco-economy.  
As demonstrated in the existing literature, local state officials select model villages mostly 
out of consideration of their political interest (Rosenberg, 2015). Despite the motivation and 
competition schemes at county level, the socio-economic contexts and living standards of 
each village in Deqing county were different, such that, ultimately, it was the responsibility 
of the village committees in each village to respond to the competition schemes set up at 
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the county level. While some villages responded at a minimum level by fulfilling the 
requirement of cleaning the living environment and improving living conditions in the 
village, others went further and pushed through the development of an eco-economy in the 
village by abandoning the previous industries based on exploiting natural resources, 
upgrading them into service industries based on the natural resources of the village, and by 
exploring the cultural and historical resources of the village. The following sections examine 
the transformation process of three villages, and argue that the village committees played a 
most important role in the transformation of the new economies in the Zhejiang villages.  
7.2.4 Deqing county vs Yiwu city  
Both Deqing and Yiwu city were selected as pilot areas for rural land reform. In 2009, Deqing 
promoted the “China Harmonious Beautiful Rural Home” campaign as an interpretation of 
the provincial framework “Beautiful Zhejiang”, itself an interpretation of the national project 
“Building a New Socialist Countryside” (see Diagram 7.1 for the full hierarchy of 
development campaigns). It was also a project which the county leaders believed would 
establish the leadership of Deqing county in the national project. The establishment of the 
“China Harmonious Beautiful Rural Home” campaign produced 10 villages to be national 
model villages and 11 provincial model villages. The ambition of the campaign was to 
establish Deqing county as the best practitioner in Huzhou city, top five in Zhejiang province 
and first tier in the nation (Deqing Archive, 2009). To develop rural tourism and attract 
tourists from adjacent cities, other provinces and foreign countries, the village therefore 
prioritised promoting the essence of rusticity as the key strategy. 
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Diagram 7.1: Slogans at various levels of local states  
 
(Source: author’s own diagram) 
The preservation of the village committee, unlike in the case of Tianjin where the village 
committee was disbanded, had a further impact on the institutional interactions and the 
competitive scheme in the governance system. In the rural-centric approach of Zhejiang, in 
which the village committee continues to serve as the grass-root level governance unit, 
Deqing county was able to implement a two-directional incentive structure: first, Deqing 
competed upwardly with other counties in the national competitive scheme of building a 
new socialist countryside; at the same time, it set up a downward village-level competition 
scheme leaving space for village autonomy, including differing strategies of “boutique 
village” and “model village”. By contrast, Huaming town in Tianjin at township level, was 
involved only in an upward competition but did not set up a downward competition scheme 
for villages in its administration due to the loss of individual village committees, caused by 
reorganisation of grass roots governance units, launch of the new urban neighbourhood 
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committee and loss of individual village boundaries. The institutional setup of preservation 
of the village committee not only creates autonomy at the village level in Zhejiang, but also 
has further implications in terms of village governance where the village plays an important 
role in addressing issues that matter to the livelihood of villagers.    
The different organisation of local states in Tianjin municipality and Zhejiang province is not 
only reflected in the reservation of the village committee, but also in the slogans for 
development of each village, which the individual village committees came up with, and which 
highlight the variation between villages and the scope for tailoring the development plans to 
the circumstances of individual villages.  
Comparing the different levels of rural development policy slogans in both Zhejiang and 
Tianjin is instructive. From Diagram 7.1 above, it is clear that in Huaming, local level states do 
not interpret the central goal of rural development, as the development of Huaming town is 
based directly on the national slogan “Building a New Socialist Countryside”. In the three 
villages in Zhejiang, by contrast, each village adapts higher-level development slogans to the 
specific context of their villages. What is especially interesting here is Qingyanliu village. 
Although Qingyanliu took the NSC approach to state-led urbanisation, it nonetheless 
preserved the village committee as the lowest level of governance, and its slogan fits in the 
pillar industry supported in the village, the e-commerce industry. As later sections will make 
clear, this was crucial to the shaping of development and livelihoods in Qingyanliu. As a 
county-level model village, Dongheng village established itself as a model village for the 
province. This reflects the proactive role of the village committee in advancing development 
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plans that particularly fit in the village’s context, suggesting the important implications of 
preserving the village committee in the post-resettlement village governance.  
7.2.5 Village committee’s governance roles  
In Dongheng Village, mining used to be the pillar industry for 30 years, which contributed to 
village fiscal income around 2,000,000 yuan annually. In 2009, Zhejiang province started to 
promote eco-development, which targeted pollution from industrial production, mining and 
agriculture. As a part of the development plan, Deqing county required Dongheng village to 
close the mines. The closure of mines meant that the village had to develop new income 
streams, and this happened in the same year of the village committee re-election. At the 
beginning of 2011, Dongheng Village was selected by Deqing county as a pilot village for 
“China Harmonious Beautiful Rural Home” land management, and 250 households were to 
be resettled from their scattered living pattern into a concentrated resettlement 
community. Officials from Luoshe Town asked Mr. Zhang, a village resident, who had 
founded a prestigious piano firm in Luoshe Town, to consider standing for election as the 
head of Dongheng Village and use his corporate management skills to lead the village. Mr. 
Zhang took the chance and was elected head of the village committee.  
The existing literature suggests that in local governance, the role of town governments is 
often compromised due to reduced funding from the upper-level states, which pushes the 
townships to send their cadres down to help with village governance, and leaves a 
governance vacuum at township level (Smith, 2010). However, interviews conducted with 
villagers and Mr Zhang’s team suggested that, despite his promotion by the township, he 
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was well-respected in the village by 2014. Soon after election, he came up with the strategy 
of purchasing waste from construction sites in Hangzhou for a low price, using this to 
redevelop the abandoned mine land, and using the redeveloped land to apply for projects 
and funds from the county, provincial, and even national governments. Having obtained 
these funds, the village could then seek further development. Mr Zhang earned his 
reputation as a successful village head after redeveloping the abandoned mine project. 
Apart from formulating major strategies for the village development, the new elected village 
committee under Mr Zhang’s leadership also reformed the governance structure in the 
village. It established a 19-member “Building a New Socialist Countryside” committee. The 
19 committee members were Party members and consisted of political and business elites in 
the village, including retired cadres, a CCP Party member representative and villager 
representatives (selected from each village zu by villagers). One of their responsibilities was 
to communicate between the village and villagers, and to help villagers solve problems 
during the resettlement process. Before the implementation of the construction and 
development plans, each plan was negotiated in the committee, and voted on in the villager 
representative meeting, which included a broader circle of villagers. Both the committee 
members and the villager representatives were responsible for informing all other villagers 
about the decisions made in the representative meeting. According to the village committee 
publications, this represented a transition from making decisions for villagers to villagers 
making decisions for the village. By contrast, in Tianjin, the decision-making process was one 
directional, top-down, where the Tianjin municipal government and Dongheng district make 
most of the decisions and the resettlement community simply implements them.   
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7.2.6 Negotiation, protest and conflict of villagers 
Despite of hard work done by the village commitees in Zhejiang, there were still complaints 
during the rural redevelopment process . Compared to Tianjin where villagers struggled for 
more compensation resources during the resettlement process, villagers in Zhejiang 
complained about what they have to lose during the rural redevelopment process, which 
concerns the demolition of extra houses and the need to pay back loans for the new 
resettlement housing. As a villager in Wusi village pointed out, 
“Petition and collective action only appeared in recent years. Villagers would not go against 
the orders of the local state in previous decades. The authorities arranged to use the land for 
construction and threatened villagers that they would bring down their housing if they 
refused to relocate, so the villagers’ only choice was to follow the order. Villagers see no one 
rejects it, so they would not stand against it either. Only in recent years tearing down the 
houses, people started to protest. They would make an announcement first, then talk to you, 
but if you still disagree, they would force you to do it.” (Interview WS008) 
According to the Chinese Property Law, one rural household can only possess one house, 
but some rural households had the property rights of an old house but had also built a new 
house. The policy of “one house for each household” stated that only the demolition of 
registered houses would be compensated (Deqing County, 2014). Demolition of any 
additional houses that were unregistered was not compensated. The village policies 
explained that the existence of those houses was illegal; therefore it was legitimate to 
demolish them without compensation, whether new or old. There were also campaigns in 
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the local newspaper explaining that to have more than one house for a household was 
illegal. Some villagers chose to protest against the demolition of their housing without 
compensation. One villager in Dongheng Village said: 
“We actually went to petition, around a hundred people, to the government in Hangzhou city 
once, but it did not work out and no one does it anymore afterwards. Officials protect each 
other (官官相护 guan guan xiang hu), what can you do about that? Before we arrived, a 
phone call informed the Hangzhou Government office (that we were coming). We ordinary 
people can only live with it.” (Interview DH015) 
Even some of those villagers who did not make formal protests complained about the lack of 
negotiation before demolition and compared their case with other cases where the house-
owner was a friend of one of the village cadres, and the demolished housing was 
compensated with around 400,000 yuan and there was negotiation before demolition. 
To some extent, the existence of these complaints worked as an organic oversight 
mechanism where villagers monitored the behaviours of village cadres and situations where 
people with connections to the village committee, the source of resources, might obtain 
more resources. In Dongheng village, the resettlement project opened up new feedback 
channels for villagers and the decision-making process became more transparent and 
interactive with villagers’ participation. The positive impact can be attributed to the village 
committee’s idea of setting up the “building a new countryside” committee (in addition to 
the village committee). In villages which did not have the new committee, the village 
governance and structure remained the same.  
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7.3 Village committee in the resettlement plan in Dongheng village  
According to Cernea (1997), based on empirical evidence from Kenya, the primary risk 
resettled people face is landlessness, which often causes homelessness as a consequence. 
As he states,  
“Expropriation of land removes the main foundation upon which people's productive 
systems, commercial activities, and livelihoods are constructed. This is the principal form of 
decapitalization and pauperization of displaced people, as they lose both natural and man-
made capital. Unless the land basis of people' productive systems is reconstructed elsewhere, 
or replaced with steady income-generating employment, landlessness sets in and the 
affected families become impoverished.” (Cernea, 1997)  
In the case of the Zhejiang villages, the key factors are the process of redistribution of the 
tangible asset of land and the implications for the intangible value of land during the 
resettlement process. In order to understand strategic decisions concerning land 
redistribution and the design of the compensation package, it is necessary to consider the 
following three issues: first, the compensation method for the lost farmland, rural housing 
and the homestead (the household plot); second, the productive efficiency of the new form 
of land rights; third, whether farmers have a choice when it comes to making the decision to 
resettle. In terms of access to land rights, this section considers the enhancement of existing 
ways in which those resources contribute to livelihoods through the rejuvenation of 
abandoned land, and a more flexible redistribution of land rights. The land redistribution 
process in Dongheng village was flexible because the reform untied villagers from their land, 
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which meant that villagers could retain rights of the land and receive income generated 
from the land even when they did not work on the land. Therefore, their resources were 
composed of both newly created and existing resources, of which the most tangible part is 
the compensation package and the related intangible resources that made available by the 
village committees. In this section, I examine the components of the compensation package, 
how the decision was made and its implications, as well as whether the interests of each 
social group was represented in the decision-making process. Then this section examines the 
process of resource redistribution, particularly whether farmers have equal access to each 
type of resource, since discrimination in access potentially creates intra-village inequality 
and stratification in the post-resettlement village.  
Dongheng village committee was an important driver in the development of the village. It 
was the head of the village who came up with the idea of turning resources into sources of 
livelihood enhancement by using the abandoned mines for the construction of residential 
housing. Because the abandoned mines were unsuitable for farming, building constructions 
on the land for economic or residential use was the best approach to enhance the 
productivity of the land. Compared to Huaming town, where the resettlement community 
was built on farmland, the land use in Dongheng village was more efficient and created new 
value from the land.  
In the case of Dongheng village, the village committee successfully eliminated livelihood 
risks and threats caused by loss of assets, which include landlessness and homelessness, 
according to Cernea’s (1997) IRR model. Rather, the village committee in Dongheng village 
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was able to create new resources based on the existing resources, and identify the best way 
of using the resources, thereby improving the efficiency of resource use and sharing the 
benefits of the improved efficiency. Without the Dongheng village committee, particularly 
the head of the village, Dongheng village would most likely still be a village which had lost its 
income source from the mine, in which the livelihoods of villagers suffer because of the 
polluted living environment and the lack of income. It was the Dongheng village committee 
which applied for the funding from Deqing county and Zhejiang province, bringing in budget 
support and attention from the higher level states. In the 1980s, mining was the major 
industry in Dongheng village with more than 160 mines, the size of 700 football courts, 
making the biggest open mine area in Zhejiang Province. In 2009, mines in Dongheng were 
closed after the resources ran out, releasing 47,500 mu of land. After the closure of the 
mines, the village collective GDP dropped from 2 million yuan to less than 200,000 yuan, 
according to the head of Dongheng village (Interview DH009). 
The resettlement project required reclamation of land in 8 sub-villages within Dongheng 
where 55 households had to resettle to the new concentrated village. For other households 
within Dongheng, resettlement was a voluntary option. Compared to Huaming town in 
Tianjin, where large-scale resettlement required all of the villagers to move, in Dongheng 
village, the amount of “shock” (sudden and unpredictable threat) created was considerably 
reduced by giving most villagers choices. In Dongheng, redevelopment also took place over a 
longer timescale than in Tianjin and this made it possible for there to be discussion and 
negotiations at each stage, rather than the rapid imposition of a top-down plan as in Tianjin. 
While the speediest resettlement in Tianjin happened within a year after the initial 
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development decision, the development in Dongheng village took place across a 5 year and 
10 year plan. The longer period of resettlement and transition left many opportunities for 
negotiations and discussions when conflicts emerged, which mitigated the chances of the 
emergence of abrupt violent collective actions.  
Dongheng village also minimised the number of people affected by displacement, something 
which the village committee addressed from the earliest stage, from the perspective of 
development rather than liability. When it comes to the intangible perspective of 
capabilities, the choices available in Dongheng village gave villagers the impression that their 
livelihood was their choice, since they were expected to be an active participant in the policy 
design and implementation process. The effects of this on villagers' identity and self-
perception will be discussed in the later part of this chapter.  
Initially, since the resettlement project required 150 mu of farm land, the village head came 
up with the idea of building the concentrated village on the abandoned mines. After 
consulting experts about validity of the project, he suggested the idea to the village 
committee and “building a new countryside” committee, which transferred the idea into 
reality. Dongheng Village therefore used 150 mu of land from the abandoned mines, of 
which only 9 mu was agrarian land, to construct the new concentrated village (zhong xin cun 
中心村), which had five 11-storey buildings, 100 terraced houses and 72 semi-detached 
houses. The average floor area for these houses was above 200 square metres. 
Infrastructures and facilities were also built, including the culture theatre, grocery market, 
supermarket and digital cinema. In Dongheng, accommodation was available for villagers to 
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purchase, at a rate of 1,000 yuan per square metre for apartments in the tall buildings, and 
1,300 yuan per square metre for semi-detached houses. Apart from the residential area, the 
development area used 30,500 mu of land, the farming area used 10,400 mu and the 
woodland area 1,200 mu (Interview DH009). 
7.3.1 The registration of land rights  
Land rights registration was the first step in carrying out the land shareholding programme. 
In Zhejiang, Deqing county was one of the first counties to start the process of land rights 
registration in 2013, and Yiwu city started in 2015. In September 2013, Deqing county 
launched hukou reform, which aimed to abolish the distinction between agricultural and 
non-agricultural hukou by registering all the villagers as Zhejiang residents (jumin 居民). The 
first step in carrying out the policy was land rights registration because rural land was 
collectively owned by the village committee and individual ownership was not clearly 
identified. The rights registration included three types of collectively owned assets: farm 
land, village properties, and the homestead land.  
The challenge in the land rights registration process was the settlement of cases where the 
boundary of the land was unclear. Unclear boundaries were a source of conflicts between 
villagers, households and villages. Most of the hindrance stemmed from historical problems 
where certain plots of land belonged to two households, or two villages, at the same time. 
During the land registration process, each household and village attempted to maximise 
their gain from the process by increasing the size of land they possessed before, making the 
unclear boundary of overlapping ownership on land a particularly sensitive issue during the 
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land rights registration process. In the short term, the disputes on the unclear land boundary 
increased shock for villagers where they might have to accept the fact that the land that 
used to be theirs was not a part of their possession anymore, or if they chose to argue for 
the rights of the land, their social relations with their neighbours could be put in danger and 
social tension increased. In the long term, the inappropriate settlement of the land rights 
disputes could be the source of intra village conflicts; more importantly, for the villagers 
whose livelihood used to rely on the disputed land, if they los他 the land, their post-
resettlement livelihood could be in danger.  
In the settlement of conflicts and disputes, the village committee played a particularly 
important role in negotiating the interests between villagers, between households and on 
behalf of the village to other villages, making deals and making sure the process progresses. 
The ground work done by the village committee was critical in terms of removing the 
obstacles for villagers to access the new source of asset income.  
The village committee in Dongheng Village also reformed the registration of land titles and 
rural property rights policies in the village, which made it possible for villagers to mortgage 
their rural housing and apply for loans from local agricultural banks. Before resettlement, 
increasingly fewer villagers were working on the farm, yet villagers were not able to use 
their housing as mortgage to take loans from banks due to the collective ownership of their 
property. The income from renting 6 mu of land was only 1,500 yuan (Interview DH012). 
Since 2011, Dongheng Village became the pilot place for rights registration and certification 
of rural homestead and rural housing, in which the Dongheng village committee rented out 
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the land for aquaculture and built roads as well as other types of infrastructure. The reform 
of the rural property rights system was the first step for the development of rural economy 
and secured villagers’ property rights, increasing the income of villagers to more than 
thousands of yuan. 
In conjunction with the village development strategies and resettlement schemes, village 
committees in all three villages in Zhejiang came up with innovative reforms to approach the 
collective ownership of land and village assets, while redistributing the collectively owned 
resources after resettlement. If the strategies for rural redevelopment created more 
resources in the village in the rural form, the further reforms and innovations of property 
rights, collective ownership and the village governance structure ensured that villagers could 
benefit from the newly created resources in terms of proportional redistribution of 
collectively owned properties. There are several benefits of the Dongheng model. First, 
without the burden from the increased living expenses and interruption of employment, the 
chance of shock being transferred to chronic stress on the cost of living was reduced. 
Second, the tailor-made development plan for the village created more productive 
opportunities, lower costs and more income sources, therefore reducing the possibility of 
stress.  
7.3.2 Reserved farmland for villagers 
In the rural development programmes in Zhejiang province, most villagers were given the 
option of moving to the resettlement apartments (See Image 7.1 blow). On one hand, this 
provided choices for villagers, absent in the Huaming town case; however, on the other 
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hand, villagers were not compensated as much as in the Huaming town case. While the 
Dongheng village committee provided subsidies for villagers who moved to the resettlement 
apartments, the subsidies were not aiming to restore the livelihoods of the resettled 
villagers by covering destroyed livelihood income sources for villagers, because in Dongheng, 
the income sources were not destroyed during the resettlement process. Therefore, this 
chapter does not use the term “compensation” when describing the subsidies in the 
Zhejiang case as the components, intention and meaning of “compensation” in Zhejiang is 
very different from that in Tianjin.  
Image 7.1 New Buildings in Dongheng Village, Zhejiang  
(Source: author’s own photograph) 
One additional way that the Dongheng village committee responded to the potential threats 
is not covered directly by Cernea’s (1997) IRR model. It is worth noting that the Dongheng 
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village committee left a plot of land to replace the lost backyards for concentrated 
household farming. It is similar to the idea of mitigating the risk of “landlessness and food 
safety” as mentioned in the IRR model. However, in Dongheng village, providing a 
concentrated plot of land for the resettled villagers to farm served more than the basic 
purpose of providing self-sufficient food. The identity of farmers had been mostly associated 
with land, where villagers viewed land as the root of their identity. By providing a plot of 
land available for farming, the village committee in Dongheng aimed to preserve villagers’ 
rural identity and self-perception as a villager. The village committee’s action was important 
because the continuity in villagers’ self-perception and identity reduced the psychological 
shock and stress during a period of transformation and change. Especially when the physical 
change to the landscape is dramatic, it is important for local governors to provide residents 
with psychological continuity. It is this intangible facet that is not covered by Cernea’s IRR 
model; however, it is critical when it comes to the level of shock, stress, risk and threats that 
are perceived by the displaced population. More on self-perception will be provided in the 
next chapter, where the implications of rural development programmes in Zhejiang on social 
stratifications in the village and between rural and urban areas will be analysed in detail.  
7.3.3 Planning for the new labour market and industry 
As mentioned above, even before resettlement, most of the villagers in Dongheng worked in 
the mining sector, were employed in the adjacent Luoshe town, or worked in village 
industries or family workshops, while few were working on agricultural-related business. As 
the resettlement project was based on the abandoned mines, land which was not effectively 
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used before resettlement, it was possible to enhance the efficiency of land use in Dongheng 
village without creating threats to villagers’ livelihoods.  
Compared to Wusi village and Qingyanliu village, discussed in the later sections in this 
Chapter, the change in the labour market in Dongheng village was relatively small. This is 
because most of those who had wage work before resettlement were already based in the 
adjacent Luoshe town. The limited changes in the labour market avoided requiring the 
transformation of farmers from informal sector to formal sector workers, and from the 
agricultural industry to other sectors; therefore, the transformation did not requires villagers 
to seek new income streams, which is usually the source of stress and even threats in the 
event of failure in securing wage work, which in Huaming town case pushed villagers to try 
to find employment in the urban labour market.  
In summary, the Dongheng village committee played an important role in the rural 
development process in the village in three aspects. First, the head of the village committee 
came up with an economic development plan suitable for the village based on the existing 
resources and context. Second, it was the village committee that responded to the 
competition scheme set up at the county and provincial level. This bottom-up response 
system was important for successful rural development in Dongheng village compared to 
other villages in Deqing county without a rural development agenda, where the village 
committees were simply satisfied by fulfilling the requirements of the upper level states, 
rather than taking a further step by actively participating in the competition scheme and 
coming up with a development strategy for the village. Compared to Huaming town in 
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Tianjin, where the village committee was dissolved, the existence of the village committee 
was also important because it planned and followed up the village development plan based 
on the context of the specific village. Third, it was the village committee that overcame the 
obstacles in developing the land shareholding programme by negotiating the disputed land 
rights between villagers. Fourth, the village committee managed the pace of the rural 
development process so that villagers could adapt to it. Fifth, it also considered the 
psychological perspective during the development process by providing villagers a plot of 
land for the continuation of self-perception and rural identity, which mitigated the shock 
and stress created in the tangible transformation in the village considerably. That the village 
committee in Dongheng village was able to deliver and consider the above factors can be 
attributed to its closeness to villagers, the informal communication with villagers, and the 
feedback channels, such as small talks with villagers and visiting villagers in their homes. 
Moreover, the head of the village committee had been a life-long member of the village who 
understood the cultural and historical as well as socio-economic context of the village well.  
 
7.4 Carrying out the resettlement plan in Wusi village  
Like the land shareholding system in Dongheng Village, the rapid increase of village revenue 
in Wusi village in 2008 can be attributed to the establishment of the land stock cooperative 
(tudi gufen hezuoshe土地股份合作社). Before 2008, investment from outside the village 
could not be brought in because there was no available large-scale land and because of the 
restrictions from collective ownership of the land. In 2008, Wusi Village established the first 
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land stock cooperative in the Huzhou area. Wusi Village committee expropriated only the 
rice fields (dao tian稻田) and rented this land out, so villagers still retained their own 
farmland (di地) for alimentary crops. Also, most of the villagers still continued to live in 
their previous housing after redevelopment; only a few villagers who lived on the planned 
area needed to be resettled. There was no concentrated complex built for this group of 
villagers, and the subsidy for resettlement was limited.  
Based on the rural household responsibility system, villagers exchanged their land rental 
rights (tudi chengbao jingying quan土地承包经营权) for shares in the land stock 
cooperatives. In Dongheng Village, the scheme was based on village assets, while in Wusi 
the scheme was based on income from letting out the collective land. The villagers received 
land stock ownership certificates. By using this method, the village was able to re-centralise 
the use rights of the land and rent it out for investment collectively. Overall, 90 per cent of 
farmers in Wusi transferred to work in rural tourism from small-scale farming after the land 
stock cooperative was established. This is different from Dongheng village where most 
villagers were not farming as a job even before resettlement. This indicates that in Wusi, the 
new wage income was more important for villagers as an income source than in Dongheng 
village; therefore, the transformation of the rural labour market and upgrading the 
agricultural industry to the service industry was vital in Wusi village.  
In the land stock cooperative system, the operator of the land rents the land by bidding for 
it. There are also limitations on what the land can be used for, for example agricultural 
production must be prioritised over other uses. The amount of dividends villagers receive 
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from the land depends on the bidding price of the land. For example, after the first round of 
rental contract of 650 mu of land in Wusi Village ended at the end of 2002, the bidding price 
of the second round in January 2002 was 10 per cent higher than the first round on account 
of the increasing participants in the bidding and the increased competition. The bidding 
price in 2005 was another 10 per cent higher again. The rental price in 2007 ranged from 
550-750 yuan per mu of land (Deqing government, 2005). Therefore, the amount of 
dividends villagers receive for each period depends on the rental price of the land, which is a 
result of the bidding process.  
As in Dongheng, villagers in Wusi received dividends from leased land, which went through 
the village committee in both cases. Compared to Dongheng Village, as only few villagers in 
Wusi Village whose rural housing is located in the planned area needed to relocate, there 
was no concentrated complex built in Wusi. At the centre of the village, three-floor villas 
stand next to each other. Each villa belongs to one household and each also has its own 
yard. These villas are the new homes built by the better-off farmers themselves, with the 
costs also paid by villagers themselves. In contrast, old rural bungalows remain in the middle 
of the farm, which look as though they may collapse at any moment, but which cannot be 
seen from outside the farm. Those who cannot afford to build new houses to resettle 
continue to live in this old rural housing.   
7.4.1 Agriculture based development plan 
Wusi village pursued a strategy of eco-friendly agricultural modernisation and specialisation, 
creating job opportunities in large-scale agriculture and tourism. Based on the traditional 
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agriculture and the geographic location close to Mo Gan Mountain, and through the use of 
the expropriated rice field land, several strategies were used by Wusi Village to develop the 
agricultural industry. They included agricultural sightseeing; efficient ecological agriculture; 
the “happy farm” business model; the creation of a tourist centre; and an experimental 
agricultural project site. Agritourism is tourist activities in an agricultural setting, for example 
on a farm or in a greenhouse. In aiming to build a “Green Village”, the village committee 
built a villager park at the centre of the village, which has pavilion, rocks, fitness facilities, 
walking path and a small wood, which targeted both domestic and international visitors. 
According to village documents, in 2013, industry and agriculture total GDP reached 412 
million yuan; per capita income was 20,890 yuan (Interview WS010).  
Agricultural sightseeing targets domestic visitors from adjacent provinces like Shanghai. 
Expropriated land is rented out to greenhouse/flower companies and private investors; for 
example, the China Red Rose Garden, run by the Yifeng Flower Company, now produces 
7,000 roses in Wusi annually (See Image 7.2 below). Traditional greenhouses were 
transformed into a tourist spot where tourists can pick vegetables; and activities are 
organised focusing on families and also school camping trips. Most customers are urbanites 
who have never been to the countryside before, and seek a rural experience or want to 
spend weekend leisure time away from the urban area. This represents the transition of 
agricultural industry to the service sector.  
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Image 7.2: Greenhouse in Wusi Village, Zhejiang 
(Source: author’s own photograph) 
According to the statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture, agritourism brought 14.01 billion 
yuan for Zhejiang Province in 2013, consisting of more than 10 percent of rural household’s 
income growth in the province. Yifeng Flower Company founded in 2007 with 20 million 
dollars investment, occupies 1,200 mu of land. It is also a “model” greenhouse in the Huzhou 
metropolitan area. To develop efficient ecological agriculture, the village introduced the 
“China Red” Rose Garden, maple planting and the cultivation of Rongze grapes. Apart from 
these village initiatives, the business owners also have their own ideas for gaining 
competitive advantage. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter with 
comparison with the impact on their livelihoods and comparison to other social groups.  
Under promotion of the agritourism business model by Wusi village committee, the 
entrepreneurs in Wusi Village came up with different business models, of which one was 
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“Happy farm”. “Happy Farm” was originally a highly popular social network online game in 
China, which simulated farm management where players could grow crops, plants and 
flowers with friends, harvest them and steal each other’s vegetables. The “Happy farm” 
business model in Wusi Village simulated the game version, where customers could rent a 
piece of land and the company provided help to grow plants and vegetables, so that 
customers could come to the farm and harvest the fruits. The business was launched in June 
2011, using 30 mu of expropriated land to rent out for urban tourists, with a rental fee for 
every 30 square metres of 1000 yuan per year. The expected gross revenue was up to 
20,000 yuan per mu. Unfortunately, the business did not last long and had failed when I 
arrived in Wusi Village in 2014.  
Another example of the agritourism business model, promoted by the Wusi village 
committee, is a 2,000 mu rose garden operated by a businessman from Yunnan Province. 
The business targets tourists from the Yangtze River Delta. After harvesting herbs, urban 
tourists can soak their feet in warm herbal water. In 2009, when Deqing County had a 
project on establishing tourist centres, the village committee landed the project for Wusi 
Village. The village committee organised a tourism company, a forest company and the 
Wuyuanda asset management company to fund the project together, while the village 
committee exchanged 30 mu of land for nine percent of shares. The stock cooperative 
model gave birth to “Tong Guan Manor”. After a year of operation, this tourist centre served 
more than 29,000 tourists and received a revenue of 4.30 million yuan (Zhejiang News, 
2016). 
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Wusi Village not only targets rural tourism to national tourists, it also attempts to attract 
international tourists. The designer style of the Manor is based on Chinese Southern town 
characteristics, like the river, the winding narrow bridge and the water tank. Targeted at 
foreign tourists, advertisements of the hotel and restaurants in Tong Guan Manor could be 
found on English language websites and international hotel booking websites. This business 
initiative is successful, but it is noticeable that the entrepreneurs are mostly non-local 
villagers. The non-village member identity of the entrepreneurs tends to increase the social 
tension in the village, as will be discussed in the next chapter together with the social capital 
of the villagers and their self-perception.  
The village plans to strengthen its competitive advantage in rural tourism. With projects like 
Deqing County Forest Culture museum, the village aims to upgrade the industries from 
sightseeing agriculture to recreational agriculture. The village also focuses on the farming 
culture and develops local culture experience projects, for example the establishment of the 
“Source of Celadon” museum. The third part of the plan is to improve the quality of service 
and extend the value chain of rural tourism. In each of these actions and behaviours of the 
village, the village committee played the most important role in attracting funding, 
developing projects and implementing change.  
 
7.5 Carrying out the resettlement plan in Qingyanliu village - the rise and fall of e-
commerce 
7.5.1 Creation of livelihood threats  
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Farming was not the major income source for villagers in Qingyanliu village, in the east 
suburban area of Yiwu city. Due to the entrepreneurial culture in Yiwu city area, the elders 
typically stayed in the village to farm while the young migrated to start their own 
businesses. Villagers used to live in one or two storeyed housing, where the muddy road was 
narrow and dirty. Before resettlement, the livelihoods of villagers in Qingyanliu village relied 
primarily on rental income from tenants who worked in the adjacent commodity market in 
Yiwu. In order to gain more rental income, villagers kept building new illegal bungalows, 
which contributed to the deterioration of living conditions in the village. In 2005, the head of 
Qingyanliu village, Mao Shengping, initiated the “Renovating old villages” project, in which 
he organised construction of five-storey buildings and re-allocated new apartments to 
villagers. The villagers, seeing that other villages locally had constructed new housing with 
spare rooms for renting, supported the idea. Some migrant villagers who ran businesses 
elsewhere also came back to the village to help build the new accommodation.  
“Renovating old villages” is an integrated part of the national “Building a New Socialist 
Countryside” programme, which focuses on the reorganisation of the village environment 
and efficient use of rural land. Comparing to “Renovating old village”, “Building a New 
Socialist Countryside” has a much broader meaning, including economic development, 
productivity enhancement, cultural integration and social governance. In terms of the type 
of housing it targets, it is the urbanisation process of the suburban area. In this way, the 
redevelopment of Qingyanliu can be seen as showing similarities with the Tianjin case and 
differing from the previous two Zhejiang villages, in terms of the scale of the resettlement 
programme, the pace of change and the setting up of the new urban labour market.  
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The reallocation of the new apartments in Qingyanliu followed a set of rules: the size of each 
room in the new apartment was around 36 square metres, and the number of rooms each 
rural household was entitled to was determined by the number of household members and 
the number of children. There are three communities in total in the new resettlement area, 
labelled A, B and C, and villagers could bid for apartments in any of the three sections. The 
pricing in each section varied depending on the distance to downtown, with Section A and B 
more expensive than section C because the former are close to Yiwu city, while section C is 
next to a mountain. Therefore, one apartment in Section A or B could cost more than 
120,000 yuan, whereas in section C, the lowest priced apartment is around 50,000 yuan. 
Even in section C, however, the costs could be a fortune for villagers to afford. Mr. Liu, a 
man in his 40s, bought 3 apartments in section C, which cost him 100,000 yuan each. He said 
that it is not cheap, but he favoured the location as it is the same place as his previous 
housing.  
7.5.2 After the transition 
Similar to Huaming town in Tianjin, the transformation of Qingyanliu was rapid, taking only a 
month to tear down the old rural housing and a little over a year to construct the new 
apartments in sections A and B (See Image 7.3 below).  
Image 7.3 Qingyanliu Village, Zhejiang  
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(Source: author’s own photograph) 
The new apartments were more attractive to tenants, and villagers were able to charge 
higher rents compared to the old housing, such that the rent of one room increased from 
100 yuan to more than a thousand yuan per month. For a household living on one floor and 
renting out other floors, the rental income amounted to between 40,000 yuan and 140,000 
yuan annually, depending on the location. The majority of villagers took loans to pay for the 
resettlement housing. 100,000 yuan of bank loan was made available for each apartment. 
With a stable rental income stream from renting to traders in the small commodity market 
adjacent to Qingyanliu, the villagers’ fortunes improved. However in 2008, the relocation of 
the market to Yiwu international trade market, the world’s largest wholesale market of small 
commodities, on the other side of Yiwu city, brought the tenants away from living in the 
village, posing threats to the income sources of villagers in Qingyanliu village. Villagers 
started to compete for tenants and the pricing for rent plunged. 
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7.5.3 Role of the village committee in solving Qingyanliu’s problem 
The village committee played an important role in addressing shock and stress in villagers’ 
post-resettlement livelihoods in Qingyanliu by adjusting the existing top-down development 
plans and developing new strategies based on the progress of state-led urbanisation. When 
the initial plan of generating income for resettled villagers through increased rents for the 
new accommodation failed after the relocation of the commodity market and the loss of 
tenants, the village committee in Qingyanliu identified new opportunities and created new 
income-generating mechanisms for the resettled villagers. The problem of the village was to 
attract new tenants and create rental income for villagers. During that time, the concept of 
business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce became popular and a few young people in 
Qingyanliu village started to run shops on Taobao, s the most renowned e-commerce trading 
website in China. One villager, Liu Wengao, who ran a business selling amber, noticed the 
trend and set up a website for his company, which he found was an effective way of 
increasing sales.  
Liu Wengao recommended the idea of developing as an e-commerce village to the village 
committee. He persuaded the village committee that e-commerce business was an 
opportunity not only to attract tenants for the village, but also to create employment 
opportunities for villagers. The head of the village accepted the idea and brought it for 
discussion in the village representative meetings, where the committee approved the idea 
and gave responsibility to Mr Liu, entitling him the head of the “e-commerce development 
team”. Given the fact that the Taobao owners in Qingyanliu village were typically only 
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around 20 years old without higher education, capital advantage or price advantage, Mr Liu 
then came up with a competitive idea of teaming up the existing Taobao shop owners in the 
village and asking them to source products collectively. Whoever could source the best price 
product would be in charge of the products, and would share the quantity in the village. The 
idea succeeded and the scale of e-commerce in Qingyanliu village expanded. Afterwards, Mr 
Liu came up another idea to reduce the inventory level of Taobao owners in the village, 
which attracted even more businesses owners. Apart from the innovative ideas, Mr Liu and 
the village committee also negotiated preferred deals on behalf of the village with logistic 
companies, photography companies and other e-commerce platforms. These deals ensured 
lower costs in essential services required by e-commerce businesses in Qingyanliu village, 
providing the village with a competitive advantage compared to other villages. This series of 
activities earned Qingyanliu village a reputation of “Taobao village” such that Taobao store 
owners all wanted to come and run businesses there. The success of the e-commerce 
market boosted the property market in Qingyanliu village, so that the rent of a four-room 
apartment increased from 40,000 yuan a year in 2008 to 130,000 yuan a year in 2010. 
7.5.4 Generating employment opportunities for young people 
Having experienced the development of the e-commerce industry, more than 100 young 
people in Qingyanliu village also started Taobao businesses. The success of the e-commerce 
development plan can be attributed to the eco-system created in the village that provided 
essential services for Taobao business owners with relatively low prices, including storage, 
sourcing, photography and logistics. The most important factor was the location advantage 
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of being close to Yiwu with its International Commodity Market. The response of the village 
committee of serving Taobao business owners was also important, for example, setting up 
broadband across the village to ensure the infrastructure and facilities for Taobao business 
owners.  
With input from a villager, the Qingyanliu village committee identified the new business 
trend of e-commerce and the opportunity of making the market by creating facilities for the 
e-commerce business owners. Compared to Dongheng village where the redevelopment 
plan was made ahead of resettlement, the village committee in Qingyanliu village came up 
with an emergency plan after the original labour market development plan, part of the top-
down provincial development plan, failed. The ability of the village committee to react to 
the development process in such way significantly reduced the long term threats to villagers’ 
livelihoods, and again highlights the important role of the village committee in shaping 
development outcomes. Nonetheless, the rental income in Qingyanliu village still heavily 
relies on the local e-commerce market. When the e-commerce industry under-performs, 
and Taobao businesses go bankrupt, the resettled farmers risk losing tenants.  
7.5.5 Skill training programmes 
The booming of e-commerce in Qingyanliu’s resettlement complex created many work 
opportunities. However, the e-commerce opportunity requires villagers to be computer-
literate where most of the villagers are not. The village committee therefore provides free 
training sessions for villagers who would like to run e-commerce businesses. Despite the 
availability of training programmes in Qingyanliu village, e-commerce has even higher 
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requirements for entry, and most of the older farmers have never seen a computer in their 
lives. To set up a business in the newly developed e-commerce industry and succeed in it 
requires the resettled farmers to be computer literate and understand the business world. 
Therefore, the newly created work and entrepreneurship opportunities in Qingyanliu village 
also benefit those who have acquired urban skills (computing, and more specifically typing, 
using search engines and understanding marketing and customer service), education and 
experience already, which is similar to Tianjin case. The similarity between the Qingyanliu 
case and Tianjin case is that the skill training rarely those who did not have urban skills with 
the new skills they need to work in the urban labour market. Similar to Huaming town, in 
Qingyanliu village, some local villagers together with rural migrants set up their own stand in 
the middle of the resettlement community (See Image 7.4 blow). 
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Image 7.4: Informal vegetable market in Qingyanliu Village 
 
(Source: author’s own photograph) 
The main reason behind the skill requirement and the failure of the training programme 
shared by Huaming town and Qingyanliu village is that both of the two places are with NSR 
approach where there was large-scale resettlement and development of industrial clusters. 
By contrast, in Dongheng and Wusi, the economic development programme and the 
industries promoted during the process are easier for villagers with no urban skill-set to 
participate in. 
Although there are also other work opportunities in Qingyanliu village apart from e-
commerce, for example in the nearby restaurants, those work requires farmers to have 
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customer service skills and willing to work in a fast pace, indoor environment, and following 
a fixed work schedule, which farmers might not be willing to. 
 
7.6 Management in post-resettlement Dongheng and Wusi village 
7.6.1 Cultural training programmes - Educating and “civilizing” the villagers 
To improve the employability of villagers as well as their “suzhi” (quality) – transforming 
villagers from old farmers to new farmers living an urban lifestyle, for example rubbish 
recycling and increased consumption, the Dongheng Village committee used their village 
theatre for a range of events including educational events. Apart from cultural events, 
performances and competitions, there were also public lectures targeting villagers. Trainings 
targeted at adults included upgrading “Harmonious community exemplified village” (he mei 
jia yuan jingpin cun 和美家园精品村); public lectures on gardening and agricultural skills; 
and sessions on eliminating illiteracy, organised by Luoshe Town Adult School. Most such 
training sessions provided in the village targeted teenager education and cultural education 
of adults. This shows the efforts of the Dongheng village committee in improving 
employability and suzhi of villagers, launched as a part of their rural redevelopment 
programme. Not only does the project aims to imitate the urban area in terms of the 
construction of the village and buildings, but also matching the suzhi of villagers to the urban 
standard. According to recent literature, “suzhi” in the context of reform-era China has been 
used as a measure of the worth of human capital, which is attached to individuals as a label 
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(Anagnost, 2004). The devaluation of individuals’ suzhi is often in the aim of exploiting their 
labour power in the case of rural migrant workers (Anagnost, 2004). When it comes to 
resettled farmers, a study of in the resettlement project caused by hydropower plant 
building in Yunnan province, local ethnic minority residents were framed as “backward” and 
“low-quality”, implying that the locals were responsible for the lack of development of the 
area rather than the absence of development intervention (Harwood, 2013). Moreover, the 
rhetoric framing had a further impact since the “social engineering” project aimed to 
transform farmers into urban workers who could contribute to the growing demand of 
labour in the Chinese economy (Harwood, 2013). Similar to the Nu River case, resettled 
villagers in the state-led urbanisation process in both Tianjin and Zhejing were usually 
framed as having low suzhi and being “backward”, compared to their urban counterparts, 
and this was reflected in the training programmes on offer. On one hand, such framing 
blames the lack of development or any failure of rural development projects on the low 
quality of resettled villagers; on the other hand, the framing could also shape the dreams 
and desires of the resettled villagers, by aiming to transform resettled villagers into urban 
workers.  
Similar to the four dimensions in the Deqing County “China harmonious beautiful family” 
project, Wusi Village also aimed to improve the suzhi of villagers. Both the villages use the 
model family strategy and labelling, for example “Peaceful family”, “Green family”, 
“Harmonious family”, “Entrepreneurship family” and “Learning family”. Households that are 
entitled to these labels are elected by villagers. In the total 444 households in Wusi Village, 
352 “model Hemei households”, 260 “civil families” and 65 “learning families” were 
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selected. The head of the village employs such strategies for households to supervise each 
other and to catch up with the model households. During interviews, villagers did not 
mention much about the methods, expressing neither liking nor dissatisfaction toward the 
method.  
Wusi village also used labels for individuals, such as “model daughter-in-law and mother-in-
law”, or “model neighbours”. Moreover, the village established model characters like the 
story of Li Peihua who was filial to his parents. The suzhi training of villagers started from 
young people, including social activities in the greenhouse. The competition for model 
families was to reduce violent behaviours in the village, also behaviours that breach the law, 
break the one-child-policy, and superstition and gambling activities. Labelling thus has two 
function. On one hand, the rhetoric of the labels sets the suzhi objectives for villagers. On 
the other hand, in a community with small number of population, it serves as an incentive 
mechanism among households.  
When it comes to effects on identity, self-perception and social stratification, discussed in 
detail in the next chapter, the most striking change has been found in villages where the 
individual village boundary is damaged and villagers live in a new community, either in the 
rural or urban context. In the three villages in Zhejiang, both Qingyanliu village and 
Dongheng built new residential communities for resettlement, while the configuration of 
Wusi village remains the same and the individual boundary of the village remains 
unchanged. As a result, it is not surprising to find the most changes in Qingyanliu village, 
where state-led urbanisation involves the largest-scale resettlement, and in Dongheng 
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village where there is also a newly built community, but villagers had choices to move in or 
not. In contrast, limited changes in villagers’ self-perception and social stratification are 
found in Wusi village.  
 
7.7 Conclusion 
Parallel to Chapter 5, this chapter has explored the set of livelihood risks, stresses and 
shocks in the NRR approach to state-led urbanisation, paying special attention to the role of 
the village committees in the three villages in Zhejiang and the transformation of the key 
institutional mechanisms, including the rural labour market and redistribution of village 
assets, and the generation of entrepreneurship opportunities. This chapter shows that, in 
the case of the three Zhejiang villages, the village committees played an important role both 
during and after resettlement concerning overcoming livelihood risks, threats, stress and 
shock.  
Specifically, in Dongheng village, the village committee played an important role in creating 
income sources where the village committee came up with an economic development plan, 
and applied for funding from upper level states. By negotiating the disputed land rights 
between villagers, slowing down the pace of rural development processand reinforcing the 
rural identity of villagers, the Dongheng village committee not only reduced economic risk 
experiment by villagers, but also psychological stress and shock. In Wusi village, it was the 
village committee that generated the new idea of agritourism business model and 
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implemented in the village. In Qingyanliu village, it was the village committee that adopted 
the e-commerce business strategy from the villager, of which the success of the model 
significantly reduced the long term threats to villagers’ livelihoods. After the resettlement 
process, the village committees acted as an informal feedback channels for villagers and 
providing training for “modern” villagers. Village committees are able to identify local 
problems immediately and respond in a timely manner, which secures the livelihoods of 
villagers.  
Compared to Huaming town and Qingyanliu village under the NSC model, the village 
committees in Dongheng village and Wusi village under the NRR model contributed more in 
terms of assisting the resettlement process and creating plans to share common property; 
moreover, the economic development plans also tend to be designed from the interests of 
the village rather than an urban blueprint. The empirical evidence in this chapter shows that 
compared to Chapter 5 where rural development did not happen in Huaming village, one 
important reason is absence of the village committee. Without the village committee on the 
ground, the county level state cannot set up a competition scheme for the villages to 
compete and for the villages to come up with bottom-up economic development plans that 
are the best suitable for the socio-economic and cultural context of the individual villages. 
Therefore, the existence of the village committee is as important as the behaviours of the 




Chapter 8 Post resettlement livelihoods in Zhejiang 
8.1 Introduction 
Parallel to Chapter 6, which focuses on the implications of resettlement for livelihoods in 
Tianjin, this chapter discusses implications for the livelihoods of individuals and households 
with the New Rural Reconstruction (NRR) approach to the state-led urbanisation process in 
Zhejiang province. Concerning the implications for livelihoods, this chapter considers three 
inter-related questions from the perspective of individuals and households and examines 
the impacts of resettlement upon their livelihoods.: first, how individuals and households 
are affected by the state-led urbanisation process; second, the responses and strategies of 
individuals and households in overcoming livelihoods threats; third, the effects of 
resettlement on the perception of villagers, in terms of their self-perception, identity and 
fairness of resources redistribution. Because of limitation of space, again this chapter does 
not discuss each village in every section; rather, it selects the most suitable examples in each 
section for discussion. 
To understand the livelihoods of resettled farmers under the NRR model fully, this chapter 
discusses how different social groups are affected by the transformation of each of their 
livelihood components. The first part of the chapter identifies the gains and losses of 
livelihood resources, with comparison to the NSC model regarding the primary type of 
capital necessary to make a sustainable living in the reorganised rural environment of the 
resettlement community. The livelihood resources include tangible and intangible assets, 
where tangible assets are farm land, rural housing and family plot, and intangible assets 
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include the intangible value of land, human capital, and social and cultural capital. Then the 
chapter moves on to examine the existing and new ways in which resettled villagers’ possess 
or lack capabilities to act on the new dynamics of the allocation and redistribution of assets. 
Because different social groups have various capabilities and sets of skills, as in Huaming 
town, the new dynamics of resource allocation benefit certain groups while disadvantaging 
others. This chapter examines whether this is also the case in the villages in the NRR model 
in Zhejiang province, as well as outlining the various patterns of activities and strategies that 
resettled villagers use in response to different livelihoods implications. Along with the new 
redistribution of resources and the response from villagers, it also examines whether new 
types of social stratification are an implication of the post-resettlement livelihoods under 
the NRR approach to state-led urbanisation, and compares the Zhejiang cases to Huaming 
town in Tianjin. 
 
8.2 Assets – land and the land shareholding programme  
With the NRR approach, the rural development process in Zhejiang is different from the 
state-led urbanisation in Tianjin in terms of the transformation of land assets and the 
methods of redistribution of the land assets, as discussed in the previous chapter. Three 
characteristics of the land shareholding programme and the NRR approach more generally 
include: first, the separation of land rights from the economic activities on the land; second, 
the reserved rural setting with individual village boundaries unchanged and no large-scale 
resettlement to a new community; third, in Dongheng village, the village committee 
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reserved a plot of land for farmers to grow their own food in a self-sufficient manner, and 
did not expropriate the previous farmland until the new plot was available. This section 
focuses on the implications of these new forms of assets and distribution methods on the 
livelihoods of different social groups in the three Zhejiang villages. In order to compare 
explicitly with Huaming town in Tianjin, this section especially focuses on the vulnerable 
groups whose livelihoods were negatively affected in the Huaming case, including unskilled 
farmers, entrepreneurs who had developed businesses before resettlement, women, 
farmers in their 40s and 50s, and the elderly.  
In Zhejiang, as the following discussion will show, these social groups benefit from the land 
shareholding programme in a variety of ways. For entrepreneurs and business owners in 
particular, access to the new form of land assets provides them with opportunities to 
expand their businesses, while the preserved rural setting preserves their business models 
and secures the continuity of their businesses. For other villagers, while they are untied from 
land with the access to the new forms of assets, the reserved rural setting maintains the 
rural informal economy in which they participate and the reserved household plot of land 
serves to keep their living expenses down.  
8.2.1 New source of income from land shareholding programme 
The three villages in Zhejiang all avoid the IRR model’s risks of landlessness, homelessness 
and loss of access to common property in the short term through different approaches. 
These different approaches lead to various effects on longer term risk and threats. The 
access to land assets of the vulnerable groups is secured in both Dongheng village and Wusi 
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village, because of two measures taken by the village committees. First, the land 
shareholding programme ensures that villagers still have access to the profits generated by 
the land despite not directly participating in productive activities on the land; second, 
reserving a plot of land collectively for farmers to produce self-sufficient food meant that 
there is no increase on living expenses and therefore farmers face no pressure of seeking for 
new source of income.  
As outlined in Chapter 7, the village committees played important roles in assisting 
vulnerable groups to access the new form of land assets based on the land shareholding 
system through the land stock cooperative (tudi gufen hezuoshe土地股份合作社), in which 
Deqing county was one of the first counties to start the process of land rights registration in 
2013. While Dongheng Village became the pilot place for rights registration and certification 
of rural homestead and rural housing since 2011, Wusi Village established the first land 
stock cooperative even earlier in 2008, as a pilot spot in Deqing county. The land 
shareholding system allowed villagers to exchange their land rental rights (tudi chengbao 
jingying quan土地承包经营权) in the form of shares. This benefitted individual villagers by 
preserving their possession of land assets while they were not physically participating in 
productive activities on the land. This also benefitted the village collectives by re-centralising 
farmland and transforming small-scale farming into more productive large-scale farming, as 
well as enabling a shift from a solely agricultural economy to a service economy.  
8.2.2 Benefits from land shareholding  
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Business owners in Zhejiang particularly benefitted from the new form of asset 
redistribution through the land shareholding programme. Compared to the findings in 
Huaming town, where most villager entrepreneurs lost their businesses after resettlement 
because of the expropriation of the land on which their businesses were built, and therefore 
suffered from the pressures of looking for new employment and deteriorating living 
standards, the livelihoods of business owners improved in villages in Zhejiang. Not only were 
their businesses not destroyed with the rural development programme, the land 
shareholding programme provided better organised land for them to rent and expand their 
businesses, and benefits from economies of scale, bringing more income.  
Similarly, for prospective entrepreneurs, especially farmers with agricultural skills and 
expertise, or who had urban work experience and ideas but did not have the capital to start 
their own business, the rural development programme in Zhejiang and the increased supply 
of spare land for economic activities also generated new opportunities to rent land and start 
businesses. Having the opportunity to take out bank loans, for example access to formal 
credit for the first time, helped with this too. Therefore, entrepreneurs and prospective 
business owners benefitted from the better access to the productive factor of land from the 
land shareholding programme.  
Another group that benefitted from the land shareholding programme in Zhejiang was those 
vulnerable in the Huaming case, including unskilled farmers, particularly those in their 40s-
50s, women and the elderly, who were untied from direct physical participation in 
agricultural productive activities on farmland through the land shareholding programme. 
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Instead, they could participate in other productive or entertainment activities while still 
receiving dividends from the land shareholding programme. Furthermore, the large-scale 
farming and the upgrading from agricultural to service sectors on the expropriated land 
usually increased the productivity of the farmland, which meant that this group of villagers 
received more financial benefits than working on the land by themselves. 
8.2.3 Benefits from the reserved rural setting  
Apart from benefiting from the land shareholding programme, the preserved rural setting in 
Dongheng and Wusi villages in Zhejiang was not only a blessing for business owners and 
entrepreneurs, but also for the vulnerable groups listed in the Tianjin case, including 
unskilled farmers in their 40s-50s, women and the elderly.  
For business owners and entrepreneurs, the reserved rural setting was an opportunity to 
upgrade their existing business operations in the agricultural sector and expand into the 
service sector, rather than start over again. By contrast in Huaming town, where the 
countryside was reorganised as an urban community, previous business owners were forced 
to give up their businesses, either because the land was expropriated or the customer base 
was substantially changed, or because the business model had no competitive advantage in 
the new urban context. For example, as discussed in Chapter 6, the transportation business 
model, which depended on the distance between villages and provided easy access service 
for villagers to commute between villages, no longer matched the demand in the market, 
because there was no distance between villages after they were relocated to one 
concentrated community. As a result, for the owners of transportation businesses, their 
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options were either to identify a new opportunity in the new urban community context, or 
give up the entrepreneurial activity and looking for waged employment. Re-identifying new 
business opportunities and developing a successful business model based on them is risky 
and often fruitless, although there were cases of success. By contrast, in Zhejiang, there was 
a much more limited change in consumer demand, which prevented large-sclae negative 
impacts on businesses. 
8.2.4 Benefits from reserved farm land 
By contrast with Tianjin, the living expenses in rural Zhejiang remained at a similar level to 
that before resettlement. In Dongheng Village, the village committee reserved a plot of land 
in the concentrated village for villagers to farm. During my fieldwork in 2014, the reserved 
farm land was still at the planning stage because not all villagers had completed the 
resettlement process. According to the plan made by the Dongheng village committee, after 
the resettlement was completed, villagers would farm on a concentrated plot of land where 
each household had their own small area. Farmers could use the land to provide vegetables 
for their own consumption, but it was not designed for professional farmers due to the small 
scale. Before moving to the concentrated village, villagers still farmed on their own previous 
land and the village committee did not expropriate farmers’ land until they had completed 
the resettlement process. As discussed in Chapter 6, resettled villagers in Huaming town 
complained about the waste of their farmland, indicating that the urban neighbourhood 
committee expropriated their farmland and then left it empty before the land was 
contracted for construction. Villagers in Huaming were dissatisfied with the fact that while 
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the land was not being used for the new economic activities, they were not allowed still to 
farm on the land. Compared to Huaming town, the implementation plan of the Dongheng 
village committee maximised the productivity of land by avoiding any gap period where the 
land was not in use.  
Image 8.1: Supermarket in Dongheng Village, Zhejiang 
(Source: author’s own photograph) 
Most Zhejiang villagers did not live on agricultural production after resettlement. Instead, 
the vegetables harvested from the land were mostly consumed by their own household 
rather than sold. This had the effect of not increasing living costs, unlike in Huaming town, 
where resettled villagers complained about the increasing expenses of living. In Dongheng 
village (See Image 8.1 above) and Wusi village, because the previous villages were 
preserved, as well as much of the rural housing, the majority of the villagers still did not 
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need to pay for water, gas or community service fees after rural development. With the 
reserved plot of concentrated farmland where villagers could farm, self-supplied food was 
still available. This particularly benefitted those groups who were vulnerable in the Huaming 
case, including unskilled farmers especially those in their 40s-50s, women, and the elderly.  
For these groups, while not participating in the urban labour market as in Tianjin, their 
activities and lifestyles were not substantially affected by the rural development process in 
the villages in Zhejiang. They continued to contribute economic value to households by 
providing self-grown food for their families, the relationships and division of labour in the 
rural households are maintained.  
While the Dongheng village committee provided subsidies for villagers who moved to the 
resettlement apartments, the subsidies were not compensation for destroyed livelihood 
income sources, as in Tianjin, since livelihoods were not destroyed. The process of 
resettlement in Dongheng village therefore substantially eliminated the shock and threats to 
livelihoods during the transition period. From the material perspective, even if farmers did 
not receive the subsidies in time, they could still be self-sufficient in food; therefore, there 
was little threat to their living expenses. On the other hand, leaving farmers with their 
previous farm land until after the resettlement process was complete also reduced the level 
of psychological shock, since villagers tended to perceive that their livelihoods after 
resettlement were not much different from those before, apart from the location of their 
house. 
8.2.5 Improved living conditions 
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Among the three villages in Zhejiang, living conditions were improved in the two villages, 
Dongheng and Qingyanliu, where there was a newly constructed resettlement community. 
In Wusi village, living conditions remained the same for most, since only the rich could 
afford to build new housing and the poor stayed in their old housing. The two functions of 
improved living conditions regarding villagers’ livelihoods are retaining villagers who were 
seeking to move out of the village, and shaping villagers’ behaviours and perception of their 
identity.  
By contrast, in the Tianjin case, where villagers were resettled to the urban complex, the 
original rural environment was entirely lost. Villagers needed to adapt to the concrete and 
brick built urban buildings, and were kept away from the rural environment of mountains 
rivers which they were used to. Compared to this approach, village committees in Zhejiang 
made efforts in retaining and improving the natural rural living environment for villagers. 
After resettlement, every resettlement household in Dongheng village was equipped with a 
septic tank and the sewage treatment rate reached 100 per cent. The Dongheng village 
committee invested more than 2 million yuan and built the first solar powered sewage 
treatment pond in Deqing County, processing 30 tons of household sewage daily. The eight 
pig farms in the village were also equipped with biogas ponds. These were new 
infrastructures built by the village committee, allowing households to raise domestic animals 
in their backyards; at the same time, it enhanced the efficiency of resource use in the village 
and made it more environmentally friendly. This had two effects. On one hand, the living 
condition in the village was improved and the villagers felt that the organised rural living 
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environment was increasingly like urban life; on the other hand, enhancing the natural and 
built environment was also an important measure for the village committee to take in order 
to encourage tourists to their transformed eco-tourism industry or other ecological-based 
economy.  
Moreover, before the redevelopment programme, smaller natural villages in Dongheng 
Village had no access to broadband Internet or TV, and some households did not even have 
access to electricity and water. One advantage of land consolidation and the resettlement 
project was that individual households no longer needed to work on refurnishing and 
rebuilding their houses anymore, but had access to these housing supplies after the rural 
redevelopment programme. 
In Dongheng Village, living conditions also improved considerably after resettlement due to 
the closure of mines and the attempt at restoring the natural environment by planting trees 
and growing a forest. By planting the forest, the Dongheng village committee aimed to 
enhance the environmental quality of the village, and to restore the natural scenes in the 
village. In this way, the village became even more rural, which also happened in Wusi village 
where the village committees encouraged villagers to protect the environment for attract 
tourists for the eco-tourism businesses, while forming sharp contrast to Huaming town and 
Qingyanliu village where the village became more urban. Villagers contrasted the current 
living environment in Dongheng favourably with that in the former mining community, when 
the mine-transporting vehicles drove around the village, leaving holes in the ground and the 
air full of dust. Ms. Yao, a housewife in her 40s, said, “The transporting vehicles came and 
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went, the dust was everywhere and I could not even open the window nor could I dry our 
clothes outside”. After the rural redevelopment project, villagers’ attitudes towards their 
living environment improved considerably. As Mr. Jiang, a retired factory manager in Luoshe 
town, pointed out: “The environment has improved a lot after the closure of mines and 
abandoned mines redevelopment. Recently it was the egret laying period; tens of thousands 
of egrets gathered near the mountains. Also, from next month, we can use gas at home.” 
This suggests that the local villagers welcomed the combination of the natural environment 
with the introduction of urban facilities. This forms a sharp contrast with the villagers’ views 
in Tianjin where resettled villagers complained about the loss of their natural living 
environment and the difference between urban and rural living environments.  
Surrounding the residential area in Dongheng is the cultural theatre, exercise ground and 
agrarian product market. Decisions concerning the construction of these were initiated by 
the head of the village and the village committee, and passed in the village representative 
meeting. “Villagers can enjoy city life without going out of the village” was an official slogan 
promoted by the head of the village. This suggests that the combination of the rural natural 
environment and urban infrastructure was the goal of the village committee, which 
attempts to make villagers feel proud of the village where they live, which is an 
interpretation of the NRR framework. Concerning the combination of natural living 
environment with improved infrastructure, some villagers expressed their preference for the 
countryside compared to life in the city. Mr. Hu, a man in his 50s who used to do 
administrative work in a cotton factory in Luoshe town, explained: “My son asked me to live 
in the city with him. I refused. The environment in the village is much better than that in the 
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city. Dancing, singing, watching films, we can do whatever people in the city do and it is all 
free here.”  
The above discussion shows that Dongheng village committee attempted to combine the 
natural environment and urban infrastructure in the village, and successfully gave villagers 
the impression that living in the village is even better than living in the city. Most of the 
villagers agreed with the idea that they could do whatever urban people could do, and even 
better, because it is free in the village but not in the city. This include free cinema and 
cultural events in the theatre, since the village has built a cinema and a cultural theatre for 
the first time after resettlement, and organises free cinema nights for villagers. Most of 
cultural events in the theatre are organised in the aim of improving suzhi of villagers, 
providing skills training seminars or providing cultural education for the young people. These 
activities are free and not compulsory, although the village committee encourages the 
villagers to attend. In reality, however, the attendance rate is usually low.  
Furthermore, compared with life in a town or county, there is still a lack of population, and 
limited choices for cultural, food or entertainment consumption in the village. Villagers 
might not know what life in the city is really like, although they feel that the lifestyle in the 
village is more “urban” after redevelopment. Villagers resettled in Tianjin have much better 
access to the urban consumption and entertainment facilities because of the reduced 
distance between the resettlement community and the urban centre, as well as because of 
the construction of the urban resettlement community with urban facilities.  
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Nevertheless, it is important to note that better access to the facilities does not mean that 
the villagers necessarily use them. The reasons behind this are both economic and cultural. 
Economically speaking, villagers with urban work could normally afford urban consumptions 
due to their urban income, but for unskilled farmers, their lack of urban income sources and 
the lack of rental income suggest that they do not have the same purchasing power as the 
urban-skilled workers. Culturally, the villagers, particularly those who do not have urban 
experience, are used to a lifestyle that is predominantly not based on consumption. 
Therefore, even if it is financially possible for them to access to the urban entertainment 
facilities, it is not likely for the villagers to use them.   
8.2.6 The proportional redistribution of assets  
Compared to Huaming town where villagers lost their land rights with a one-off 
compensation, in Zhejiang villagers still possessed the rights to land, while the access to land 
is transformed from tangible to “intangible” access. The intangible access brought both 
benefits and disadvantages for villagers in Zhejiang. As for advantages, the access provided a 
long-term income source for villagers in Zhejiang; also, as the dividends villagers received 
were closely related to the economic performance of the business operating on the land, the 
values of the land shares increased with the passing of time and economic growth. The long-
term approach to dividend sharing avoided the problems in the Huaming case, where 
villagers were cut off from their land in a potentially unsustainable one-off deal. In a one-off 
compensation, the value of the land is typically determined by the market price of the land 
at the time of compensation distribution. From the perspective of villagers, they would 
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always find the deal unfair given the possibilities of increased value of their land with the 
passing of time  
Although in the Zhejiang case the proportional distribution of the land rights is not equal, in 
the sense of giving an equal amount of land to each household, villagers tended to perceive 
the redistribution method as fair, as they received a number of shares with equal value to 
their previous possession of the size of their land.  
While the former ensured proportional redistribution of assets and access to it through 
village membership, the latter enabled the vulnerable groups to support themselves with 
low living costs. Although the proportional redistribution of assets did not equal reallocation 
of assets to villagers, and thus involved of the risk of enlarging the intra-village wealth gap, it 
created a perception of “fairness” among villagers. This had an impact on villagers’ 
intentions to take violent or non-violent actions, when they compare their gain of assets 
compared to their neighbours. I analyse this in the context of social stratification and 
conditions for collective action, with a comparison to the Huaming case, in the last section of 
this chapter.  
In Dongheng and Wusi, the gain of assets was not from rental income as in Huaming town; 
rather farmers gained access to their collectively-owned asset through the land shareholding 
schemes. This new way of providing access to land tended to benefit villagers equally. Unlike 
in Huaming, the new access to land was not transferred into rental income; instead the new 
access to the asset of land was based on continued village membership, where the village 
committee organised productive activities on the land collectively on behalf of the villagers. 
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During the fieldwork, I found that the vulnerable populations, including unskilled farmers, 
people in their mid-late 40s50s, the elderly and women, were better off in Dongheng and 
Wusi villages compared to Huaming town. The following will examine the villager groups 
that benefit in Dongheng village first and Wusi village second.  
 
8.3 Human capital and capabilities  
Sen (1997) explains the broader meaning of “human capability” compared to “human 
capital”, where “human capability” also concerns individuals’ choices, ability to lead lives 
they value based on their experiences, socio-economic background and personal reasons, as 
well as being an integrated part of the productive process. According to Sen (1997: 1959), 
the broader sense of capability enhances “people’s ability to be agents of change, the ability 
to question, challenge, propose and ultimately usher in new ways of doing things, and the 
ability to change the rules of the development game.” This means that capabilities are 
essentially about individuals’ ability to act on their possession of capitals, including human 
capital, land capital and social capital. Capability could be interpreted as the interaction 
between the living context, individuals’ possession of capital and their activities in making 
use of the capital to make a sustainable livelihood. Therefore, a change in any of the three 
components would affect the livelihood results after resettlement. In the three components, 
the context of living and the assets possessed by the resettled villagers are considerably 
affected by state intervention, as discussed in Chapter 7.  
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Although villagers are the subject of their own activities, their behaviours are also shaped by 
state intervention and guidance to some extent. Synergy is generated in capabilities when 
the changing context works well with the changing capitals. For human capital, the synergy 
is about whether the newly developed labour market matches the skill-sets of the villagers, 
or whether they produce greater economic value based on villagers’ skill-sets and 
experience. Changing the skill-sets of villagers to match the skill-set requirement of the new 
labour markets could also increase synergy, although this requires the provision of 
employment training programmes, as well being conditioned on the ability of villagers to 
absorb new knowledge and transform their skill-sets. Similar to human capital, when it 
comes to social capital, the networks and access to certain institutions and organisations 
enhance people’s capability to use those capitals and enhance their livelihoods. Moreover, 
social capital gives people the chance to express their value, the voice to articulate demand 
and be the agent of chance (Bebbington, 1999).  
Different groups of people benefit in different villages. As mentioned in Chapter 6, in 
Huaming town, the resettlement process made it easier for villagers who have urban skill 
sets to act on their human capital and take investment initiatives on their property 
ownership. In contrast, it was more difficult for farmers without urban skills to act on their 
human capital, to acquire property ownership or to start businesses. In the three villages in 
Zhejiang, similar to Huaming town, certain population groups benefit more from the synergy 
between their capabilities, human capital and land rights. However, these are different 
groups of people compared to those in Huaming. In Dongheng village and Wusi village, the 
resettlement project brought opportunities for villagers to act on their entrepreneurial skills. 
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Therefore, villagers who were already running rural businesses before resettlement could 
expand their business by renting more land from the village committee. These people were 
usually those who either have business management experience before resettlement 
already or those with specialised knowledge in a field who set up a new venture after 
resettlement to step up on their skills. This shows that the Dongheng and Wusi model 
benefitted small business owners and entrepreneurs. For ordinary villagers who spent their 
life time farming and without any business running or management experience, they were 
not likely to take advantage from these opportunities, but nor were they typically worse off 
after redevelopment. 
8.3.1 Villagers with urban skills 
Despite the improved living conditions, villagers with urban skill sets did not benefit as much 
in Dongheng village as they did in Huaming Town in Tianjin. There are two reasons behind 
this. First, the resettlement community was based in the original village, where it took 
around an hour by car and 1.5 hours by bus to commute to the adjacent Deqing county town 
centre. The infrastructure improvements did not decrease the commuting time like in 
Huaming Town, mostly because the individual boundary of Dongheng village was preserved 
and the resettlement community built on the previous village land. Second, there was no 
new labour market developed in the resettlement community. For villagers with urban skill 
sets, or specialised skills like wood furniture making and piano making, there was not much 
difference in their work before and after the rural development process, unlike that in 
Huaming town. The most important reason is that most of the small-scaled manufacturing 
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factories these villagers worked in were based in the adjacent Luoshe town. Similar to 
Huaming town, this group of villagers gained their skills and work experience before the 
rural development process.  
8.3.2 Villagers without urban skills 
For those with only farming skills, although there was no apparent enhancement of their 
skill-sets, the value generated by their assets increased after rural redevelopment due to the 
change of context. With the same set of farming skills and similar activities on the farm, by 
working as agricultural wage labour for the service driven eco-economy, the economic value 
generated by the same activities increased after rural redevelopment. Furthermore, after 
improvement of the social welfare system to meet the urban standards, villagers enjoyed 
the same level of social welfare as their urban counterparts. Although the rural development 
process did not involve a compensation package like that in Huaming town where some 
villagers become rich very quickly by gaining assets, villagers in Zhejiang did not become rich 
in new assets but kept their old assets of land in various new forms, including shares, 
reserved plots, and the ability to take bank loans based on their land.  
As mentioned above, villagers in Dongheng have newly acquired diversified income sources 
without increased living expenses. Villagers have income from the land transference 
programme where villagers let the land to the village committee and the village shares 
dividends to villagers from collectively organised productive activities. Mrs. Hu, a female 
villager in her 40s working in the village committee, who knew the resettlement programme 
well, explained that “After the land was transferred to the village, the village used the land 
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for aquaculture and the annual rental income for our household from the land amounted to 
100,000 yuan.” Mr. Jiang, a man in his 60s, now retired after farming for most of his life, 
commented similarly: “My household receives more than 10,000 yuan each year from the 
land transference programme.” Compared to before resettlement, the land rental income 
increased from 400 yuan per month per mu to 1300 yuan per month per mu. This is in 
contrast to Tianjin where the property rental income for a 45 square metre apartment is 300 
yuan a month.  
In comparison to Dongheng Village where the adjacent Luoshe Town already had many 
small enterprises and provided work opportunities for farmers both before and after 
resettlement, Wusi Village developed new rural labour markets, which created opportunities 
that matched the skill-sets of farmers. After the establishment of the land stock cooperative, 
villagers received land-leasing income of around 500 yuan/mu per year with an increase of 
10 yuan/mu per year. According to the interview with the head of the Wusi village 
committee, compared to the previous small-scale traditional agriculture, the income from 
every mu of land increased by 140 yuan per month where each household had 3 mu of land 
on average; at the same time, villagers were released from the land. Villagers were now free 
to move and work outside the village. 
For those who in their 50s with low levels of education, they were unlikely to find new work 
outside the village but had the opportunity to work in the new greenhouses as wage 
labourers for monthly incomes of 900-1,000 yuan. Work in the greenhouse varies from 
laying bricks (see image 8.2 below), to binding up and packing flowers. The tolerance of age 
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in employment in Wusi village is better than that in Huaming town, where most of the 
positions in the urban labour market in the Airport Economic Logistic Zone do not accept 
workers older than 40s. Overall, villagers’ average annual income tripled from 3860 yuan in 
2006 to 14,844 yuan in 2010 (Wusi village, 2010).  
Image 8.2 Local male villagers working in the greenhouse in Wusi village  
(Source: author’s own photograph) 
Seen from one perspective, then, Wusi successfully attracted investors from elsewhere who 
created new livelihood opportunities for the local villagers, for example working in the 
greenhouses. Seen from another perspective, however, outsiders came in and the locals 
now had to work for them, while the outsiders became rich. While this section discusses the 
response of the local villagers in Wusi village in terms of their employment choices, the 
social stratification section will focus on the implications of influx of the migrant 
entrepreneurs on local villagers’ self-perception, identity and the further effects on intra-
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village social stratification. Rural tourism businesses created agricultural wage opportunities 
where villagers could use their farming skills and work as waged labour. Nevertheless, in 
reality, very few Wusi local villagers chose to work as waged agricultural labour in the 
greenhouse for two reasons. First, they thought that working for a migrant was losing face; 
second, they reckoned that the non-local entrepreneurs were prosperous only because they 
were able to rent and run business on the village land. Seeing non-locals benefitting from 
their own land made the local villagers envious of others and unwilling to contribute to their 
success. The consequence was that some villagers refused the chance to work as agricultural 
wage labour in the greenhouses run by non-local entrepreneurs. For the small amount of 
villagers who work in greenhouses, most of them are in their 40s and 50s. While male 
workers do brick laying, female workers tie flowers up into bunches.  
For those who could not find work or were not willing to work as wage labour in the 
greenhouses, they spent their days playing Mah Jong. Similar to resettled villagers in Tianjin, 
villagers in Wusi Village complained about the hard work of waged labour and that the 
money was not worth the hard work. Compared to pre-resettlement where villagers worked 
for themselves, working for others on their own land challenged their perception of their 
identity. Although agricultural wage work requires a similar set of agricultural skills to 
independent farming, there are considerable differences regarding shifts, working times and 
work discipline. Similar to the non-agricultural wage workers in the Airport Economic 
Logistic Zone near Huaming town, waged farm work also requires workers to work according 
to a timetable where they take breaks in turn and need to fulfil their shifts. Compared to this 
rigid work schedule, while working on their own farmland farmers used to be able to work 
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to their own timetable and take breaks at will. Moreover, in terms of work discipline, waged 
farmworkers are required to follow a set of procedures and are assigned certain tasks. It is 
the above employment relationship, work schedule, shifts and labour discipline that affect 
farmers’ perceptions of themselves as wage workers rather than a rural farmer.  
In Qingyanliu village, most resettled unskilled villagers relied on rental income as the major 
income source. Compared to rental income in Tianjin where it could only be used as a 
complementary income but was not enough fully to cover monthly expenses, in Qingyanliu 
Village each household was resettled to half a building of apartments (normally 5 
apartments), so they could solely rely on the rental income to cover their living expenses. 
Nevertheless, villagers in Qingyanliu Village were resettled to the new apartments mostly 
with their own savings, with very limited subsidy from the state, which meant that they had 
to pay back loans. The need to pay off loans pushed villagers to look for work in the labour 
market or to set up their own businesses. Some computer-literate and business-savvy 
villagers set up e-commerce business and succeeded, becoming wealthy enough to afford to 
move out of the resettlement community. As in Huaming, most of these successful villagers 
chose to rent out the whole resettlement apartment and buy a villa somewhere else with a 
more pleasant environment to live, and to live in the same area with people who possess a 
similar amount of wealth. 
8.3.3 Business owners and entrepreneurs 
Compared to Tianjin where most of the business owners lost their businesses without 
compensation, business owners in Zhejiang were able to expand their businesses after the 
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rural redevelopment projects, which can be attributed to the village committees’ efforts in 
reforming the property rights.  
In Dongheng village, for those who had worked in the quarrying business, particularly the 
mine owners, their business was bankrupted due to the exhaustion of resources in 2009 
before resettlement, and villagers who used to work in the industry had to find alternative 
employment. Although quarrying was a major industry in the village, mine owners who were 
struck most by the closure of the mines were the minority of big bosses who could explore 
other mines in other places, while most of the medium-sized mine owners chose to quit the 
business and look for work in other industries. Most of those who worked on the mines 
could find waged work in other industries after resettlement. As Mr. Hu commented: “After 
the closure of the mine, my son, nephew and their friends went to Hangzhou to do other 
businesses.” Resettlement provided work opportunities for them where they could use the 
capital they accumulated from their quarrying business or mortgage their housing and take 
loans from the agricultural bank. After the closure of mines, Mr. Dai used the accumulated 
capital from the quarrying business to purchase a wine making factory in the village. After 
three years, the factory was running well, and spent more than 6 million yuan on machinery 
upgrading in 2014. However, others expressed concerns about the risk and hardship of 
starting a new business, and chose not to risk their capital. 
Villagers with special skills, for example sericulture, borrowed loans from the village and 
start their own business. Mr. Lu used his housing as a mortgage and borrowed 300,000 yuan 
loan from the bank to expand his aquaculture business. Mr. Lu had years of experience in 
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aquaculture and he had a small pool for aquaculture business. After being able to borrow 
loans from the bank, Mr. Lu expanded the business and the business benefits from the 
economics of scale.  
In Wusi village, two types of work opportunities were created: entrepreneurship 
opportunities of starting and running a new business, and work as agricultural wage labour – 
the latter of which, as explained above, was unpopular with villagers. Because villagers’ 
farmland was expropriated and collectively managed by the village committee, it became 
available for renting, and in theory, anyone could rent a plot of land from the village 
committee and start or expand their business. In reality, though, the opportunity was not 
open for every villager because capital was required for land renting and knowledge for 
managing a business as well as technical skills, for example in botany. As Mr. Wang, a 
villager in his 50s who had spent his lifetime farming in Wusi village, complained about the 
situation: “Both locals and non-locals could rent the land to run a greenhouse, but it is the 
rich non-locals who really rent the land and run the businesses” (Interview WS003).  
Most of the businesses run on the rented land were greenhouses. The village committee 
discovered that the demand for flowers and seedlings in Zhejiang Province was high and 
there was a huge gap on the supply side. Much of the demand was met by importing from 
other provinces, particularly cut flowers, which enjoys high popularity in domestic 
households. Although Kunming in Yunnan Province is a major cut flower supplier, the cost of 
transportation limited the market it could cover, creating a gap for cut flowers from Wusi. 
The business model had two parts: one was the flower wholesale business, where flowers 
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including roses, orchids and others were exported to other provinces domestically or even 
internationally. The other part of the model was rural tourism, where the greenhouse itself 
attracted tourists for the display of flowers and group activities. The former business model 
lies in the agricultural industry, while the latter belongs to the service industry. As outlined 
in the above paragraph, ordinary villagers usually did not have the required capital to rent 
land, nor did they have the expertise and skills to run and manage a business in the service 
industry. Instead, the opportunity benefitted already-existing business owners who could 
expand their businesses.  
Most of the new business owners in Wusi village were from other provinces. They either had 
experience running their own businesses before in Wusi village or had work experience in 
the urban service sector. This suggests that they had the essential experience, skills and 
expertise running their entrepreneurial businesses, apart from being able to afford to take 
risks. The influx of migrants, both of entrepreneurs and labourers, created increasing 
amounts of social tension in Wusi, making the local villagers more aware of their village 
membership and the distinction between locals and non-locals. The tension became 
particularly acute when the local villagers realised that not all the migrants were poor, and 
some of them, like the entrepreneurs, were doing far better than the local villagers. When 
the non-villager entrepreneurs hired agricultural wage labour from the village, villagers 
became even more sensitive about their identity. There are two actions that local villagers 
took as response. First, they reinforced the local village network by aligning with people who 
they knew; second, building on the first reaction, villagers included entrepreneurs in their 
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network only when they were introduced by a familiar villager. As one entrepreneur who is 
from the same county but a different village, running an orchid greenhouse, said,  
“Local Wusi villagers think we are non-local (waidi ren外地人), but we are from the same 
County, just not this village. They see us like outsiders; it’s very curious. If no one they know 
introduces you to them, or if they have never heard of you, they would think you are from 
other places. I can adapt to anything. No business is possible if you do not network with 
locals.” (Interview WS002)” 
In Qingyanliu village, unfortunately, nine out ten villagers did not become rich with the 
growing of the e-commerce business. The mismatch between villagers’ skill-sets and the 
labour market left three options to the villagers. One was to learn computing and upgrade 
their skills to join the new labour market. In reality, however, very few villagers could 
actually learn computer skills. Attending the e-commerce training programme required that 
villagers already know the basics of how to use computers, or at least how to spell, but many 
resettled farmers in Qingyanliu village were illiterate. The other choice was to find 
unskilled/semi-skilled work in the community or restaurants which had opened to cater for 
the incoming tenants nearby. The third option, which left the villagers in a vulnerable state, 
was to rely solely on the rental income from their resettlement housing, in which case 
villagers’ income was tied to with the ups and downs of the e-commerce industry. Whether 
it is possible for villagers to maintain a sustainable livelihood is still in question, particularly 
considering the fast-changing and competitive nature of the industry since the e-commerce 
market is reaching maturity. When it came to the housing market in Qingyanliu Village, it 
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meant a high turnover rate of tenants because most businesses could not be sustained for 
more than half a year. In the more rural-centric approach, the agriculture-based businesses 
provide the possibility of wage work for farmers with their existing skill-set (even if they are 
not always willing to take up such work), and provide entrepreneurial opportunities for the 
current and potential business owners. Additionally, it sets free non-agricultural villagers 
from the land, brings them additional income and strengthens their village membership and 
rural identity. 
The Dongheng and Wusi cases in this research show that, securing the individual land use 
rights through institutional innovation could also remove the barriers for farmers to 
participate in off-farm activities in rural areas, releasing the potential of untapped rural land 
assets by creating liquidity, which leads to increased entrepreneurial activities and the 
growth of the local economy in Dongheng and Wusi village. 
Compared to Tianjin, there appears to be enhanced rural economic performance as well as 
increased entrepreneurial activities in Zhejiang. In Wusi village there is the emergence of 
rural tourism, and in Dongheng village we see villagers with skills and management 
experience expanding their fish cultivation businesses, wine making factory and wood 
manufacturing factories. In contrast, although the scale and technology involved in the 
businesses in Tianjin are much more advanced than that in Zhejiang, it is however more 
common for small businesses owners there to lose their businesses due to land 
expropriation. New entrepreneurial businesses set up by the resettled villagers in Tianjin 
mostly aim to meet the demands of urban consumption, rather than the previous rural 
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based consumption, including property agents and convenience stores. Although they draw 
on the same customer base, i.e. the resettled villagers, demand has shifted to urban-based 
consumption. For examples, farmers spend more on decorating their new apartments like 
an urban apartment and purchasing electronic devices, like TVs, washing machines, and 
furniture, like sofa. The change in demand requires the enterprise owners to adjust their 
business models to meet the new tastes in Tianjin. Even though some business owners were 
brave enough to pick up the challenge, they face fierce competition from already-existing 
businesses within Tianjin city and have to find a niche to survive and thrive.   
One constraint for rural tourism development is its requirement for investments from the 
government. Usually, it is difficult for the businesses to raise funds via bank loans because of 
the small size of rural tourism enterprises; at the same time, those loans are critical in terms 
of business expansion and reaching economies of scale. In Wusi village, with the village 
committee presenting itself as the representative of the collective land, it built up 
partnership with the agriculture credit banks and made it possible for businesses to borrow 
small amount of bank loans. On one hand, this creates more entrepreneurial opportunities 
for the resettled villagers; on the other hand, the land shareholding system ensures the 
income of farmers with no urban skill-sets.  
In conclusion, it seems that the Tianjin case benefits those few who were already better off. 
Those who can fit into the urban labour market and can take economic risks are the well-
connected and those with urban experience and urban skill-sets. As a result, the best off do 
better in Tianjin than they would have in Zhejiang. But the worse off, who are less able to 
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adapt to change/cope with shocks, are mostly much better off in Zhejiang compared to 
Tianjin. 
 
8.4 Challenges and struggles 
8.4.1 Qingyanliu village – burden of debts 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, it was theoretically possible for villagers in Qingyanliu Village to 
pay off the debt incurred through purchasing resettlement accommodation in three years if 
villagers saved up their rental income. In reality, only a handful of villagers managed to save 
their rental income as much as possible, paying off debts from 2005 to 2008. However, 
during the fieldwork, villagers’ comments reflected that only a part of the villagers have the 
self-discipline and investment knowledge to do this. Others spent their rental income in 
gambling or on important uses like education of their children and healthcare, and were still 
trapped in debt during my interviews in 2014. Although the Qingyanliu property market was 
re-boosted by the e-commerce sector development in 2007, the reliance on the rental 
income for livelihoods tied villagers to the performance of the local industry, which 
constituted a livelihood risk.  
Compared to Huaming town where resettled farmers were stuck in the resettlement 
community and white collar urban workers could usually have the initial capital to make 
investment in Tianjin city and move out, it is similar in Qingyanliu village. In the latter, some 
villagers set up Taobao businesses, among which a few succeeded in the businesses and 
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made a fortune enabling them to invest in apartments outside of Qingyanliu village as well 
as outside of Yiwu city. Those who succeeded in Taobao were usually the earliest 
entrepreneurs who set up Taobao business. It became increasingly difficult for the late 
entrants to be profitable from the business due to the increased competition level and 
stabilisation of the e-commerce market. As in Pareto principle, at certain stage, the market 
typically evolves into a situation where 80% of the market share and profits are taken by the 
20% of the players in the market (Juran & Riley, 1999). When the market matures, it 
becomes very difficult and risky for small players to survive, let alone make their fortune 
from it.  
Comparing Huaming town in Tianjin and Qingyanliu village in Zhejiang, in both villages, the 
majority of resettled villagers tended to be stuck in the resettlement community due to the 
lack of capital to invest in apartments elsewhere or because they could not afford a period 
with no rental income coming in. The difference is that in Huaming, those who were able to 
source additional income to afford apartments outside the resettlement community were 
often people who worked in the urban area, who had urban working experience and 
education credentials before resettlement. It was their skills, knowledge and experience in 
the urban sector that differentiated them from the rest. Those who suffered from the 
process were exactly the opposite, particularly those who had spent almost all their life in 
farming without any urban work experience, or the essential skill-sets and knowledge to join 
the urban labour market. In contrast, in Qingyanliu village, those who benefitted from the 
resettlement process were an entirely different group. They were the entrepreneurs who 
caught the business opportunity of trading on the e-commerce platform, setting up their 
 327 
online business at a very early stage, picking the right products and using the profitable 
marketing strategy.   
In both cases, Huaming town and Qingyanliu village, although the skill-sets, work experience 
and background required for the winners are different, what the outcomes have in common 
is the population group that is excluded from the process. In both villages, farmers who 
farmed throughout their lives, without skills of capturing market trends or participating in 
business development, would not have an opportunity to become either of the two 
successful groups.  
 
8.5 Strengthened village membership and the villager identity  
When it comes to the difference between urban and rural areas, the economic gap and 
perception gap were both reduced in the three rural villages in Zhejiang province. Some 
villagers even believed that their economic condition was better than that of their urban 
counterparts after the rural redevelopment programme, and they had a choice in terms of 
the place they live and their identity. Villagers in the fieldwork sites in Zhejiang tended to 
prefer their rural identity. In the three villages, the superior status of the countryside was 
reflected from different perspectives.  
In Dongheng and Wusi villages, very few villagers moved out of the village after 
resettlement, even those who expanded or started their own businesses. There are two 
facets of village membership and identity; on one hand, village membership concerns the 
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material benefits that are attached to it; on the other hand, village membership is also 
closely related to villagers’ self-perception and identity. Before discussing the financial and 
psychological implications of village membership, this section first examines access to village 
membership.   
The current village membership is an extension of an individual’s previous hukou status after 
the rural and urban hukou statuses were replaced by the Zhejiang universal residence status 
in 2014. In the case of Dongheng village, villagers qualified for village membership if the 
registration address on their previous hukou was in the village and they had not transferred 
it to an urban hukou. Villagers would lose their membership if they moved out or 
transferring to urban hukou. The new village membership was issued by birth to children 
born in the village, while the village did not accept the transference of hukou, either from 
non-village residents or from previous village residents who had already transferred their 
hukou out of the village. 
The village membership system in Dongheng village is similar to the previous hukou system, 
where the privileges and benefits are restricted to a certain group of the population. The 
strict village membership scheme was designed by the village committee to ensure that only 
villagers in Dongheng were fully entitled to the financial benefits generated from the 
collectively owned village assets. In the case of Dongheng village, the three most important 
benefits of holding village membership included: first, the dividends generated from the 
collectively owned village assets; second, cash payback from the land shareholding 
programme; third, village membership qualified the villager to purchase housing in the 
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village, which is unavailable to non-village residents. Given the combination of the 
restrictions on qualifying for the village membership and long-term financial benefits 
generated by the village membership status, most of the villagers chose not to give up their 
village membership even if they could financially afford to move out of the village.  
Other reasons varied according to the background of the villagers, but the two typical 
reasons given by villagers concerned their activities in the village and the more choices they 
had if they kept the village membership. For villagers who owned their own businesses, they 
rarely moved out of the village even if they could afford it. Because the built environment 
remained rural-based, entrepreneurial activities were usually based in the agriculture sector, 
either in the form of value-added agriculture, like fish farming, or the service industry, like 
rural tourism. For villagers who did not run businesses in the village, they benefitted from 
more choices of property ownership either in the village or in the urban towns and the land 
shareholding programme by keeping their village membership, and most of them were 
proud of being a part of the village. 
Most of the villagers in Dongheng expressed contentment with rural life and their rural 
identity. Mrs Chen, a woman in her 40s, living in the newly built resettlement housing and 
working in a factory in Luoshe town while her husband ran a business, said:  
“I have an apartment in Luoshe town and just bought this apartment as well. I live in my 
apartment in Luoshe during the week days and spend the weekend in Dongheng village. The 
air is fresh here, the house is bigger and I can plant vegetables in my own garden here and 
cook organic food for myself – very relaxing. I kept my village membership because I could 
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always buy an apartment in Luoshe town or Deqing county with my village hukou, but I could 
not own an apartment in the village if I change it to urban hukou.” (Interview DH018) 
The above quotation shows that Mrs Chen was content with rural life, or even preferred 
rural life to urban life because of the closeness to nature, the space for gardening and the 
peaceful mindset in the countryside. Mrs Chen had the villager identity but had urban 
employment. Materially speaking, she had more choices in terms of property ownership and 
a place to live by keeping the village membership. Also, as shown in the previous sections of 
this chapter, as the distribution of dividends from the village collectively owned asset was 
based on the village membership, villagers received more financial rewards by keeping their 
village membership. From the conversation with Mrs Chen, there was no sign of concerns of 
low rural suzhi or the perceptions from urban people of rural people as backward. The 
decision to stay or leave Dongheng village was more driven by practical concerns over living 
conditions. Mrs Chen further suggested that she was not the only one behaving in this way, 
since friends in her circle also tended to keep their village membership. She also suggested 
that most of the residents in the detached houses, unlike the tall buildings, had another 
apartment either in Luoshe town or in Deqing county.  
In Qingyanliu village, the livelihoods of both of ordinary villagers and entrepreneurs were 
improved after the rural development programme. The enhanced economic condition of 
villagers in the resettlement community also had an impact on their self-perception, 
considering both the administrative boundary of the new resettlement community and their 
economic condition compared to urban residents. On one hand, living in the now urbanised 
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area made villagers perceive themselves as urban people. As one villager in her 40s reflected 
during the interview, “We used to be rural people, but now could be accounted urban 
people as we live in an urban area.” (Interview YW009). On the other hand, for ordinary 
villagers, the economic conditions were enhanced after resettlement due to the gain of 
urban apartments, which significantly increased their rental income. Compared with urban 
residents, especially the ones who live across the street, villagers believed that their 
economic condition was better than that of their urban counterparts.  
“Urban people have a much harder time than former rural people. After the equality of job 
opportunities, there is no difference between rural and urban after the reconstruction of the 
rural community, at least in Yiwu area. Because you cannot arrange work for urban residents 
anymore and they do not have apartments to rent out.” (Interview YW011) 
For the successful entrepreneurs, in contrast to Dongheng village but similar to Tianjin’s 
Huaming town, in Qingyanliu village the resettled villagers who succeeded in the e-
commerce business tended to move out of the resettlement community. Their neighbours 
claimed that they were moving on to live in luxury houses somewhere else. As resettled 
farmers left in the community were those who relied on rental income, they let apartments 
to e-commerce owners, which brought service businesses like restaurants and logistic 
services. Therefore, unlike in Huaming town, the resettlement community developed an 
effective combination of local formal and informal economy. This did not happen in 
Huaming, because the formal planning of the Airport Logistic Area where the functions of 
the zone had been planned at the provincial level, aimed to introduce airport industry-
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related companies where most of the companies are either state-owned or foreign owned 
with high level of market capitalisation. The formal layout of the area and the special 
function of the zone encouraged the development of international manufacturing or 
services businesses rather than small businesses that served the local residents.  
The impact of this for those who live in the resettlement community in Qingyanliu village is 
that, first, they can find work in the local informal economy; second, they could use the 
services provided for the e-commerce businesses themselves, for example eating in the 
restaurants. Comparing with the lifestyles of those in Tianjin, the resettled farmers in 
Qingyanliu village are incorporated into the local economy more thoroughly, including work 
and leisure activities, apart from their residential address. This has further impacts on 
identity where the urban lifestyle makes the resettled villagers in Qingyanliu village identify 
themselves as urban people more easily, while those in Tianjin expressed more confusion in 
in terms of their identity.  
8.5.1 The village identity and the outsiders 
In Wusi, because of the seasonal nature of greenhouse work as well as the unwillingness of 
local villagers to take the work, the greenhouse businesses owners hired migrants, and they 
expressed the difficulties in hiring enough workers during the busy times. Therefore, this 
created a unique phenomenon in the Wusi labour market of unfilled agricultural wage work; 
at the same time, villagers complained that they could not find a job because foreigners took 
their land. In this situation, although the non-local entrepreneurs would prefer to hire local 
villagers, when the posts were unfilled, they imported labour from other adjacent villages. 
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The cost of non-local farmers is higher because the entrepreneurs need to provide them 
with accommodation and food as well as wages. These actions further introduced more non-
locals into the village, with a mixture of high-end and low-end skill sets. The business owner 
who ran an orchid greenhouse said:  
“I hire local villagers (as agricultural wage labour). Local villagers are cheaper than migrants. 
There are many women, but we need male labourers. For Wusi village, 60-70% are working 
in this agricultural park. Young people all go outside. The population is small here, and there 
is a lack of labour.” (Interview WS002) 
This quotation implies that there is a labour division based on gender in the village where 
male farmers usually do bricks laying work and female farmers do tying flowers; moreover, 
the quote suggests that local women are more likely than local men to take up the work. 
From the perspective of the entrepreneurs, it is a matter of challenge to fit in the village and 
cope with the local villagers. Another business owner from another part of Deqing County 
explained that he was still seen as non-local by the Wusi villagers, but expressed 
determination to overcome his outsider status, since business would be much more difficult 
if he failed to network with the locals (Interview WS002). 
This shows the importance of social capital and networks in the village. Compared to 
Huaming town, the boundary of Wusi village was not broken by redevelopment. On one 
hand, similar to Dongheng village, this strengthened the village membership and villagers’ 
self-perception as a rural person and a membership of the village; however, on the other 
hand, it also created barriers for non-locals to mix and fit into the village. This was not a big 
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issue in Dongheng village, because the rural development project was not attached to a new 
labour market drawing a great number of migrants. But in Wusi this increased the level of 
social tension, because most business owners on the rented land and agricultural wage 
labourers are not local villagers. As the above example suggests, even when the non-local 
was from the same county as Wusi village, the strong social network in Wusi still rejected 
the person until the person took actions and actively made connections with the locals. In 
terms of villager identity, by contrasting with the new non-locals, Wusi villagers feel their 
identity and social networks strengthened. At the same time, barriers to entry the village 
and the village network increased for outsiders.  
Unlike Huaming town, in Dongheng village and Wusi village, the new required skills to make 
a living in the resettlement community were not urban-oriented. They were still based in the 
agricultural sector, and were typically not much different from the previous ones. While the 
required skills were still agricultural-based, the new built environment and the enterprises 
create opportunities for farmers to participate with their existing skill-sets, particularly for 
those who do not have urban-related work experience. On the other hand, for villagers who 
had the experience and ambition to start their own businesses, resettlement opened 
opportunities for them to expand their businesses as well. Therefore, in Dongheng village 
and Wusi village, villagers can be grouped into people who expanded their own businesses 
and people who worked for others. In Qingyanliu village, villagers can be grouped into those 
who setup their own e-commerce businesses successfully, and those who lived on rental 
income.  
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8.6 Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter has examined the livelihood implications for villagers under the 
NRR approach to state-led urbanisation with the IRR framework and livelihoods framework 
in three villages of Zhejiang province, Dongheng village, Wusi village and Qingyanliu village. 
It shows that the rural development process has different effects on different population 
groups. In Dongheng village and Wusi village, under the NRR model, farmer’s land rights are 
proportionally redistributed based on individuals’ village membership. Entrepreneurs and 
unskilled farmers benefit from the access to the new forms of assets. When it comes to 
human capital, Wusi village creates more entrepreneurial opportunities and wage work 
opportunities for villagers. Nevertheless, most of the villagers are unable to act on these 
opportunities due to their lack of business operation knowledge, experience and capital, and 
their unwillingness to engage in wage labour for others on their land.  
Neither Wusi nor Dongheng village particularly benefits the urban white collar group, which 
by contrast benefits the most in Huaming town in Tianjin. Qingyanliu village is rather more 
similar to Huaming town, operating under the NSC approach. Similar to Wusi village, in 
Qingyanliu village, although there are abundant opportunities for entrepreneurs, most of 
the villagers cannot act on these opportunities. Compared to Huaming town in Tianjin, the 
village membership is strengthened in two of the villages in Zhejiang through the 
redistribution of village assets and collective land through the land shareholding 
programme. Villagers also become more proud of their rural identity.  
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In terms of social capital and social stratification, the village membership in both of 
Dongheng and Wusi villages is strengthened, while the influx of migrants to Wusi village 
drives local villagers to be more sensitive about their identity and attempt to distinguish 
themselves from the outsiders. Nevertheless, the re-enforced rural and village identity also 
creates barrier for the outsiders to settle down in the village. Overall, the comparison 
suggests that the best off, in terms of education, connections and existing urban-type 
employment, do better in Tianjin. However, the worse off, which is the largest part of the 












Chapter 9 Discussion and conclusion 
9.1 Main findings and arguments  
This thesis has attempted to answer the question of how the livelihoods of resettled farmers 
are affected by the two different approaches to state-led urbanisation process. The evidence 
from Tianjin and Zhejiang supports the widely held view that, in many countries and 
particularly in China, the state plays a critical role in shaping the livelihoods of the displaced 
population. Nevertheless, the relationship between state intervention and livelihoods 
implications on the displaced population is unclear where the focus of the debate is the 
modes of state intervention, whether NSC or NRR approach is better. This thesis has 
approached to this important question with a livelihood perspective. 
The main argument of this thesis is that the village committee and the organisation of the 
local states that play a critical role in shaping the livelihoods of the resettled farmers, 
reducing livelihood risks, stress and shock, and creating resources, space and opportunities 
for sustainable livelihoods. The mode of state intervention matters; when it fits the local 
context, at individual level, not only does it create conditions for the better-off to benefit 
from development, but also for the worse-off and more vulnerable groups to benefit as well. 
At community level, this also reduces the intra-village wealth gap and intra-village conflicts. 
This research finds that the NRR approach to state intervention is more flexible in planning, 
adjusting and adapting to the context of individual villages in the context of village transition 
and rural development than the dominant NSC approach. The main reason for the success of 
the NRR approach is that, as a result of the organisation of local states, the village 
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committee plays an important role in designing and implementing the policies. This is in 
comparison to the NSC model where the village committees for each village were replaced 
by the urban neighbourhood committee, which oversees all the previous villages in the 
resettlement community. The vacuum of governance body at individual village level during 
the transition period led to loss of collective assets and deterioration in the livelihoods of 
certain groups of villagers, especially the vulnerable populations.  
The first part of this section summarises key findings on the livelihoods of social groups in 
Tianjin and Zhejiang respectively; then it compares the same social groups across Tianjin and 
Zhejiang to reveal the role of the village committee and the organisation of the local states 
in eliminating livelihood risks and creating sustainable livelihoods; the last part of the section 
goes beyond the implications of transition of tangible assets, discussing transformation of 
rural identity under the two modes of development approaches.  
9.1.1 Tianjin - Huaming town 
In Huaming town, Tianjin municipality, where farmers were resettled to the urban 
resettlement community under the NSC approach, the state-led urbanisation process has 
various implications for different groups. There are three distinct groups in Huaming town: 
those with urban skills, those without urban skills, and business owners. Urban skills in the 
case of Huaming town are those that could be gained through higher education and related 
work experience, including computer skills, report-writing skills, communication skills, 
interpersonal skills and the ability to work in an office. This section summarises the 
livelihoods of these different groups after resettlement by focusing on the livelihood risks, 
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stresses and shocks they suffer, as well as their possession of resources for the maintenance 
of sustainable livelihoods.  
As Chapter 2 discussed, one major theoretical framework for understanding DIDR is Cernea’s 
“Impoverishment, Risks and Reconstruction” (IRR) model. The impact of DIDR on uprooted 
people’s livelihoods is threefold: economic, social and psychological. More specifically, 
according to the IRR model, eight risks threaten the livelihoods of displaced people: 1. 
Landlessness. 2. Joblessness. 3. Homelessness. 4. Marginalization. 5. Increased morbidity 
and mortality. 6. Food insecurity. 7. Loss of access to common property. 8. Social 
(community) disarticulation (Cernea, 2007, p1572). Support for the displaced population’s 
livelihood restoration is typically composed of three parts: compensation for resettlement 
and lost assets; assistance during the transition period to the resettlement site; and shared 
benefits of the additional economy created by the more efficient use of rural resources 
(Cernea, 1993). Given the risks and consequences, Cernea (2007) argues that effective 
measures to minimise or avoid damage include the setting up of national safety nets, 
supported by substantial national financial investment, in the form of compensation from 
multiple channels apart from cash compensation. Project planning from the start of the 
project with the aim of mitigating adverse effect is also key. The restoration of livelihoods 
concerns not only how access to common property resources is lost, but also how access to 
new resources is created. Having recapped the relevant literature on livelihood risks, stress 
and shock, the rest of the section will summarise the empirical findings using these 
frameworks. 
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9.1.1.2 People with urban skill-sets 
For this socio-economically stronger group, low levels of livelihood risk, shock and stress are 
created during the resettlement process. This group, accounting for around 30 per cent of 
the population in Huaming town, includes those who are in their 20s to 40s, with higher 
levels of education and urban-related work experience before resettlement. The transition 
period may create disruption to their daily routine, but this disappears when they settle 
down in the new community.  
They benefit overall from the process in four ways: through gain of rental income, high wage 
income, urban networks, and the improved living environment. With regard to the gain in 
rental income, in addition to the average gain of two apartments, people in this group 
understand the policies of resettlement and how to maximise their personal gains while not 
violating the law (in particular, those who work for the Huaming government and banks in 
Tianjin city centre do well from resettlement compensation). Second, in terms of the high 
wage income, their skill set fits in the new labour market created in the urban setting of the 
Airport Economic Development Zone; at the same time, they benefit from the closeness of 
the resettlement community to the urban labour market as well as the urban city centre. 
Third, they benefit from the urban networks and connections in two ways. Their urban 
networks provide this group with the information and connections to take advantage in the 
redistribution process of resettlement apartments. They also open up new work and 
entrepreneurial opportunities, providing this group with better access to urban resources, 
opportunities and information. The urban network is still helpful when villagers do not have 
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urban skill sets; for example, in the case of the taxi-driver-turned-property-agent in Huaming 
town who built her business based on advice from her previous clients. Fourth, while gaining 
at least the average of two apartments, this group does not rely on the rental income to 
support their living expenses. They are white collar professionals, whose salary is sufficient 
to cover living costs. Therefore, they are able to rent out most of the resettlement 
apartments, or buy commercial housing in Tianjin city.  
9.1.1.3 People without urban skill-sets  
In contrast to the group with urban skills, the livelihoods of those with no off-farm 
experience are worse in Huaming town after resettlement. This group includes farmers 
without urban skill-sets or work experience (especially those in their 40s-50s), those who are 
not well connected, and many women, accounting for around 65% of the residents in 
Huaming town. Compared to the urban-skilled group, this group tends to receive less rental 
income; at the same time, their urban living expenses are higher than in the rural area.  
This group, which was already socio-economically weaker, suffered from significant 
livelihood risk, shock and stress. Furthermore, the post-resettlement livelihood of this group 
is also affected by the form of the new labour market and land related policy. Compared to 
the urban-skilled group with good networks and connections, there are two types of people 
in the unskilled group. One has village-level connections, such as to the village committee, 
and was often able to take advantage of the resettlement process; the other group includes 
people who have neither urban connections nor village connections. The most they could 
obtain is two apartments, and some of them only received one. During the transition period, 
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they needed to rent apartments in the resettlement community. Although the expense was 
covered by the local state, this interrupted their daily life routines, creating shock and stress, 
and requiring adaptation. Households with more family members who occupy all/both the 
resettlement apartments they obtained do not have spare rooms to rent out to generate 
rental income. Therefore, the group that needs the rental income the most is often unable 
to obtain it.  
Compared to the urban skilled group, this group also suffered from lower levels of wage 
income, because there are no farming opportunities in the new urban labour market, and 
the loss of their household plots also reduced the opportunity to take domestic production 
work. Compared to the urban skilled group, whose skills and work experience are in high 
demand in the Airport Economic Development Zone after resettlement, unskilled labourers 
are also required to work in manufacturing or as cleaners and security guards. However, this 
low end of the work spectrum is regarded by the locals as a type of work only for migrants, 
and taking up the work involves a loss of “face”. Furthermore, many stated that they did not 
reckon the low salary worth the effort. Without the cash flow generated from multiple 
income sources, most of this group therefore relies solely on rental income to cover their 
living expenses. The reliance on rental income ties them into the resettlement community, 
and they lack additional savings and cash liquidity to invest in commercial housing and move 
out from the resettlement community.  
Without the additional income of the urban skilled group, it is already difficult for this group 
to make a living after resettlement where the loss of the rural setting, farmland and plots 
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has a further impact on those with no off-farm experience in their 40s-50s and particularly 
women. These two groups used to combine farm work and informal domestic work. Losing 
the rural setting not only causes them to lose their income stream, but also the physical 
space for domestic production and reduction of expenses. Although these two groups are 
freed from the farmland, they typically fall into a dilemma of not fitting in the urban labour 
market while there is nowhere to farm either. Where this group used to use the farmland or 
the household plot to generate food self-sufficiently for the household, the transition of 
living environment from rural to urban, which requires a neat and organised community 
layout, eliminates any space for this group to reduce their living expenses. At the same time, 
living in the urban area, they face new payments for water, gas, heating and community 
maintenance fees, which did not exist in the rural setting. These changes have a much lower 
impact on the urban skilled group, as they did not rely on the farmland for food, nor was it 
an income source.  
9.1.1.4 Business owners and entrepreneurs  
The transition of the community setting from rural to urban had an even greater negative 
impact on the livelihoods of business owners and entrepreneurs in Huaming town. Those 
who ran their businesses and factories based on farmland, around 5% of the Huaming 
population, were compensated for the loss of the land they occupied. However, they were 
not compensated for the loss of their factories and businesses built upon the land. The 
suspension of business and the need to relocate caused some entrepreneurs to abandon 
their businesses. Restarting businesses in the new urban setting involves many uncertain 
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factors, including space, rent and the suitability of the business type. Those who failed to 
start over in the new urban setting, were forced to look for waged work. While used to 
hiring people to work for them, these businesses owners reflected in the interviews that the 
need to start working for others was a big shock. Moreover, the previous business owners 
also reported deteriorating living standards, and had to adapt to a more prudent way of 
living. This generates livelihood risk and long term stress for the business owner group.  
On the other hand, not all entrepreneurs suffered from the transition of the community 
setting. Some identified opportunities in the post-resettlement community and started new 
businesses, such as the real estate agent who set up an agency after resettlement and found 
herself now in a booming rental housing market. However, not all former farmers were 
positioned to identify and take advantage of businesses opportunities in the new living 
environment. The new entrepreneurs were those who had a certain level of urban work 
experience, urban connections, or knowledge, and as such overlapped to some extent with 
the “urban-skilled” group identified above. For example, the property agent used to 
combine farming with taxi driving before resettlement, and had built up a network with 
lawyers and accountants who worked in Tianjin city in that work. Her clients gave her advice 
during the process and also helped set up her new business. Farmers who spent their whole 
lives farming did not have the network, capital, or the know-how to reinvent themselves as 
entrepreneurs.  
9.1.2 Zhejiang – Dongheng village, Wusi village, Qingyanliu village 
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Unlike Huaming town, where the urban skilled workers benefited the most from the 
resettlement process, this group did not particularly gain or lose from the rural development 
process in the three villages in Zhejiang. The urban skilled group is around 10% of the 
population in Dongheng village, 10% in Wusi village and 15% in Qingyanliu village. The main 
reason for this stability is the location of the three villages in Zhejiang. Dongheng village and 
Wusi village were less connected to industrial development centres, and there was no 
advanced manufacturing development. Therefore the skills that were in demand in Tianjin 
were not so much so in Zhejiang. Although Qingyanliu village is located in the suburban area 
of Yiwu city, the pillar industry in Yiwu is small commodities trade, which does not require 
construction of offices or factories; therefore, the urban skilled workers did not benefit from 
the state-led development as much as the same group in Huaming town.  
9.1.2.2 People without urban skill-sets  
A group that benefitted from the NRR approach in Zhejiang was those who were left most 
vulnerable in Huaming, including those with no off-farm experience, particularly those in 
their 40s-50s, women and the elderly. This is the majority group in Zhejiang, amounting to 
around 70% of the population in Dongheng village, 80% in Wusi village and 70% in 
Qingyanliu village.  
The livelihoods of this group were enhanced in villages in Zhejiang for the following four 
reasons. First, in Dongheng village and Wusi village, the land shareholding programme 
untied those with no off-farm experience from direct physical participation in agricultural 
productive activities on farmland. Instead, they could participate in other productive or 
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entertainment activities while still receiving dividends from the land shareholding 
programme. Furthermore, large-scale farming and the upgrade from agricultural to service 
sectors on the expropriated land usually increased the farmland’s productivity, which, 
because of the land shareholding programme, meant that this group of villagers received 
more financial benefits than working on the land by themselves. Second, this group of 
farmers in Dongheng village and Wusi village also benefited from the concentrated plot of 
farm land that was reserved by the village committee in their village development plan,, and 
perceived the proportional redistribution of assets as fair.  
Third, the reservation of the individual village boundary and the rural setting provided this 
group a choice in terms of resettlement; importantly, they could keep doing the domestic 
production work they did before resettlement. Fourth, the development of rural based 
business opportunities, for example eco-tourism in Wusi village and e-commerce in 
Qingyanliu village, also benefitted this group. In Wusi village, some of this group worked 
together with the urban skilled entrepreneurs in the rural tourism businesses (nongjiale 农
家乐), or worked as agricultural waged workers. In Qingyanliu village, this group worked 
with the e-commerce business owners and provided accommodation and logistic related 
services. Thus, they gained from the synergy between rural based businesses and the 
informal economy, including family workshops and domestic work.  
However, not all those without off-farm experience were better off in Zhejiang. In 
Qingyanliu village, many farmers had to fund their own apartments in the resettlement 
community. Similar to Huaming town, villagers were forced to move to the resettlement 
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community and relied on rental income from the resettlement apartments to cover living 
expenses. As villagers relied on themselves to find tenants, this increased the level of stress 
and livelihood risks in both cases. In comparison, in Dongheng village and Wusi village, the 
village committee recruited tenants for the land on behalf of the villagers and redistributed 
the collective asset income to villagers directly, which reduced the level of livelihood risk for 
individual villagers and households. Furthermore, if villagers in Qingyanliu did not have other 
income streams, the lack of cash liquidity left them stuck in the resettlement community, a 
livelihood situation similar to that of those with no off-farm experience in Huaming town. In 
contrast, in Dongheng village and Wusi village, very few villagers were forced to find new 
income streams after resettlement and very few were in debt after the rural redevelopment 
programme. This is because the village committees gave most farmers a choice of whether 
to resettle, and tailored the resettlement plan to minimise the number of people affected.  
This aimed to make sure that resettlement improved the livelihoods of farmers, and to 
attract them, rather than force them, to move.  
9.1.2.3 Business owners and entrepreneurs  
In sharp contrast to Tianjin, where business owners were a vulnerable group, business 
owners and entrepreneurs in the three villages in Zhejiang benefited from the rural 
redevelopment programme in a variety of ways. The entrepreneurs and business owners 
group was around 20% of the villagers in Dongheng village, 10% in Wusi village and 15% in 
Qingyanliu village. Unlike Huaming town where business owners lost their businesses due to 
the expropriation of land and suffered from deteriorating livelihood standards, in the three 
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villages in Zhejiang, business owners had more opportunities to expand their businesses 
after rural redevelopment and enjoyed enhanced livelihoods. Business owners and 
entrepreneurs in the three villages in Zhejiang benefited for five reasons: better access to 
land, improved access to financial instruments, preservation of existing business, emerging 
new business opportunities, and no increase in living expenses. First, the land shareholding 
programme and the village collective management of rural land made it possible for 
business owners in Dongheng village and Wusi village to rent land from the village 
committee and expand their business. Second, business owners in Dongheng village 
benefited from their access to loans after registering the individual rights of the collective 
assets. Third, most of the business owners in Dongheng village and Wusi village could build 
on their existing business. With the reserved individual village boundary, the fish pools and 
businesses built on the farmland were not destroyed, unlike in Huaming town where the 
continuity of business was broken. Therefore, business owners could keep expanding their 
existing business rather than bearing the risk of starting over. Fourth, the business owner 
group benefited from the increasing entrepreneurial opportunities in Qingyanliu, where 
village committees responded to villagers and decentralised certain responsibilities to 
capable villagers.  
Despite the improved access to land and capital for farmers in Dongheng village and Wusi 
village, and the new business opportunities in Qingyanliu village, most of the business 
owners after resettlement were those who had already been running their businesses, or 
who had accumulated urban related skill sets, before resettlement. The fieldwork found 
almost no cases where those with no off farm experience transformed themselves into 
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business owners or urban skilled workers. This shows that the urbanisation of people does 
not necessarily happen just because of the availability of financial resources and 
opportunities. Additionally, similarly to other groups in Dongheng village and Wusi village in 
Zhejiang, business owners and entrepreneurs’ livelihoods were also enhanced because they 
continued to live in the previously rural communities, and did not have to bear the increased 
living expenses of urban communities.  
9.1.3 Comparing the same groups across Tianjin and Zhejiang  
This section compares the same social groups in different modes of state intervention, NSC 
and NRR, and explains how the state’s different approaches to resource redistribution 
mechanisms shape the livelihoods of resettled villagers. The summary in the previous 
section showed that those with urban skill-sets are better off in an NSC approach to state-
led urbanisation, while they are not much affected by the NRR approach. The post-
resettlement livelihoods of the majority group in the state-led urbanisation, those with no or 
only limited off-farm experience, was improved by the NRR approach compared to by the 
NSC approach. Business owners and entrepreneurs’ experience and livelihoods are also 
significantly better in the NRR approach than in the NSC approach. In comparing the role of 
the state, this section focuses in particular on the role of the village committee and 
organisation of local states. In terms of resource redistribution mechanisms, these include 
organisation of the labour market, compensation packages, land shareholding projects, as 
well as their impacts on the formation of new identity and membership. 
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It is not unusual to find social stratification in the same village after redevelopment, such as 
in Huaming where groups with more urban-related skills benefited more than those without. 
However, it is worth paying attention when similar population groups have very different 
experiences under different approaches to state-led urbanisation, as this shows the 
implications of particular forms of intervention for resettled farmers’ livelihoods. Therefore, 
this section focuses on the groups that had the greatest differences in post-resettlement 
livelihood experience. The most interesting group is those with no off-farm experience, 
whose livelihoods deteriorated in the Tianjin case but were enhanced in Zhejiang. As well as 
this group, this section also discusses the business owner group and the group with urban 
skills. By analysing the reasons behind the different experiences of similar population groups 
in different contexts, this section draws out the effects of different modes of state 
intervention on the formation of labour markets, compensation, land related policies and 
identity shaping.  
9.1.3.1 Those with urban skill sets better off in Tianjin 
The livelihood implications for the group with urban skill sets was more positive in Tianjin 
than in Zhejiang. In Tianjin, those with urban skills sets are those who can work for the 
advanced manufacturing companies, banks, government institutions, and so on, who have 
already acquired education and urban work experience before resettlement. In Zhejiang, 
demand is higher for entrepreneurial skills and agricultural-related expertise; this is 
particularly relevant for those who could expand existing businesses or start new businesses, 
but who had lacked the capital to do so before redevelopment. The labour market created in 
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Zhejiang was thus suited to the majority of the villagers including the skilled, those with no 
off-farm experience and business owners, and was more inclusive and closer to the pre-
resettlement background of most villagers. By contrast, in Huaming most entrepreneurs did 
not benefit from the resettlement process, because the conditions for business owners to 
expand or start new businesses were not created. As summarised in 9.1.2, business owners 
in Zhejiang benefited from two factors: first, the increased availability of capital released 
from the collectively owned village land and assets; and second, the newly developed eco-
economy, for example rural-tourism in Wusi village and e-commerce in Qingyanliu village. 
9.1.3.2 Those with no off-farm experience better off in NRR approach 
Those with no off-farm experience had drastically different livelihood experiences with NRR 
and NSC approaches to state-led urbanisation. This group benefited more from the NRR 
than the NSC approach, due to the important role of the village committee in the NRR 
approach, which eliminated livelihood risks and created livelihood sustainability. 
As discussed in the previous section, those with no off-farm experience in Tianjin 
experienced deteriorating livelihoods after resettlement, particularly those in their 40s-50s, 
the elderly, and women. The same group also existed in the villages in Zhejiang, but the 
livelihoods of this group were enhanced compared to before. This section argues that it is 
the different livelihood setting, constructed by the different modes of state intervention 
within the NSC and NRR approaches that generated different synergies with the group, who 
shared a similar type and amount of human capital in farming. The factors that contributed 
to the different implications for livelihoods include the livelihood context, as well as the 
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interaction between human capital and the social context (labour market, land related 
policies and identity shaping) in the different locations. By comparing how the different 
livelihood contexts were formed, this section shows how the village committee reduced the 
livelihood risks and increased the resources for sustainable livelihoods in Zhejiang by taking 
the leading role of initiating, designing, implementing and adjusting policy during the 
resettlement process. By contrast, the failure to eliminate livelihood risks, stresses and 
shocks, as well as to create sustainable livelihood resources for those with no off-farm 
experience in Huaming town under the NSC approach was in large part due to the 
dissolution of the village committees and the implementation of only a top-down 
redevelopment plan.  
9.1.3.3 Rural setting with no increased living expenses  
The living expenses in the new resettlement community and the new income sources 
explain the livelihood experience of those with no off-farm experience in different contexts. 
Compared to Tianjin, the improved livelihood for those with no off-farm experience in 
Zhejiang can be attributed to the following factors: first, unlike in Tianjin, the living cost was 
not increased after rural redevelopment because of the preservation of the rural setting and 
the concentrated household plots of farmland; second, unlike Tianjin, the village committee 
acquired rental income collectively and redistributed it to villagers.  
In terms of the first factor – reduced living expenses in Zhejiang, on account of the preserved 
rural setting and the concentrated plots of farmland – the three villages in Zhejiang had 
different approaches. The Dongheng village committee reserved a concentrated plot of land 
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for the resettled farmers to farm, and this was embedded in the resettlement plan. Before it 
was made available, villagers’ previous farmland was not expropriated and was still available 
to farm, even after villagers moved to the new resettlement community. This forms a sharp 
contrast to the situation in Huaming town where villagers’ farmland was expropriated even 
before they moved into the resettlement community. Although no construction projects 
were ready to be implemented, the land was fenced and abandoned, causing villagers to 
complain that the land was wasted. By reserving a plot of farmland for villagers after 
resettlement, the village committee in Dongheng village not only reduced the amount of 
shock during the transition period in resettlement, it also eliminated livelihood risks of food 
insecurity and reduced psychological stress for villagers in adapting to the new living 
environment.  
Unlike Huaming town and Qingyanliu village, the village boundaries remained the same after 
the NRR approach to state-led urbanisation in both Dongheng and Wusi villages, including 
the administrative boundary, the institutional body (village committee) and the village 
membership. With the preserved village boundary and land, villagers continued to live on 
the plot of land that belonged to the village, together with other villagers who share 
membership of the same village. Resettlement is not the central theme in either of the two 
villages, particularly in Wusi village where there was no resettlement community. In 
Dongheng village, the resettlement community was based on village land where there used 
to be abandoned mines. Both of these villages took a rural-centric approach, which focuses 
on how to maximise the productivity of collectively owned assets. Not only does the 
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administrative boundary remain the same, it is still the village committee which takes the 
leadership role, organising village development.  
The clarification of the collective property rights and the innovative land shareholding 
programme in these villages significantly enhanced the value of village membership by 
binding more dividends generated from collective assets to village membership. This is 
unlike Tianjin, where a sense of community was eroded. The increased financial value of 
village membership further generated a sense of pride in belonging to the village. With the 
preservation of the administrative and institutional boundaries, the collective assets were 
still managed by the village committee, and closed to other interest groups, similar to the 
situation before resettlement. The strengthened village membership secured the 
redistribution of dividends generated from the collective assets to individual farmers. Unlike 
the urban-centric approach, where rapid resettlement left only a very short period for the 
clarification and dissolution of collective ownership rights, the NRR approach focuses on the 
sustainability of collective assets.  
9.1.3.4 Village collective ownership and sustainable asset income 
In Zhejiang, the collectively owned village assets, collective ownership and the village 
committees were preserved because the individual village boundaries were reserved. The 
increased land shareholding income in Zhejiang can be attributed to the existence of the 
village committee and its re-organisation of collectively owned village assets. In Tianjin, by 
contrast, as a result of the NSC model, the village committee was replaced by the new urban 
neighbourhood committee to carry out the resettlement plan, and the individual village 
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boundary was dissolved due to the large-scale urban resettlement plan. This meant that 
collective ownership was transferred into state ownership with the dissolution of the village 
committee.  
In terms of additional asset income created from collective village assets, in Wusi the village 
committee collectively sourced tenants for the rental land planned for economic 
development rather than individuals having to seek their own tenants to rent rooms as in 
Tianjin. This provided a more stable and sustainable income for individual farmers, therefore 
reducing livelihood risks and increasing livelihood sustainability. Similar to Wusi village, in 
Dongheng, the village committee rented out the collectively owned village asset and 
generated sustainable income for villagers. As a collective entity acting on behalf of 
individual villagers, particularly vulnerable groups, the village committee also has more 
bargaining power for resources compared to individual farmers. In contrast to the NSC 
approach where collective assets are decentralised to become privately owned assets, 
granting flexibility to groups with urban skills and leaving groups without urban skills 
unprotected, the NRR approach strengthens the bargaining power of the collective that 
owns the assets. This brings benefits to each villager who has membership of the village and 
redistributes the dividends generated by the collective assets in a more equal manner.  
In short, it is the active role of the village committee and the existence of the village 
committee that reduced the livelihood risks for resettled farmers in villages in Zhejiang. The 
village committee was not preserved in Tianjin because the villages were reclassified as 
urban, so the form of government was shifted to an urban administration, including the 
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replacement of the village committee, and the setting up of the urban neighbourhood 
committee (with significantly reduced governance functions by comparison with the former 
village committees). The dissolution of collective ownership and the decentralisation of 
collective ownership rights to individuals in Huaming significantly compromised the 
negotiation power of the villagers. Unlike previously, where collective ownership rights were 
parallel to the state ownership of land, after being resettled to the urban context farmers 
stand as individuals where their legal negotiating power against other institutional parties is 
vastly reduced. In contrast, village committees in the three villages in Zhejiang negotiated 
favourable conditions for individual farmers as a collective entity with more bargaining 
power. 
Nevertheless, the dissolution of collective property ownership creates increased flexibility 
and liquidity for groups with urban skill-sets, who are not dependent on the income from 
letting out their apartments, to dispose of their assets in a resource-efficient way, which fits 
with their own plans and choices. This also grants them the mobility to move out of the 
resettlement community. The increased flexibility and agency for the group with urban skills, 
and the decreased rights and benefits from negotiation for the group without urban skills, 
further enlarges the income gap between them, as well as the sense of social division. Even 
worse, when the group with urban skills move out of the resettlement community, the 
population left in the community is uniformly characterised by a lack of urban skills and 
experience, which reduces the diversity of the community. Furthermore, this identifies the 
resettlement community as a place where people are “left” rather than a place people 
would choose to live. The result is a loss of agency for those unable to move away. 
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The lack of a village committee in Huaming town state-led urbanisation project generated 
more shock and stress for the resettled farmers. First, the pace of transformation of 
Huaming from several villages of peri-urban Tianjin to a model town of state-led 
urbanisation has been extremely speedy, not only in terms of the transformation of the built 
environment and the industrial cluster, but also the livelihoods of rural residents. The 
relocation of the rural residents, as well as the transition of their productive activities, 
lifestyle and leisure time activities took 2 to 3 years to complete (Ma & He, 2015). The 
transition is multi-faceted, where the built environment is transformed from dispersion to 
concentration, and the industrial layout from agricultural to non-agricultural. The short time 
period of transition created shocks for the resettled farmers, while the inability to find urban 
employment created both financial and psychological stress. Second, the plan that was 
carried out by the new urban neighbourhood committee in Huaming town was a top-down 
approach, implemented without being specifically designed for the village context. It also did 
not resolve the conflicts between the villagers, which left them with no way to provide 
feedback beyond direct confrontational action. Third, although the value of possessed assets 
was increased in Huaming town, after the urban resettlement apartments exchange, most 
villagers were unable to sell them and thus could not benefit from the increased value of 
their assets. 
9.1.3.5 Business owners are better off in NRR than NSC   
Business owners and entrepreneurs benefitted from the new eco-economy and the new 
labour market created in Wusi village by the village committee with the NRR approach, and 
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in Qingyanliu village by the village committee which adapted the NSC approach. Unlike 
Tianijn, where the resettlement project expropriated the land on which the previous 
businesses were built, and generated livelihood risks and stress for the business owners, the 
intervention of the village committees in Zhejiang created more opportunities for business 
owners by responding to suggestions from villagers on the latest business trends, as in 
Qingyanliu village, responding to the market, and providing financing services and 
infrastructure for business owners.  
On the other hand, the rural-centric NRR approach does not worsen the livelihood 
conditions for business owners and entrepreneurs. In Wusi village, which is still based on the 
rural village land with a plot of land to farm for household consumption, the insurance 
function of the land is preserved. Apart from generating sustainable dividends from the 
collectively owned village assets, which leads to proportional redistribution of the collective 
properties, the rural-centric approach also creates employment opportunities for farmers 
who do not possess urban skill-sets. Based in the rural context, enterprises in villages with 
rural-centric approaches often develop agricultural-related businesses, which create wage 
work for farmers whose skills can fit in, for example cutting and binding flowers in the 
greenhouse, laying bricks for the greenhouse, or guiding the tourists. Similar to the case of 
Kaili village, where Kendall (2015) demonstrates that rural villages are using their rural 
images as a strategy to promote their tourism businesses, Wusi village also aimed to attract 
urban and foreign tourists interested in the authentic rural life in China and the essence of 
rusticity. In contrast to Huaming town, where the income gap between groups with and 
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without urban skills is enlarged after resettlement, the rural-centric approach does not 
worsen the livelihood conditions for farmers without urban skills.   
The continued existence of the village committee serves as an informal feedback channel 
where business owners specifically had input into the redevelopment process in the 
Zhejiang model, because of the retention of the village committees. For example, in 
Qingyanliu village, it was the business owner who approached the village committee about 
his idea of development of the e-commerce sector for the village. Furthermore, the village 
committees in Dongheng village and Wusi village also play an important part in the larger 
governance structure, which leaves space for villagers’ autonomy and experimentation. 
Wusi and other villages took the initiative in experimenting with mobilising collective land 
rights; then it appeared in the county level “building harmonious rural home” campaign 
guideline.  
In Qingyanliu village, which is based more on the NSC than the NRR approach, the role of the 
village committee was particularly important. The village committee identified the economic 
development opportunity of e-commerce, with assistance from villagers, and developed 
infrastructures to attract the initial batch of entrepreneurs, which not only brought rental 
income for the villagers but also influenced the young people in the village. The village 
committee in Qingyanliu village was crucial, because it responded to the market when the 
initial resettlement plan failed to generate rental income for the resettled villagers. It was 
the village committee that significantly improved livelihood conditions for the villagers by 
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creating rental income. Without the village committee, the resettled villagers faced 
livelihood risks of landlessness, food security and possible homelessness.  
The co-existence of the village committee and the NSC approach in Qingyanliu village shows 
that, beyond the difference between NSC and NRR approaches, it is the role of village 
governance that is really key to successful development, particularly in the implementation 
of rural development plans. Therefore, it is crucial to consider the preservation of the village 
as an entity. The preservation of the village is inseparable to the organisation of local states 
in Zhejiang, where there is an interactive system where the upper level states (province and 
county) select models from below and the lower level states (village) apply to be chosen by 
the upper levels. The career promotion opportunity for the cadres in the selected model at 
each level reinforces the system and provides motivation for each level of the state. While 
Zhejiang province launched a new cadre evaluation system, Deqing county selected model 
villages. Despite the motivation and competition schemes operating at county level, as the 
socio-economic context and living standard of each village in Deqing county is different, so, 
ultimately, it is the responsibility of the village committee in each village to respond to the 
schemes. While some villages responded at a minimum level by fulfilling the requirement of 
cleaning the living environment and improving living conditions in the village, others went 
further and pushed through the development of an eco-economy in the village. 
In Zhejiang, each level of the local state levels interpreted the policy framework from the 
upper level, rather than directly implementing the provincial level framework at the village 
level. In Zhejiang, the provincial level state developed the provincial level framework of 
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“beautiful Zhejiang” and linked it to economic development; in 2009, Deqing county 
promoted the “building harmonious rural home” campaign (中国和美家园 zhongguo hemei 
jiayuan) as an interpretation of the provincial framework “beautiful Zhejiang”. The 
establishment of the “building harmonious rural home” campaign has produced 10 villages 
as national model villages and 11 as provincial model villages. At village level, Dongheng 
village branded itself as the “best village in Deqing”. Each level of government therefore 
interpreted the policy in terms appropriate for that level. In contrast, Huaming town, at the 
same administrative level as Deqing county, was involved only in an upward competition, 
directly implementing the provincial level campaign, but did not set up a downward 
competition scheme for villages under its jurisdiction, due to the lack of grass-root 
governance units after the dissolution of the village committees.  
The village-led redevelopment, observed in Dongheng village and Wusi village, is not an 
option for every village. This model requires access to resources and management. In terms 
of resources, it includes natural resources and financial funding. For example, development 
of eco-tourism would not be possible if Wusi village was not adjacent to Mogan Mountain, 
and one critical condition for developing the e-commerce industry in Qingyanliu village was 
the existence of the nearby international small commodities trade centre in Yiwu city. In 
contrast, it would be much harder for poorer villages, with less access to natural resources 
or not in the national development area, to repeat the success of village-led development in 
the three villages in Zhejiang, even if their village committees have excellent management 
and business development skills. Therefore, while redevelopment schemes might reduce 
intra-village inequality, they might actually also increase inter-village inequality. 
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9.1.3.6 Stronger rural identity in NRR compared to NSC 
Further to the above comparisons, the formation of different types of labour market, land 
shareholding policies and the layout of the village space also have implications for the 
formation of villagers’ new identity and village membership. In Dongheng and Wusi villages 
in Zhejiang, the redistribution of collective village assets is bonded to village membership, 
which means that only people whose previous hukou was issued by the village are entitled 
to a share of collective village assets. The consolidation of village membership has three 
dimensions, financial, administrative and cultural. The financial dimension concerns the 
preserved collective ownership of the village’s collectively owned assets, which has been 
discussed in section 9.2.2 above; the administrative dimension is about the restructured 
village boundaries, as illustrated in section 9.2.2; and the cultural dimension relates to the 
new identity in the villages.  
In Huaming town, the village membership lost its financial, cultural and social dimensions 
after resettlement. In terms of finance, during the resettlement, villagers obtained 
resettlement apartments through the villages they belonged to. While there is variation in 
terms of the amount of compensation for farmland, due to the relative location of villages to 
the resettlement community, the compensation guideline for villagers was identical, and it 
was the urban neighbourhood committee that matched the rural housing measurement to 
the distribution of new resettlement apartments. After resettlement, villagers do not receive 
any dividends generated by their former villages’ collective assets, and their social welfare 
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also transitions to a new urban resident based standard, albeit less than that of the existing 
urban residents.  
With regard to the social dimension, the reshuffle of villages in the new resettlement 
community and the loss of individual village boundaries indicate the formal loss of previous 
individual village identities. During fieldwork, villagers sometimes identified themselves and 
each other with the name of the new compound they lived in, in addition to that of their 
original village. Villagers thus gained a new aspect of formal identity after resettlement in 
Huaming town, although they very often continued to identify themselves with their original 
village in casual chatting. Villagers also mentioned their original villages to compare the 
compensation packages they each received. For those who were from the same original 
village, identifying themselves with the original village was an attempt to maintain a sense of 
belonging that is challenged by the move to the concentrated resettlement community. The 
original village to which they were attached is a bond that links villagers and what they share 
and have in common, but as these villages no longer exist, villagers’ sense of identity and 
belonging is gradually decreased.  
By contrast, in Zhejiang, the existing rural identity and village membership were 
strengthened. Administratively, as the value associated with village membership increased 
in Dongheng village and Wusi village, the village committees started to tighten the village 
membership criteria, so that membership can only be possessed by hukou with village 
residence, and once members give up their village membership in pursuit of urban hukou 
they cannot regain it afterwards. The increased barrier of the village membership creates a 
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sense of “us” and “them”, awarding members of the village financial dividends not available 
to outsiders, while the one-directional membership scheme decreases the risk of villagers 
leaving. This generates a strong sense of belonging and identity, and strengthens the sense 
of community in the village. Meanwhile, this strong bond and community encourages 
behaviours in line with village norms; therefore, it automatically cultivates an environment 
which promotes better behaviour by the villagers. Of course, at the same time, there is more 
negative impact for the migrants who work in the villages, who face increased barriers to 
integration into the social life of the village, but for the villagers themselves the effects on 
identity seem broadly positive. 
 
9.2 Review of research questions 
This thesis has effectively addressed the research questions that it set out to answer. The 
main question this thesis seeks to answer is: What are the impacts of two different 
approaches to state-led urbanisation on the livelihoods of resettled rural farmers? 
Specifically: first, who are the winners and losers in terms of post-resettlement livelihoods in 
each case study village? Second, what are the factors that affect and shape the post-
resettlement outcomes in each village? Third, what are the drivers that formulate the 
factors and mechanisms affecting resettled villagers’ livelihoods? Fourth, what is the impact 
of the changing pattern of means of living on resettled rural farmers’ perception of their 
social status and the social stratification of their communities?  
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Based on the findings from the four villages, this research shows that the NRR approach is 
better at protecting the most vulnerable groups compared to the dominant state model, the 
NSC approach. The NRR approach benefited those with no off-farm experience and business 
owners the most, while NSC approach benefited the urban skilled workers the most. 
Comparing the two approaches, in the process of increasing the worse-off groups’ access to 
new forms of assets and employment opportunities, the village committee and the 
organisation of the local states in the NRR approach played an important role in mitigating 
conflicts, risks, stresses and shocks, as well as creating sustainable livelihoods by identifying 
industrial development trends. From the observation of Dongheng village, Wusi village and 
Qingyanliu village, the existence of the village committee was vitally important in preserving 
the collective economy, which protects the property rights of farmers, organising productive 
activities collectively on behalf of the individual villagers, and redistributing the collectively 
created value to individual farmers. This reduces the risks of impoverishment for the worse-
off groups, from exposure to economic uncertainties and the imbalance of supply and 
demand in the local housing or labour market. The collective economy redistributes more 
resources through the asset component of livelihoods, and therefore creates a balance 
between the livelihood components that benefits farmers, particularly those with no urban 
skill sets.  
This conclusion is complicated by the Qingyanliu case, where the village practised the NSC 
model but the village committee also played an important role in the development process, 
in responding to suggestions from villagers and developing the e-commerce industry. This 
confirms the importance of preserving village-level institutions and shows that doing so can 
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help even within a NSC approach (even if not as sustainable an approach as in Dongheng 
village and Wusi village). Therefore, a development model which preserves the rural villages, 
regardless of the mode of industrialisation or redevelopment, seems key.  
However, reflecting on the introduction of this thesis, the type of development path the 
Chinese state has planned for next 10-20 years is the NSC approach, the Tianjin model, 
which develops the countryside by moving villagers to cities through large-scale 
resettlement, urbanising the village and villagers. As the findings from this research shows, 
the most vulnerable groups benefit least from the NSC approach. Therefore, important 
questions to consider include how villagers, especially the worse off groups, will adapt. The 
Chinese government is aware of this problem, hence it has emphasised “urbanising” the 
villagers (shiminhua 市民化). However, is “training the villagers to be urban” going to be 
enough given the lack of suitable labour market opportunities?  
At least, the Huaming case shows that it did not work in Tianjin for two reasons. First, those 
with no off-farm experience did not possess the minimum skills, education or experience 
required even to enter many of the training programmes necessary for gaining urban 
employment. Second, although the state-led urbanisation programme created unskilled 
opportunities, for example cleaning and door-guarding, those with no off-farm experience 
were less likely to do the work due in part to their self-perception as superior to migrants, 
and in part to employers’ reluctance to hire them over younger and less costly migrant 
labourers. The result of a lack of additional income sources for those with no off farm 
experience is that they tend to get stuck in the resettlement community; in contrast, those 
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who secure well paid urban work can resettle to commercial apartments in the urban centre 
and move out from the resettlement community. This mode of urbanisation may lead to 
urban ghettoes of resettlement communities deserted by all of the better-off people. 
The Chinese state’s urbanisation plan is still workable. As findings from Qingyanliu village 
suggest, what matters most is not the mode of industrialisation/redevelopment, but, rather, 
it is whether the development model preserves the rural villages and allows for the related 
context-sensitive adaptations of the development plan. It seems that different interactions 
between provincial- and county-level states in governance decision making processes and 
the cadre evaluation system are important for the existence of the village committee, as 
well as cadres’ motivation. This research found that the preservation and empowerment of 
the village committee has a profound impact on protecting collectively owned property 
rights, and thus protecting the deprived villager groups, who do not have urban skill-sets. It 
does so by creating unskilled employment opportunities, and strengthening the collective 
ownership rights. The latter is particularly important, because it creates bargaining power 
and protects the most deprived farmers. When the collectively owned properties are 
decentralised to privately owned assets, bargaining power with other interest groups is lost, 
and thus individual farmers are exposed to the market and state.  
Second, in terms of global issues in development, this research raises questions regarding 
the aims of rural development. Should rural development aim at helping rural people to 
become urban, and urban centres to benefit from the integration of rural surroundings? Or 
should it aim to benefit rural dwellers who remain rural, including the weakest groups, for 
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example poor farmers with no other skills? According to the global development literature 
(Greig et al., 2007), economic development benefits those with the human capital that fits 
the new development, and this is often the already better-off group. The most vulnerable 
groups are supposed to be a target and focus of development programmes, but they are 
often left vulnerable in a development process. The possession of various amounts of 
human capital, including educational background, urban-related skills and work experience, 
and possession of economic assets, including land, housing and cash, enables diverse 
capabilities for different social groups to adapt to the new mechanisms, including in the 
labour market, land market and business environment. Social groups with urban-related 
skills and experience benefit when the resettlement process creates more urban-related 
opportunities. The livelihoods of social groups with few urban-related skills and limited 
experience, by contract, are enhanced when state-led urbanisation projects upgrade the 
agricultural sector and combine it with the service sector, accommodating agricultural work, 
rather than uprooting existing productive activities. Therefore, identifying a mode of 
development which benefits both better-off and more vulnerable groups becomes 
increasingly important, given the fact that the vulnerable group is usually less capable of 
adapting to new trends and protecting themselves.  
 
9.3 Original contributions to scholarship 
As briefly stated in the introduction 1.3, this thesis’s original contribution to scholarship is 
fourfold: empirical literature, conceptual understanding, methodology the theoretical 
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framework. This section provides a more explicit and elaborative summary of the 
contribution.  
First, for the empirical literature, this research has further implications for rural-urban 
studies and for future research focusing on livelihoods in a transitional context. In the 
existing literature, there is limited research on the behaviours of local states and the central 
state, the policy framework, and the funding mechanisms of rural redevelopment in China. 
Most of the existing literature on the role of the state examines either the central state, or 
the upper-level local states, at county and township level, rather than at village level. In the 
rare studies of village level governance units, the existing research focuses on their role in 
democratic elections rather than their role in rural development. In the theoretical debate, 
neither the sustainable rural livelihood framework nor the Development-Induced 
Displacement and Resettlement (DIDR) and Impoverishment, Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) 
models sufficed on their own to address the implications of state intervention for livelihoods 
during the transition of the livelihood context. This thesis expands empirical literature on 
China’s urbanisation process by investigating an important but systematically understudies 
aspect of China’s rapid urbanisation, the implications for livelihoods of displaced farmers 
and the livelihood in transition. This under-researched area is also policy relevance at local, 
national and global scales.   
Second, at conceptual level, this thesis innovatively combines the theoretical insights of the 
sustainable livelihoods framework with the development-induced displacement and 
resettlement, as well as impoverishment, risks and reconstruction models. Linking the 
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empirical findings to theoretical debates, this thesis is the first attempt to combine the 
sustainable rural livelihood frameworks and the displacement frameworks. The sustainable 
rural livelihood framework was particularly useful for analysing villagers during the 
transitional process, while the DIDR and IRR model allowed for a comparison of how two 
different state approaches to urbanisation led to the generation and transition of livelihood 
risks and shocks. When it comes to the role of the state, this thesis particularly considers the 
motivations behind, and implications of, state intervention during state-led urbanisation. 
Furthermore, this study represents the first attempt to apply this mutually complementary 
and sophisticated framework to analysing the specificities and complexities of China’s rural 
and urban development contexts, as well as the interplay of multiple social dynamics related 
to livelihood sustainability and security of the resettled villagers. This not only expands the 
scope for discussion on urbanisation in China, but also the global development process.  
Third, methodologically this thesis innovatively formulates a comparative case study method 
comparing and contrasting, as well as identifying commonalities and differences, strengths 
and weaknesses of two major urbanisation-driven development paradigms, i.e. the “Building 
the New Socialist Countryside” programme (termed as the “urban-integration approach”), 
and the “New Rural Reconstruction” initiative (termed as the “rural indigenous development 
approach”) through protracted in-depth ethnographic field studies conducted in North and 
Southeast China (Tianjin and Zhejiang). The comparison between two development modes 
unveils the linkage between governance and individuals’ livelihoods.  
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The answers to the research questions of this thesis are also relate to much broader 
questions about the nature of development in general, in terms of whether the state should 
aim to benefit specifically the weakest social groups, for example poor farmers with no 
other skills, or if they should aim more generally at enhancing the economic development of 
the target area. 
Fourth, with regard to the theoretical literature, the implications include those for the 
livelihood framework and for development studies. This research broadens the theoretical 
framework by incorporating an overlooked dimension of governance through investigating 
the role of the local state, in particular the village council, in policy implementation, 
adaptation to local conditions and its dealings with other actors below (e.g. villagers) and 
above (e.g. upper-level authorities) in the process of displacement, resettlement, 
negotiations, rural/urban change and transformations. As the literature review chapter 
shows, Ahlers & Schubert (2009) argue that NSC has been effective in achieving its main goal 
of improving rural incomes, reducing the rural population and transforming the countryside. 
They attribute the success to the high level of coordination between policy planning and 
implementation, but there is also a debate over the role of different levels of local states 
during implementation, including the county level (Ahlers & Schubert, 2009), municipal level 
(Ong, 2014), and the village level (Wang, 2009). The thesis argues that on the one hand, the 
incentive structure of the governance system has played a central role in reorganising and 
reallocating rural resources (the NSC model), while on the other, allowing space and capacity 
for village initiatives, led by the village committee, is crucial for the success of the rural 
development programme (the NRR model). 
 372 
9.4 Limitation of the research and future lines of enquiry 
There are three key types of limitations in this research, including generalisation, reliability 
and inaccuracy, as well as scope and time limitations. First, this research is not generalisable 
nor transferable to other parts of China let alone other parts of the world. The main reason 
is that there is huge variation in methods of state-led urbanisation and I did not see other 
parts even of Tianjin and Zhejiang, where there may be differences, let alone other 
provinces.  
Second, in terms of reliability and inaccuracy, despite my best efforts, there is scope for me 
to have been given misinformation by informants: officials wanted to impress me, while 
villagers were used to having to follow a “script”. This is especially likely to have been a 
problem in Dongheng village, where I was introduced by the village committee to start with, 
since committee members might have introduced me to the villagers who were the most 
satisfied with the rural development process and avoided villagers who perceived that the 
standard of their livelihood decreased after resettlement. Some villagers also saw my 
interviews as a chance to raise grievances with the hope of my research would reflect their 
dissatisfactions and what they perceive as unfairness to the government. Moreover, people 
in general are often inaccurate about sensitive topics due to the worry of censorship and 
other political concerns, which is especially true in China.  
The third aspect of limitation of this research concerns the scope and time limitation of the 
research. Especially in Wusi village and Qingyanliu village, as my visits were briefer, it was 
difficult to understand fully complex case studies in a short time as an outsider. Therefore I 
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would expect that there are features of the NRR approach to state-led urbanisation that are 
not captured.  
However, despite the limitations, this research remains of value, which is reflected in three 
aspects. First, this research highlights different impacts between NRR and NSC approaches 
to state-led urbanisation, which may have relevance for policy development across China, 
despite broader non-generalisability. Considering the number of farmers involved in the 
rural redevelopment process, the study of their post-resettlement is valuable. Second, the 
value of this research also lies in the key mechanisms identified in the implementation of the 
state-led urbanisation, for example the important role of the village committee in planning, 
implementing and adapting the rural development plans based on the context of specific 
village, which has been overlooked in other research. The third aspect of value of this 
research lies in the focus group, resettled farmers, who are often neglected in studies of 
China’s urbanisation, where most studies focus on rural migrants who participate in 
voluntary migration and have the ability to join in the urban labour market. 
Moving on to the future lines of enquiry, a first question raised by this research concerns the 
theoretical literature on the sustainable rural livelihood framework, displacement and 
development globally, as well as rural development in China. As demonstrated in the 
literature review, the livelihoods framework has not been applied to the Chinese state-led 
urbanisation process. More importantly, although the framework embeds context in its 
analysis, it does not address the transition of contexts, not to mention the role of 
governance intervention in shaping the relevant context, institutional mechanisms and 
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livelihood components. My research uses the sustainable livelihood framework in 
combination with the displacement frameworks to solve these issues. The DIDR (and IRR) 
frameworks focus on the context of the case study, particularly the role of the state, while 
the livelihood framework examines the displacees’ livelihoods. By bringing the two 
frameworks together, my research addresses the insufficient understanding of the 
relationship between state intervention and the individuals’ and households’ livelihood. My 
research also enriches the DIDR and IRR frameworks for understanding state-led 
urbanisation cases, because they have previously been used in the Chinese context only to 
analyse processes led by dam construction, rather than the much more widespread state-led 
urbanisation project.   
Furthermore, the NRR approach to rural development processes has only weakly theorised 
the role of the village committee, and thus left a vacuum in our understanding of the 
livelihoods of resettled villagers. In my research, it is the village committee that resolves 
conflicts over overlapping farmland, calculates the size of the compensable farmland, comes 
up with redevelopment plans based on the socio-economic context of the village, and 
coordinates with the upper level local states. Therefore, a key implication for future 
research is that the combination of the sustainable rural livelihood framework and 
displacement frameworks could help identify the specific part of the governance structure, 
as well as the set of risks, stresses and shocks that are particularly important to the 
displacees, which is useful in adjusting state intervention and policy design.  
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With regard to the NRR approach to the state-led urbanisation process, this research raises 
more specific questions. Given the wide range of varieties of rural villages in China, including 
their socio-economic foundations, development demands and position in the national and 
regional development agenda (for example, the sharp difference in development priority of 
villages located in the eastern coast and in the western-central region), my case studies only 
scratch the surface of variations that exist across the villages. The comparison between 
other case studies of both NRR and NSC approaches in a broader range would reveal more 
dimensions and functions of the important role of the village committee, as well as exploring 
the deeper relations of market mechanisms and resettled villagers’ livelihoods. 
The case studies in this research are clear examples of the NSC and NRR approaches for two 
reasons. First, to construct a comparative case study, I selected villages for NSC and NRR 
approaches that are both based on the eastern coast of China, and similar to each other in 
terms of gross domestic productivity (GDP) per capita and the size of the village. Second, 
most of my case studies are model villages, either at national, provincial or county level. 
Compared to non-model villages, the selected villages in my research attracted both more 
financial and intellectual resources from the upper level states. In villages where resources 
are scarcer, the village committee might not have the space or flexibility to implement their 
plans; especially in villages where the natural resources are scarce, it could be increasingly 
difficult to upgrade an agricultural economy to an ecological and service-based economy. 
Also, the competition between villagers in obtaining redistributed resources could be fiercer, 
which leads to intensified collective action and violent interaction with local states.  
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Another question raised by this research concerns how identity-formation occurs in villages 
where villagers believe that they are better off than their urban counterparts. What does 
the identity of “rural” mean for them now? Does the rural identity imply rural 
entrepreneurship, rather than farming? Which aspects of the rural identity do they tend to 
associate themselves with, given the gradual elimination of the economic and social welfare 
difference between rural and urban identities?  
This leads on to a final possible line of future enquiry, to observe the interaction of the local 
villagers and the newcomers to each village and the role of the village committee in shaping 
the new rural identity and reforming village membership. Particularly, it would be 
worthwhile to analyse the mechanisms and institutions the village committee uses to shape 
the village identity, including financial incentives, model household tactics, cultural 
mechanisms, and new discourses. Analysing these institutions from the perspective of the 
village would reveal a great deal about how the village collectively reaches consensus on 
identity, the evolution of rural identity and the consequent changing relationship of the 
rural-urban psychological gap. Studying the consensus reaching and decision making 
processes in the village could also help us to understand the potential democratic 
development process in China.  
In summary, my research has laid the groundwork for future studies in three aspects: first, 
on the theoretical literature on displacement and development globally, as well as rural 
development in China; second, on the identity formation process in the rural area where 
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development has occurred; third, on the role of the village committee in shaping the new 
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Appendix 1: Interview Question Guide 
 
Resettled Villagers Interview Topic Guide 
Interview Code:  
Date of Interview: 
Place of Interview: 
A. Basic Information of participants  ..................................................................... 2 
B. Employment situation  ..................................................................................... 2 
  B1. Basic employment information ....................................................................................... 2 
  B2. Questions for current wage earners ................................................................................ 4 
  B3. Questions for current self-employed resettled peasants  .............................................. 4 
  B4. Questions for those who do not work at all currently  .................................................. 5 
  B5. Questions for migrants  .................................................................................................. 5 
C. Resettlement and compensation  ..................................................................... 6 
D. Lifestyle and psychological perspective  ............................................................ 6 
E. Social status and perception  ............................................................................ 8 
F. Ending Question  .............................................................................................. 8 
 











5 Hukou status   
6 Education Level   
7 Family Background   
8 Location of the residence   
9 Number of household members migrates to work   
 
B. Employment situation 






1. Job title   
2. Industry of the job   
3. What do you do during the job?   
4. Any contract has been signed? 
 
  
5. How did you get the previous/current job?   




7. How many days per week on average do you work at 
previous/current job? (Days/week) 
  
8. How many hours per day on average do you work at 
previous/current job? (Days/week) 
  
9. What is your work schedule like?   
10. Are you actively looking for another job? If so, why?   
11. Have you taken part in any activities of labour union?   
12. Are you a member of the village committee/urban 
neighborhood committee? 
  
13. If say yes in the above question: do you see your 
membership is a privilege? In what way? 
  
14. Who will you be most likely to ask for help in your live or 
work if you are treated unfair? 
  
15. What is your household monthly income?   
16. What are your household monthly expenses?    
17. What is your income level comparing to the average of 
this community? City? 
  
18. Are you receiving of local Dibao (minimum living 
standards), how much? 
  
19. What are the procedures for you to receive local Dibao?   
20. Are you also receiving any other benefits?   
 
B2 Questions for current wage earners 
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1. Does your company provide catering? 
2. What type of salary or wage is your current primary non-farm job? 
3. Do you have other income sources other than your current job? 
4. What is the percentage of rent collecting in the composition of your monthly household 
income? 
5. Do you feel your current job challenging? 
6. Would you prefer doing the current job rather than the previous one? 
7. Did you receive any training after resettlement? 
8. Can you describe the job you are looking for? 
9. What limits you from achieving the desired job? 
10. What kind of training you think would be helpful? 
11. Have you ever think of running your own business? 
12. What mainly stops you from establishing your own business? 
13. What is the impact of resettlement on your career path?  
 
B3 Questions for current self-employed resettled peasants 
1. How many people do you hire (excluding household members)? 
2. What is the main reason for you to engage in self-employed business? 
3. How much did you invest in the business when you started it? 
4. How much did you borrow? (including from bank, credit unions or from friends and 
family members) 
5. What was your primary job before operating this business? 
6. What is the impact of resettlement on your business? 
7. Do you have other income sources other than your current job? 
8. What is the percentage of rent collecting in the composition of your monthly household 
income? 
9. Did you receive any training after resettlement? 
10. What kind of training would you like to attend? 
11. What is the impact of resettlement on your career path? positive or negative? 
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B4 Questions for those who do not work at all currently 
1. What do you live on? 
2. Have you ever worked before? 
3. When did you leave your last job? 
4. What do you do while not working? 
5. Have you been actively looking for a job? 
6. If there were a job suitable for you, would you be able to work in two weeks? 
7. What’s the main reason for not being able to work? 
 
B5 Questions for migrants  
1. How much is the monthly fee for renting a one bedroom flat in this community? 
2. Generally speaking, how much is the approximate monthly living expenses (including 
accommodation expenses) of an individual/ a couple in this community/village? 
3. How far is the factory you work for? 
4. Why do you choose to live here? 
5. Who is paying for your current accommodation? 
6. How is your relationship with the landlord? 
7. How is your relationship with local residents? 
8. How is your relationship with resettled peasants? 
9. What do you think their attitudes toward you? 
10. Can you give some examples? 
11. Have you been back to your home village for longer than 3 months after migrating to the 
city to work? 
12. If say yes in the above question: What was the reason for the last time you spent longer 
than 3 months in your home village after work in the rural area? 
13. If you were still in your home village, how much do you estimate you could earn per 
month? (Yuan/Month) 
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14. How many times did you lose your job in the last 12 months? 
 
C. Resettlement and compensation 
1. What is the compensation package you received? 
2. What is the compensation package you were informed before resettlement? 
3. How do you access to your compensation package? 
4. Which part of the compensation package you find the most useful? the least useful? 
5. Are you satisfied with the way you are compensated?  
6. How many properties you get from the resettlement process? 
7. How did you get them? 
8. How are you using the properties you get from the resettlement? 
9. How do you feel about the resettlement process? 
10. Do you feel your life is easier or harder after resettlement?  
11. What is the biggest change before and after the resettlement process? 
12. Is there any petition or collective actions in the village? 
13. Has the changes on hukou status affected you? 
 
D. Lifestyle and psychological perspective 
1. Can you describe your daily routine? 
a) Before resettlement 
b) After resettlement 
2. What is the big change in your daily routine? 
3. Do you have more spare time after resettlement? 
4. How do you arrange your spare time? 
a) Before resettlement 
b) After resettlement 
5. Do you prefer the current lifestyle or the previous one? 
6. What is your relationship with neighbours? 
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a) Before resettlement 
b) After resettlement 
7. Please describe your situation 
 Before resettlement After resettlement 
Do you think you are respected 
by the society 
  
Do you think people around do 
not care about you? 
  
Do you think people around are 
trustworthy? 
  
Are there people around that 
you do not trust? 
  
 





8.1 Do you sleep well? If say no, why not   
8.2 Do you always see things positively?   
8.3 Are you mentally under pressure?   
8.4 Do you think the daily life is interesting?   
8.5 Are you always down or depressed?   
8.6 How do you describe your own value   










1 How would you describe yourself in terms of social 
status? 
  
2 Do you see yourself as an urban or rural person?   
3 Do you see yourself as farmer or worker or 
entrepreneur or landlord? 
  
4 How do you see your social position in the Chinese 
society as a whole? 
  
5. In the past 12 months, how many serious 
crimes/illegal acts were committed in this 
community/village?  
  




F. Ending Question 
1. How likely is it that you will move out in the next 12 months? 
2. Do you know your new address? 
a) Yes (Please tell us your new address) 
Post Code __________ Province__________City ___________________________ 
(Street Name and Number) Telephone_____________ / ___________________ 
b) No, don’t know now. 
3. When do you expect to move to this new address? Within ____________ months 
4. Why are you moving out? 
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5. Would you please provide us three contact persons with their details so that we may be 
able to keep in touch with you? 
￼ 
 First person Second person Third person 
Name    
Relation    
Province    
City    
Street Number    
Mobile phone    
 
End of Interview 
Thanks for your cooperation! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
